

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

Israeli West Bank Barrier: Its Construction, Consequences and Efficiency

BACHELOR THESIS

Bratislava, April 2013

Ivana Sopóciová

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

Israeli West Bank Barrier: Its Construction, Consequences and Efficiency

BACHELOR THESIS

Undergraduate study program: liberal arts

Field of study: 3.1.6 Political Science

Thesis Advisor: Ing. Ziv Barak Bilaus

Towards academic degree: Bachelor of Science (Bc.)

Submitted on: 30.4.2013

Date of defense: 13.6.2013

Bratislava, 2013

Ivana Sopóciová

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that the bachelor thesis was entirely my own work, with the help of my bachelor advisor and I have identified sources and citations that have been used in the text properly. All the sources that have been used can be found in Bibliography, which is attached, at the end of this work.

Bratislava, 30.4. 2013

Signature

Acknowledgement

First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Ziv Barak Bilaus for his patience, support and help with working on my bachelor thesis. Thank you so much for your advices and comments that helped this thesis to be what it is now.

Furthermore I would like to thank my family, which is always source of emotional support for me and which made very good conditions for me during my whole studies and writing bachelor thesis.

Sopóciová: Israeli West Bank Barrier

Author of the thesis: Ivana Sopóciová

Title: Israeli West Bank Barrier: Its Construction, Consequences and Efficiency

Name of University: Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

Consultant: Ing. Ziv Barak Bilaus

Head of the Defense Committee: Samuel Abrahám, PhD.

Defense Committee: Samuel Abrahám, PhD., prof. František Novosád, Mgr. Dagmar

Kusá, PhD., Matthew Post, MA, prof. Silvia Miháliková

Place, year, number of pages: Bratislava, 2013, 39

Academic degree: Bachelor (Bc.)

Key Words: : terrorism, ethnic conflict, Israeli West Bank Barrier, the Judea, peace-talks, Zionism, Second intifada

Abstract

This study is an attempt to figure out why the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is ongoing for decades and what efforts have been done in last two decades to stop it. Who has the legitimate right to occupy the area of the Judea, today's Israel?

This thesis is based on the presumption that both nations, Israeli and Palestinian, have right to occupy the area of Judea in some sense, but they are not able to agree who will take power in the hands or how they will share the land. One of significant solutions that have been adopted for the sake of peace is Israeli West Bank Barrier, which is used as a fence to protect Israelis from constant attacks done by Palestinians. Is such a wall an efficient solution for both nations, and is it solving the real problem?

In the first part of my bachelor thesis I would like to focus on historical and religious background of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The main aim in the first part is to explain crucial concepts such as terrorism, Zionism, ethnic identity for the purpose of further examination in this study. The thesis also examines peace talks, which have been done in order to maintain peace in the region during last two decades and also compare different attitudes of Palestinian and Israeli leaders towards the conflict during its history. The

main focus of this study is Israeli West Bank Barrier and its real influence on the situation within the region and relationship between Israel and Palestinian representatives. Thesis also deals with economic and social consequences of West Bank Barrier.

In conclusion the thesis argues that people of both nations are not in favor of conflict anymore, but they are not willing to end up conflict at the expense of losing power and control over territory which both sides claim as theirs. Willingness of Israeli and Palestinian leaders during last two decades to accept some restrictions and concessions for the sake of adoption peace agreement also differs, and therefore it is difficult to come to a favorable conclusion for both nations. West Bank Barrier, at the time of construction seemed as the only, least radical solution, which will have favorable impact on both sides. Is the barrier considered the same way even today?

Autor bakalárskej práce: Ivana Sopóciová

Názov práce: Izraelská bezpečnostná bariéra na západnom brehu Jordánu: výstavba, dôsledky a účinnosť

Názov vysokej školy: Bratislavská medzinárodná škola liberálnych štúdií

Meno školiteľa: Ing. Ziv Barak Bilaus

Vedúci komisie pre obhajoby: Samuel Abrahám, PhD.

Komisia pre obhajoby: Samuel Abrahám, PhD., prof. František Novosád, Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD., Matthew Post, MA, prof. Silvia Miháliková

Miesto, rok, rozsah práce: Bratislava, 2013, 39

Stupeň odbornej kvalifikácie: Bakalár (Bc.)

Kľúčové slová: terorizmus, etnický konflikt, bariéra pozdĺž západného brehu Jordánu, Judea, mierové dohody, Zionizmus, Intifáda Al- aksá

Abstrakt

Táto práca sa snaží zistiť alebo objasniť prečo izraelsko- palestínsky konflikt pretrváva už niekoľko desaťročí, a aká snaha bola vynaložená oboma stranami za posledné dve desaťročia na to, aby tento konflikt zastavili. Kto má právo nárokovať si na legitimitu moci na území Judej, čiže dnešného Izraela?

Táto téza je založená na predpoklade, že oba národy, Izraelský aj Palestínsky majú právo do určitej miery okupovať územie dnešného Izraela, ale nie sú schopní dohodnúť sa, kto bude mať legitimitu moci vo svojich rukách. Jedným z vyznámnych riešení, ktoré boli prijaté za cieľom dosiahnutia mieru bola aj výstavba bariéry, pozdĺž západného brehu Jordánu. Táto bariéra bola postavená za účelom ochrany Izraelského ľudu proti neustálym samovražedným útokom, ktoré boli páchané Palestínčanmi. Je takéto riešenie naozaj efektívne a rieši skutočnú podstatu problému?

V prvej časti sa práca zameriava na historické a náboženské pozadie Izraelsko-Palestínskeho konfliktu. Hlavným cieľom v úvode a prvej kapitole tejto práce je objasniť a vysvetliť kľúčové pojmy ako sú terorizmus, Zionizmus a etnická identita. Bakalárska práca sa tiež zaoberá mierovými dohodami, ktoré boli podpísané medzi Izraelom

a Palestínou z dôvodu zachovania mieru a určenia hraníc medzi oboma územiami za posledných 20 rokov. Čitateľa táto práca oboznámi taktiež s rôznymi postojmi Izraelských a Palestínskych najvyšších vládnych predstaviteľov k riešeniu konfliktu počas posledných dvoch dekád. „Ohniskom“ tejto práce, však naďalej ostáva bariéra na západnom brehu Jordánu a jej vplyv na vzťahy medzi Izraelom a zástupcami Palestínskej samosprávy. Práca sa tiež zameriava na ekonomické a sociálne dôsledky bariéry.

Predbežné výsledky tejto bakalárskej práce sú, že oba národy by radi tento dlhotrvajúci konflikt ukončili, nie však za cenu straty moci na území, ktoré si obe strany nárokojú za svoje. Ochota Izraelských a Palestínskych predstaviteľov v posledných dvoch desaťročiach prijať obmedzenia a možno aj ústupky v prospech vyriešenia konfliktu sa líši, či už na jednej alebo druhej strane, a preto bolo a stále je veľmi obtiažne dospieť k spoločnému záveru, ktorý by bol vyhovujúci a prospešný pre obe strany. Bariéra na západnom brehu Jordánu sa v čase výstavby zdala ako jediné, najmenej radikálne riešenie, ktoré bude mať v konečnom dôsledku blahodárny dopad na obe strany. Je za také považované aj dnes?

Table of Contents

Declaration of originality.....	iii
Acknowledgement.....	iv
Abstract.....	v
Abstrakt.....	vii
Introduction.....	10
Chapter 1: Development of borders of Israel during history.....	13
Chapter 2: Israel's construction of the West Bank Barrier.....	20
Chapter 3: Effectiveness and consequences of the West Bank Barrier.....	29
Chapter 4: Conclusion.....	33
Resumé.....	36
References.....	38

INTRODUCTION

"I believe that in the long run, separation between Israel and the Palestinians is the best solution for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

(Yitzhak Rabin)

The end of World War II., almost everybody feels released and hopes for better future. However, there is still one, probably the most crucial refugee population remaining without its own land. The Jewish, who have been one of the most suffering people in the World War II., the people who have no economic, no social, but religious problem. By religious problem one should imagine that religion was on the one hand the only thing that united survivors, but on the other hand it was the major cause of suffering of the Jewish refugees. The other existing problem is the problem of a homeland for Jewish people, who have remained without a state. In 1948 was the Jewish state established. At midnight on May 14, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel proclaimed the new State of Israel. On that same date the United States, in the person of President Truman, recognized the provisional Jewish government as authority of the new Jewish. One day later, on May 15, 1948, the Arab states issued their response statement and Arab armies invaded Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war began (Bard, 2010).

Jewish people have realized long time before the war, the necessity of establishment of their own state and therefore the World War II., meant only last drop for them to take step forward. They could not feel safety anymore in any part of the world and their desire for their own state became stronger and stronger. Theodor Herzl, father of political Zionism and the visionary of the Jewish state, who lived at the end of nineteenth century, has confided to his diary:” At Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it” (Patai, 1960). Well, Theodor Herzl was right.

For the sake of objective view on the historical situation, I have to mention the fact that Zionists were aware very well of the existence of Arab population in Palestine and the possibility of resistance from their side. However, Herzl approached many world leaders and influential magnates for help in promoting his project of establishment of the Jewish State. Theodor Herzl died some decades before establishment of Israel, but his dream

came true, which did not mean only new state for all Jewish people, but also never-ending struggles with Palestinians, who had to leave or share the land, they occupied for many years, with Jewish people.

Immediately, after the declaration of independence of Israel, the new state had to face a war with the Arab population in Israel and other Arab countries. Armed struggles for the destruction of the Jewish state began because all the Arab countries around the Israel refused to recognize the right of new Israeli state to exist. Further there were also other significant wars, such as Sinai War, Six- Day War and Yom Kipur War. I consider it important to mention the fact that in all of those wars were active also other countries, so Israel and Palestine is not longer only a domestic issue, but became an international one.

Are there any possible solutions for Israeli- Palestinian conflict or is peace just a nice dream of both nations?

Well, one might think that as long as Benjamin Netanyahu will be in the office, peace in the region will not be achievable. As he said by himself in his book, which is called *A place among the nations* "...to subdivide this land into two unstable insecure nations, to try to defend what is indefensible, is to invite disaster. Carving Judea and Samaria out of Israel means carving up Israel." Netanyahu has never been too friendly towards Arabs and has never spoke in a very positive way about them, their history or their culture, according to Avi Shlaim. Benjamin Netanyahu has been in office twice. Once he was defeated by Ehud Barak and for Israelis and Palestinians it meant "the sunrise after the three dark and terrible years during which Israel had been led by the unreconstructed proponents of the iron wall", as it is written in the book *The Iron Wall*, by Avi Shlaim. I am not sure whether such a statement is right because Netanyahu, as well as all other high representatives of Israel, was willing to negotiate with Palestinians. It might be true that he was not willing to give up as much as other Prime Ministers were or that he was not very friendly, but he never said no, when it came to negotiations with Palestinians. Ehud Barak was willing to cross his "red lines" and make a compromise, including the rights of Palestinian refugees, the relinquishing of settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and sharing of sovereignty over Jerusalem, which is no longer a sacred symbol but the subject of hard bargaining. Despite all that, and despite fact that some partial ceasefire has been adopted, we still could not consider situation as an absolute peaceful one.

One of the latest solutions, against Palestinians suicide bombers, was construction of the barrier. While Israelis consider this barrier as a fence against attacks from Palestinians, the other side sees this wall as a land- grab attempt. On the one hand I understand Israel and its decision to defend its people, but on the other hand we have to take in consideration fact that many Palestinians have nothing to do with terrorist attacks against Israel and they suffer anyway. I am afraid that despite that fact, there was no other way how Israelis could prevent terrorist attacks, when we take in account that there have been even several efforts done by Palestinians representatives to prevent terrorism within the area, but they have been successful on a low level.

In my thesis I want to find out whether construction of barrier, which should separate Israel and Palestine is a long lasting and efficient solution against violent attacks and terrorism done by Palestinians or if it is only hiding problems. Do Jewish people have as the only ones right to occupy territory of current Israel or should they also accept the right of Palestinian Arabs? If both nations will just keep referring to their history, so both of them have right to stay in the territory, even though Jews were the first, present at the area. However they were compelled to leave their land and have assimilated themselves into various other cultures, mainly after the Roman conquer of Judea. Later on Arabs made their settlements in the region and naturally did not agree with return of Jews, which was the most significant after World War II. I am not defending Israeli policy towards Palestine but one has to admit or accept the fact that Jewish had to unite themselves for the purpose of their security and protection and establish their own state. Unlike other nations in the world, "Israel is the very embodiment of Jewish continuity: It is the only nation on earth that inhabits the same land, bears the same name, speaks the same language, and worships the same God that it did 3,000 years ago. You dig the soil and you find pottery from Davidic times, coins from Bar Kokhba and 2,000-year-old scrolls written in a script remarkably like the one that today advertises ice cream at the corner candy store"(Hanukoglu, 1996).

My thesis will examines historical background of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and its consequences on both sides; it will also include comparison of solutions and attitudes adopted by different political leaders in Israel and Palestine; desires of both nations and assumptions for an absolute ceasefire. I would like to take a look at the diplomatic sphere within the world and its impact on Israel and Palestine.

CHAPTER 1: Development of Borders of Israel during history

In the first Chapter I will focus on the borders of Israel today and what steps have to been done on the way of establishing them. Even though, Israel turns 65 this year, not all of its spacial limits are agreed. There are only two agreed and recognized international boundary lines with Egypt and Jordan, which have been set out in Peace Treaties. The border between Israel and Egypt was established in a Peace Treaty on 26 March, 1979 and the boundary between Israel and Jordan was established in a Peace Treaty on 26 October, 1994 (Srebro, 2012). According to Haim Srebro, who is an Israeli engineer of geodesy and mapping, it is important to mention that these boundaries were not comprehensive and left certain border issues opened. For instance, maritime boundary between Israel and Egypt has not yet been established and also the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt is still not certainly clear. In the case of Jordan, there are also some unresolved areas still remaining. The southern point of a maritime boundary between Israel and Jordan in the Gulf of Eilat has not yet been determined, even though the other parts have been established. However, this southern point is common to Israel, Jordan and Egypt and will be determined only after Israel and Egypt conclude their bilateral negotiations on the delimitation of the territorial sea in the Gulf of Eilat (Srebro, 2012). One might consider it interesting that the boundary line between Jordan and Israel is affected by the natural changes in the course of the rivers, which form border, and the boundary line shall follow them as it is written in the book of Haim Srebro. The current boundary line between Israel and Syria is a military line, which has been agreed after the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria on 31 May, 1974, to which the UN is a signatory. According to Srebro, this boundary line is well-established and stable, but still temporary. A permanent international boundary line between two states will be determined in a future permanent agreement. The present delimitation between Israel and Lebanon was established by the UN in 2000 for the purpose of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and since then, has been line commonly referred to as the "Blue Line" (Srebro, 2012). The "Blue Line" is based upon international boundary agreed upon between Great Britain and France in 1923 during the British Mandate. The course of the "Blue Line" matches the delimitation indicated for the Golan Heights in Israel's law regarding the application of law in the area. It is most probable that this line in this section will be finally fixed only after the determination of the permanent boundary between Israel and Syria as Srebro claims.



Source: <http://middleeast.about.com/od/thisdayinmideasthistory/ig/March-11-in-Mideast-History/South-Lebanon-map.htm>


The most complicated situation is between Israel and Palestine. Historically, there was no state on the Palestinian side and the present temporary delimitation lines are based on the Oslo Agreements and on Israel’s activities, including its complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 (disengagement plan) (Srebro, 2012). There is no agreement between Israel and Palestinians regarding permanent borders. The current lines that divide Israel and Palestine are only temporary. In the Oslo agreement, it was decided that the borders will be determined by agreement and discussions between the parties around the negotiating table. However, there have been several other agreements, which determine temporary borders.

Since 1993 have been several agreements between Israel and Palestinians signed, but not all of them worked as well, as it was expected. In September 1993, was in Washington signed by Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, witnessed by the US and USSR, the Declaration of Principles, which is considered as the “first Oslo accord”. According to the Declaration of Principles should both sides exercise their political rights, put an end to the never- ending conflict and live in a peaceful coexistence. This Declaration also gave a beginning to withdrawing Israeli control from Jericho and Gaza, and also save movement of people and vehicles between those two areas (Srebro, 2012).

The next agreement that has been adopted right after the Declaration of Principle was the Gaza and Jericho Agreement. This agreement was signed on 4 May, 1994 in Cairo by Yitzak Rabin and Yassir Arafat, witnessed by the USA, Russian foreign minister and President of Egypt. By this agreement were established the responsibilities and rights of the Palestinian self- government, settlement and security areas for Israel and safe passage routes between the Jericho area and Gaza Strip. The agreement also established an area for Palestinian maritime activities (Srebro, 2012).

In the Interim Agreement, which has been signed in 1995 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres Mahmoud Abbas and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, has Israel and Palestine agreed upon West Bank and Gaza Strip borders. Witnesses of the agreement were the US, Russian, EU, Norway, Egypt and Jordan. According to the Interim Agreement the area of Judea, Samaria (“West Bank”) and the Gaza Strip were considered as the one unit that has been divided into three zones A, B and C. In the area A, which can be seen as a brown colored, the Palestinians were granted authority over civilian and security matters. In the area B, which is indicated on the map on the next page, in a yellow color, authority over civilians matters should remain in the hands of Palestinians, while the authority over security matters should retain in the hands of Israel. When it comes to the area C, of which borders were not indicated, the full control over civilian and security matters should retain under Israel’s authority, according to Srebro.). It is important to stress that the majority of the Palestinian population live in the area A and B, while the area C is only thinly populated by them. The other matters of the Interim Agreement were also Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders, water, etc.

An example of a map showing areas A and B in the Interim Agreement



213

Source: Haim Srebro, *The boundaries of Israel today*. Survey of Israel. p. 213

Another, remarkable agreement was signed on 17 January, 1997 by Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Shomron and by Saeb Erakat on the behalf of PLO, which is called the Hebron

Protocol. The Hebron Protocol deals with the responsibilities of Israelis and Palestinians over city Hebron and it also specifies security arrangements and placements of Palestinian police stations (Srebro, 2012).

On 4 September, 1999 was adopted Sharm el- Sheik Memorandum, which was signed Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat. The witnesses were the US, Egypt and Jordan. The Memorandum was invented for the sake of solving problems from the Interim Agreement and solution of the permanent borders between Israel and Palestine. Three staged of redeployment were established as well as arrangements regarding safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the port of Gaza. Stages of redeployment in the Sharm el- Sheik Memorandum included that 7% of Area C was to be transferred to Area B, 2% of Area B was to be transferred to area A, 1% of Area C was to be transferred to Area A and 5.1% of Area B was to be transferred to Area A as it is written in the book, *The boundaries of Israel today*.

As the most important agreement that could possibly end up Israeli- Palestinian conflict seemed to be the Oslo Accord, which is very well described in the book *Israel and the Palestinians: The Prospect for two-state solution*, by Jim Zanotti, who is an analyst in the Middle Eastern Affairs. At the time of the 1993 Oslo Accord was considered as a possible solution for both sites, which was supported by the fact that the Cold War had ended and that significant influence within the region was in hands of the U.S. According to Zanotti United States were considered as a stabilizing factor due to fact that they defeated Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The PLO and Jordan wanted to rehabilitate their images within the world and region from the time as they both were supporting Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Yitzak Rabin and Bill Clinton, both elected to power in 1992 showed a willingness to negotiate with Palestinians and move toward a peace process. Rabin agreed to the Oslo Accord at least partly also because of demographic considerations. Many researches showed that sooner or later will Arab population outnumber the Jewish community within the combined area of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where both nations are living together (Zanotti, 2010). Yitzak Rabin was very well aware of the situation and prognosis and therefore he decided to come to an agreement with Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza in order to avoid of ruling of Jewish minority over a majority, which would be with no doubts considered as undemocratic and in contradiction with the principle of self determination. However, since signing an Oslo Accord have many things

changed in many ways. After Oslo, Hamas started to play more visible and important role on the Palestinian “field”, which meant more violence and breaking up process, which should paradoxically bring peace into the region. It all has culminated in the second Palestinian intifada, also known as the Al Aqsa intifada, which can be basically considered as an “uprising”. As it might be seen, the likelihood of a negotiated two- state solution appears to be an unreachable dream due to fact that Oslo Accord has been affected by the violence from Palestinian side in such a measure. Optimistic expectations of the Oslo has disappeared and process that should bring a peace, rather increased tensions between Israel and Palestinian Authority.

As it is mentioned above, intensity of the violence has radically increased during the second intifada, which has been accompanied by Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, and it all has end up with the Gaza conflict, which took place on December 2008 and lasted for two months. Security has been reestablished for most of Israeli population in a relatively short period of time, as Zanotti says. Israeli officials have adopted different measures for the sake of security and one of them was the construction of a West Bank barrier. Reasons for second intifada may differ, but one might realize that the beginning of violence is closely connected with Arafat’s death in 2004 and subsequently rise of Hamas. Yasser Arafat was accepted by Palestinians as their legitimate representative and during his administration, peace process seemed to be working well. “Although PA President Mahmoud Abbas has taken Arafat’s place, his legitimacy as a leader of the Palestinian people is not comparable, and the Fatah party he leads is seen by many as too divided and dysfunctional to govern successfully” (Zanotti, 2010,p.14). Due all the unfavorable facts that influenced Israeli- Palestinian relations and mainly security of Israeli civilians, radical steps have been done by Israeli officials. As it is written in Zanotti’s book, Israel has strengthen its military controls among the civilians, but probably the most visible change was the construction of the barrier, that should stop Palestinian suicide bombers from attacking innocent civilians. For less than 5% of the length of the fence was build up as a wall. The course of the security fence follows to a great extent the 1949 armistice line, but also accounts for physical features of the land and Israeli security considerations. The Armistice lines were delimited in 1949 after the War of Independence. The lines were established between Israel and all its neighbor countries except of Palestinians. In the armistice agreements it was written that they will not indicate permanent boundaries

between the parties, but they will be agreed and finalized only in the future peace agreements (Srebro, 2012).

However, an important element that will without any doubt influence the formation of the lines in a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians will be the distribution of population and settlement in Judea and Samaria, what is now known as West Bank, and also the position of various types of infrastructures, including roads (Zanotti, 2010). Other factors that will certainly play role in future delimitation are for instance, the current situation on the ground, including existing settlements, military and civilian infrastructure, historical delimitation lines, holy sites and Jerusalem.

The extensive construction of Israeli settlements and infrastructure has according to Jim Zanotti increased Israeli chance at bargaining in negotiation with the Palestinian Authority over control of the West Bank in an eventual two- state solution in the case, that one will be adopted. This construction started before the 1990s but continued rapidly right after Oslo, when it seemed that two- state solution with Palestinians could be possible (Zanotti, 2010). On the other hand, one might take in consideration that Palestinians would obviously not agree with Israeli “grab as much as you can” policy because of several reasons. The existing Israeli settlements that according to Israel should fasten final negotiations due to fact that its extensive construction should scare Palestinians, would in reality just take away “the sense of Palestinian political, economic, and cultural identity, as well as the morale and cohesion, seen by some as important to building a state”, as Zanotti points out.

Now, many years later, when we already know that Oslo Agreement did not work successfully for long time, there arise a question to what extent would Israeli have control over West Bank after constructing a barrier that gives away major part of the West Bank to Palestinians. Would Palestinians agree with Israeli control over their territory in the case that two- state solution would be signed by both sides? Is not a barrier, constructed by Israel problematic under international law and for humanitarian reasons, when it comes to question of removing already existing Israeli and Palestinian settlements? My thesis will try to find out to what extent was the barrier necessity and what was it un/effectiveness.

CHAPTER 2: Israel's construction of the West Bank Barrier

This chapter is about the construction of the West Bank Barrier, which should separate Israelis from Palestinians and prevent suicide bombers from infiltrating into Israeli centers and settlements, has started in the summer of 2002 and is very well described in the book named *Sharon's Endgame for the West Bank Barrier*, written by George Gavrilis. The wall consists of electronic sensors, barbed wire and the wall with transits. Attitude of the international community towards West Bank Barrier was rather negative than positive and they accused Israel for breaking the Green Line, which has been established in 1948 and separates Israel from West Bank and Gaza Strip (Gavrilis, 2004). Green Line is considered as a future legitimate border between Israel and Palestine and therefore it is clear why Palestinian Authority did not agree with such actions done by Israel. On the one hand, one might consider the decision of Prime minister Ariel Sharon to build a fence as an unlawful towards Palestinians, but on the other hand, one might realize that he rather chose to build a wall as inevitable solution against Palestinian terror attacks, than to go into the war with Palestinians, which would be almost surely won by Israel.

According to Gavrilis, the international community was supporting Palestinians rather than Israelis, believing that the Sharon's only purpose for creating an "Apartheid Wall", as Palestinians refers to the fence, was to grab as much as possible of land for Israelis in a case that the Palestinians state will be recognized. Recognition of a Palestinian State would allow Palestinian officials to assume full membership in international organizations. Arab League, European Union and UN representatives were persuaded that the barrier will make relationship between Israel and Palestinians even worse and very bad economic consequences for Palestinians are not excluded as well (Gavrilis, 2004). According to the international community the barrier would destroy any future chances for peace. In the book written by Gavrilis is written that the UN General Assembly asked Israel for taking down the barrier, but Israel did not do so in a faith that the fence holds a great potential for resolving the long- standing conflict between Israeli and the Palestinians. Israeli representatives believed that the creation of a wall would mean an interim Palestinian state, above which Palestinian Authority would have limited control.

The idea to build a barrier has appeared while Ehud Barak was in office as a Prime Minister since 1999 until 2001. The major official reasons for establishing a fence were the collapse of the Camp David talks and the outbreak of the Second Intifada or “Al Aqsa Intifada” (Gavrilis, 2004). The Camp David talks took place in 2000 between the United States, Israel and Palestinian authority, and unfortunately we have to consider it as an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a "final status settlement" to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Second Intifada, or the „Oslo war“ as some people refer to it, took place in 2000 and ended in 2005. It was the second Palestinian uprising, which broke all the previous peace talks and agreements, which all can be indicated as an „Oslo Agreement“. The “Oslo war“ was a period of intensive violence between Palestinians and Israelis, which began by the terrorist attacks of Palestinian suicide bombers. The collapse of all the previous agreements between Palestinians and Israelis brought down the government of Ehud Barak and his successor, Ariel Sharon, had to face very difficult situation. Sharon had to deal with increasing terrorist attacks, dissatisfaction of the nation in the terms of security and negotiations with Palestinian Authority about the future boundaries, as it is pointed out by Michael Bell, who is former Canadian ambassador to Israel. He has had only two options how to resolve the situation and stop terrorist suicide bombers from infiltrating into Jewish centers. Sharon could either attack Palestinians back or he could start with the construction of the separation fence. Some people say that the real reason behind the construction of the wall was not the security of Israeli people, but a demographic crisis. “Increasing numbers of elites argued that indefinite occupation of a rapidly growing Palestinian population would eventually make Israel a Jewish-minority state.”(Gavrilis, 2004, p. 9) Others claim, that it was not the reason for building the barrier. However, it might be seen, that the chance for Palestinians to win the possible war with Israel would be really low and also the fact that Ariel Sharon can be considered as right- wing, so a construction of a fence means a big compromise for him.

After making a decision to construct a barrier, Sharon faced another huge dilemma, which is connected with the placement of the barrier. While left- wing Israeli representatives hoped that there will not be any barrier or that the West Bank and Gaza would be given up in exchange for a permanent peace, right- wing politicians wanted to grab as much land as possible as it is stated in Gavrilis’ book. Here we meet with other compromise, done by Sharon, when he decided to place a fence in the middle of what his right- wing political

colleagues consider as Israel's indivisible territory. The barrier should not include the whole West Bank and Gaza on the Israeli side, but only half of it. Idea of Greater Israel was therefore lost and Ariel Sharon was criticized by those, who did not want to give up any piece of land (Gavrilis, 2004).

Yossi Sarid, head of the opposition Meretz Party in the Israeli Knesset, seemingly confirms this: "I know Sharon very well and ... I knew he was going to build a very bad fence. I know his political vision with respect to territory: to annex and enable a Palestinian state on about 50 [percent] of the area. The fence is instrumental for this" (Gavrilis, 2004). Opponents accused Ariel Sharon of using the fence as a part of strategy to speed Israel and Palestinians toward simplified negotiations, in other words, critics claim that Sharon did not try to find less invasive solution, but made a decision which will indirectly force Palestinian authority to accept the borders that are set up by Israel. The barrier is, according to opponents, not considered as a peace making tool, but rather as a tool of Israeli grand strategy, as Gavrilis says. There is also belief that the strategy of building a barrier has its roots in Barak's government and Sharon has just done, what was planned for a longer time. Some Israeli officials expect that with the completion of the barrier will Palestinians feel urgency to enter final-status negotiations for peace, where two states, Israel and Palestine exist alongside one another.

Ariel Sharon did not face very complicated situation only on the domestic policy level, but also on the international one. One might know, that Sharon became famous in the 1980s by actively designing, financing supporting the expansion of the Jewish settlements. Now, many years later, we can see policy of Ariel Sharon which is completely different, from the one, he used to make some decades ago. According to Gavrilis, Sharon and his colleagues from the Likud party have come to the belief that the settlement project is not sustainable anymore. Even though he realized that the policy of settlements making is not efficient anymore, he considers all the concessions done by Israel as a painful ones (Gavrilis, 2004). He took down the settlements, against his own beliefs and will. From that moment, he was not criticized only by international community and Palestinian authority but also by right-wing oriented Israeli society. When he made concessions and took down settlements for the sake of future negotiations with Palestinians, he became a traitor in the eyes of the extreme from the right wing. Jewish settlers started to talk about broken trust and they started to mobilize against Sharon's

policy (Gavrilis, 2004). Ariel Sharon understood disappointment and disagreement of his nation with his policy, but on the other hand, there was no other better solution he could adopt.

International community, many political analysts and even Israeli leftist opposition said: "Sharon is at the helm of a coalition of expansionists who want the fence to incorporate maximum settlements into the contiguous territory of Israel, simultaneously encircling the Palestinian areas" (Gavrilis, 2004). Settlers, whose settlements should be pushed outside the boundaries of a future Israeli state talked about the fence as a tool of Israeli territorial expansion, even though it surely was not the main purpose. If Ariel Sharon would really want to create the Great Israel, he would never change his right-wing policy. He would keep his beliefs, follow them and Palestinian authority could forget about their own territory in the next years, even decades.

One might take in consideration also fact, that Israel has made many changes to the route of the barrier, which were beneficial for Palestinians and not Israel. This is another evidence that Sharon's purpose was really not a territorial expansion, but a security for Israelis and compromise in the terms of borders between Jewish and Palestinians terrorism. "In early 2004 Israel tore down and rebuilt a section of the barrier in Bakalal-Sharkiya to ease hardship on Palestinian populations. In June 2004, Israel's High Court ruled that a section of the fence's route near Jerusalem must be altered to prevent to Palestinian population" (Bell, 2008). Even though is a barrier causing many humanitarian problems to Palestinians, which cannot be concealed, there is an evidence that the fence is a "moveable" structure, and it could be even eliminated in the future, in the case that both sites will come to final agreement. If barrier will not be removed completely, it might be seen that there is still a chance that some sections of a fence will be moved in favor of Palestinians.

International community and also Palestinian Authority lived in the belief that Ariel Sharon had a secret deal with Jewish settlers about the fence route, which later showed up as false accusations. Sharon kept his plans of the fence route secret to prevent settlers from mobilizing against it, as it is written in Gavrilis' book. It is known, that many settlements first heard about the fence route and their exclusion from the fence through

media, which is an evidence, that there was not a secret collusion between Sharon and Jewish settlers.

“The emergence of a provisional Palestinian state is a realistic expectation”(Gavrilis, 2004, p.11). Israeli security officials, as well as the European Union, the Arab League and the United States hope that when Israel will remove its military occupation from the areas “behind” the fence, the Palestinian leaders will exploit the situation to their advantage and focus on state building, general law, order and provision of public goods for their nation. “Israeli Defense Forces withdrawal from substantial portions of the West Bank territory would allow the Palestinian Authority to expand its control to cover the countryside and rural road network, link Palestinian urban areas, and push ahead with institution building. The expansion of Palestinian organizations charged with security, taxation, and social services over additional territory would help facilitate the emergence of a functional Palestinian state” (Gavrilis, 2004, p.11).

Opponents of the fence claim and are persuaded that Israel is willing to give up only tight territory, which is not acceptable for Palestinians in a final agreement. Palestinians argue that Sharon wants to create a partial Palestinian state “on a portion of the West Bank completely encircled by an Israel fence” (Zanotti, 2010). Palestinian representatives are afraid that the barrier will divide Palestinian territory into three districts which will be encircled by the fence and not connected together. That is why Palestinians still suspect Israel of achieving a Great Israel. According to the Palestinian authority, the barrier simply revises plans for a Greater Israel and makes it more streamlined; it will allow Israel to relieve itself of the burden of ruling densely populated, poor, and nominally independent Palestinian “Bantustans” while still holding territory from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordanian border (Gavrilis, 2004, p.13). When it comes to such a claim from Palestinian authority, we should take in consideration also facts according to which Israel is likely to make major territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Israel is willing to give up an area called “Zufin” which holds only little strategic value for them, but for Palestinians would annexation of Zufin mean a big deal because it would guarantee the contiguity of the West Bank land on the Palestinian side, according to Gavrilis. Next, remarkable step done by Israel is giving up a valuable territory, Jordan River Valley, which is sparsely populated and therefore offers place for new settlements. Jordan Valley also provides its “occupants” with a vital trade ling to neighboring Jordan. The Palestinian

authority would like to keep it under its control. Israel will lose also some of its settlements by construction of the barrier and despite that fact, was Ariel Sharon willing to make such a decision. However, Sharon does not want to provide two settlements with any fence, which for now means loss of almost 100 kilometers of a future border for Israel (Gavrilis, 2004). As it is seen, Ariel Sharon did not really mean to create a Great Israel, even though he is right-wing oriented.

Even though Israel is willing to give up some areas for the sake of final negotiations with Palestinians, it still requests some concessions from Palestinians as well. As it is well-known, both sides claim Jerusalem as their rightful capital due to the fact that Jerusalem consists of Muslim and Jewish holy sites. Internationally Jerusalem is not recognized neither as capital of Jewish nation, nor as a capital of Palestinians. However, Israel wants the Palestinian authority to give up sovereignty claims to Jerusalem. Israel would also like to keep all the populated settlements that have been built since 1967 and are located either on or out of the "Green Line". Green Line refers to the demarcation lines set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and its neighbors, except of Palestine, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The Green Line is also used to mark the line between Israel and the territories captured in the Six-Day War, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. Map of the Israel and "Green Line" can be seen on the next page.

Sopóciová: Israeli West Bank Barrier



Figure 56: The security road (Survey of Israel, 2011)

Source: Haim Srebro, *The boundaries of Israel today*. Survey of Israel. p. 90

“The Israeli government intends to absorb the entire Jerusalem area firmly into the state of Israel, disassociating many Palestinian suburbs from Jerusalem. Israel will build separate infrastructures, in the form of tunnels and bypass roads, for these Palestinian areas left outside the “security envelope,” effectively converting them into suburbs of nearby Ramallah and Bethlehem” (Gavrilis, 2004, p.15). Jerusalem means the biggest problem in terms of possible border between Israel and Palestinian authority. Palestinians would never agree with the relocation of Jerusalem behind the barrier and therefore it might seem that the fence, purpose of which should be peace between two nations, could actually mean more violence and disorder. Saeb Erakat, who is a Palestinian negotiator once said, that his greatest fear is that Palestinians will be forced to face injustice, if Israel, safe and secure behind a completed fence cannot be forced to share Jerusalem. Israel would like to exchange some of its parts for the greater or even the whole Jerusalem area, but according to the attitude of Palestinians towards Jerusalem, it might seem as an unreachable dream. However, Israeli officials admit that if the security situation in the territory of a provisional Palestinian state will be satisfactory, negotiation about the area of Jerusalem are not excluded (Gavrilis, 2004). “Security in the Palestine territory will allow the Palestinians to make the case, with the support of the broader international community, for Israel to agree to a more equitable division of Jerusalem” (Gavrilis, 2004). Israel would anyway like to keep the greater Jerusalem area, with some restrictions when it comes to Muslims holy sites. As Gavrilis says: “At best, Palestinians can hope that Israel will make adjustments to the “security envelope” and transfer some outlying East Jerusalem neighborhoods to the Palestinian authority and that Israel will agree to the creation of islands of Palestinian sovereignty around the old city’s holy sites. Mosques as the Dome of the Rock or Al Aksa might be under the sovereignty of Palestinian authority, but access to this area would be still controlled by Israel as it is stated in Gavrilis’ book. This might seem as not a big deal for Palestinians, but it is still better than nothing, and the main point, which are the holy sites, will remain “in the hands” of Palestinians.

The barrier and disengagement plan promise to reduce terrorism and create a provisional Palestinian state even for the price of removing settlements, both Israeli and Palestinian. Thus, according to George Gavrilis, despite claims that the fence will stop any progress that has been made toward peace, this barriers in fact stands the greatest chance of speeding Israeli and the Palestinians towards negotiation over final borders. The barrier

does not just hold the key to a Palestinian state, but it also determines the way borders of Israel will look like. As Gavrilis says: “Sharon’s fence not only might provide the ticket to final peace but also, as it liberally pierces into the West Bank, will ensure Israel has a maximalist bargaining position when final-status negotiations begin.”

One might take in consideration that many observers assume that the existing division of the West Bank into separate enclaves by the presence of Israeli settlements, infrastructure, and other areas of control will almost certainly have impact on the development of a future Palestinian state. In the next chapter I will focus on economic and social impacts of the barrier on both sides.

CHAPTER 3: Effectiveness and consequences of the West Bank Barrier

The construction of West Bank barrier has been accompanied by many restrictions on the Palestinian and Israeli side as well. It might be seen that the significant restrictions have been implemented on the crossing of people and goods between Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, which means bad economic situation for Palestinians. Those restrictions could be considered as a major change since the time of Oslo agreement. “According to the World Bank, Palestinian per capita GDP in the West Bank and is significantly lower than it was during the years immediately prior to the second intifada—from between \$1,200 and \$1,500 in 1997-2000 to just over \$1,000 at the end of 2008” (Zanotti, 2010, p.18). Due to fact that private sector among Palestinians is not sufficient, they have historically depended on entry into and exit out of Israel for the purpose of good exchange and job opportunities. Until the construction of the barrier was access of Palestinians to jobs or any other services easy and almost uncontrolled. According to Zanotti the outbreak of the second intifada and beginning of construction of the West Bank separation barrier caused that security scrutiny at crossing check- points have increased and access of Palestinians to work or medical health care have become much more complicated.

As it is stated in the book of Michael Bell, in October 2003 the Israel Defense Forces declared the land between the barrier in the northern part of the West Bank and the Green Line, which is a closed military zone, to be called the Seam. Today over 100,000 persons in six communities are living in enclaves almost completely surrounded by the barrier. Qalqiliya used to be a vibrant town of some 41,000 persons, where Israelis from neighboring communities used to visit, shop, and eat, back up to the Intifada’s outbreak (Bell, 2008). There has been a departure of population and many small businesses have closed. The only road in and out is guarded by Israeli checkpoints, with watchtowers and cameras ensuring surveillance. Palestinian residents of the Seam over the age of 12 require a residence authorization and those who wish to enter or leave require a further permit from the Israeli administration. They not only need permission to leave, they require a permit to remain on their land, even if they and their ancestors were born there (Bell, 2008). “West Bankers“ from outside the Seam require one of twelve purpose-specific documents to enter. Farmers have to provide documents indicating their rights to the land. Farmers face difficulties getting to their fields and marketing their products, although farming is a primary source of income in the Palestinian communities which are

situated along the route, an area that is one of the most fertile in the West Bank as it is well-known. The farming sector therefore had to face a dramatic shock in already difficult economic situation. The barrier also seriously reduces the access of the rural population to hospitals and other services in nearby cities and affects education because many teachers come from outside the communities in which they work, as Bell stresses out. Social and family ties are destroyed. If one wants to stay the night in the Seam area, and bring with himself a vehicle, he needs separate permissions. According to the human rights monitoring group B'Tselem, the authorities reject about twenty-five per cent of entry permission applications (Bell, 2008). There are also complaints that Israeli administration of the permit system is problematic and it is creating further obstacles to movement. According to Palestinian sources, approximately 3,670 acres of land were confiscated and 102,000 olive trees were destroyed in the course of construction in the north. Some farmers claim that companies that were providing construction of the barrier uprooted and stole olive trees, their being of value because, while they take five to ten years to revenue an initial crop, they bear fruit for centuries (Bell, 2008). Within the Seam there is evidence that both homes and commercial extensions are being destroyed because they were built without permissions, which is actually a common practice among Palestinians, often imposed by cost and bureaucratic red tape. In addition there are significant restrictions on local construction. The barrier situation in East Jerusalem is without any doubt noteworthy because of the political, symbolic and pure physical weight of it. According to Michael Bell, in the eastern part of the city, the barrier consists of a series of distinctly unappealing eight meter concrete walls that run for the most part, but by no means always, along Jerusalem's Israeli-defined municipal boundaries, within which some 200,000 Palestinians live. „An additional 400,000 non and former Jerusalemite Palestinians live in village communities with twenty kilometres of the city centre and are bound to it by a myriad of economic, social, political and human ties. Arab East Jerusalem has always been the geographic and spiritual focus of their lives“ (Bell, 2008).

As it is mentioned above, the greatest impact of the barrier is visible in the economic sphere. The Palestinian Federation of Industries estimated in September 2008 that 98% of Gaza's industrial operations are inactive” (Zanotti, 2010). Even if Israel agrees to Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank, there are no guarantees that Israel


will allow Palestinians and their goods meaningful access to Israeli jobs and markets. Although in 2009 Israel significantly reduced post-second intifada obstacles to Palestinian movement within the West Bank, many of these obstacles remain, and controls on movement between Israel and the West Bank remain largely unchanged. The alternatives for the Palestinians to economic interdependence with Israel would likely according to Zanotti be: “to attract investment and build a self-sufficient economy, which is probably years if not decades away;⁶⁰ to look to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, which by the way struggle with their own economic problems, for economic integration or to depend indefinitely upon external assistance”. However, one might realize that restrictions that have a huge impact on economy will sooner or later cause formation of a “black trade”. There are tunnels between Gaza and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, which thrive since the erosion of bad economic situation of Palestinians and tightening control of border crossings. “For most of the time since Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, most of Gaza’s border crossings—including the Rafah border crossing with Egypt—have been closed to everything but a minimum of goods deemed necessary to meet humanitarian needs” (Zanotti, 2010).

The political impact of the barrier is inseparable part of my thesis as well. The High Court asserted that the barrier could not be used to define a political border, which is in contrary to what many expected a barrier to be. The barrier separates the Seam to the west from areas of dense Palestinian occupation to the east. This ensures “quality of life“ settlements, which hold the majority of West Bank settlers, are included on the Israeli side. „These particular settlements were developed to populate the West Bank in areas close to the Green Line, to ‘thicken’ the Israeli presence in the occupied territories neighboring to Israel proper through the construction of bedroom communities, serving Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and other towns along the coast“ (Bell, 2008). Housing was made available at considerable cost advantage to comparable structures in Israel itself; mortgages were made hugely attractive; infrastructure and development construction was funded by the state as Bell points out in his book. These inducements ensured the growth of these communities in an attempt to „move“ the Green Line. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Jerusalem, as of June 2009, there is a “complex system of access restrictions applicable to Palestinians [in the West Bank], which include, inter alia, restrictions on the use of main roads, the [separation] Barrier and

its permit regime, closed military zones and nature reserves, and Israeli settlements and adjacent ‘buffer zones’” (Zanotti, 2010).

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Assuming that implementation of a borders and settlements agreement might be possible, most analysts acknowledge that the biggest problem with a borders first approach is Jerusalem, as Zanotti stresses out. The Israelis claim and exercise sovereignty over the whole of it, and the Palestinians seek control over its predominantly Arab eastern half. Jerusalem's holy sites including the walled Old City with its Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif and Western Wall are administered pursuant to delicate and complicated arrangements, yet remain a source of great tension (Zanotti, 2010). As some analysts have pointed out, leaving Greater Jerusalem out of border negotiations would probably be a non-starter for Palestinians because existing or potential developments in Jerusalem have implications for the territorial contiguity of the West Bank and for access by Palestinians to and from East Jerusalem and between their other key population centers. Except of Jerusalem there are also other obstacles on the way to two-state solution. One of them is challenge that Palestinians have to face when it comes to their two noncontiguous territorial entities, which are obviously the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Zanotti, 2010). The main problem is that since June 2007, these two entities have been controlled by two different regimes, Abbas and the PA in the West Bank, and Hamas and a version of the PA it represents to be legitimate in Gaza. If there will not be an agreement between Haman and Abbas's party about governing those two territories in very similar way, then it will be extremely difficult to bring these two territories under a single governing structure (Zanotti, 2010). On the one hand one might consider restrictions adopted by Israelis against Palestinian as unlawful, but on the other hand, there are legitimate reasons, mentioned above, for that. How can Israel trust Palestinians, if they are not able to communicate among themselves and choose only one ruler- Abbas or Hamas. Moreover, since the construction of the barrier, terroristic suicide attacks have decreased to 95 percent, which can be seen in the graph, which is located on the next page.



Source: <http://www.theisraelproject.org>

Sooner or later might the barrier be recognized as a lawful border between Israel and Palestinian Authority, but it can only happen if Palestine is able to be fair player and Israel is able to trust it enough. As it is seen from the previous chapter, barrier is a moveable structure and no one said that it cannot be removed completely, if there will be a final peace agreement between Israel and Palestine. Even though that barrier seems at the first sight as radical measures done by Israel against Palestine, one might realize that the second and only option Israel had was war. One has to admit that barrier caused much less damage than the war would do and we also should realize that *“Good fences make good neighbors”*- proverb by Robert Frost, who was an American poet. Under this proverb one might understand that the West Bank Barrier is ultimately good for both sides when it comes to term of security. As it has stopped Palestinian suicide bombers from killing Israeli citizens, so it did not force Israelis to attack Palestinians back.

Answer on the thesis question, whether West Bank Barrier is efficient step done by Israelis is more or less positive. It is obvious that its purpose has been fulfilled and terrorism has been radically decreased. Barrier gave to Palestinians their autonomy, which

Sopócióv: Israeli West Bank Barrier

can help them to find out how it is to be independent and live on their own. West Bank Barrier should not be, according to me, considered as a land-grab attempt, when in fact, Ariel Sharon gave up a appreciable piece of land in favor of security and peace. Palestinians can understand what has terrorism caused and start to behave the way, which would be accepted by Israelis and international community. If they will understand that cooperation with Israel is much more beneficial in economic and security terms, than suicide attacks, then there might be a huge progress and even barrier may be removed. As it is seen, Israel was able to establish its borders with other neighbor states and therefore we might assume that if Palestinians will start to collaborate with Israelis and agree on a peaceful right of Jewish to live in Israel, there is no reason for not establishing Palestinian State along side the state of Israel in the future. Construction of the barrier is not maybe the best solution ever, but probably the best Ariel Sharon could adopt at that time.

Resumé

Táto bakalárska práca pozostáva z úvodu a ďalších štyroch kapitól. V úvode tejto bakalárskej práce sa čitateľ oboznamuje s historickými dôvodmi vzniku štátu Izrael. Židia cítili potrebu zjednotiť sa ako národ na jednom území, po tom ako boli mnohí z nich vyvraždení počas druhej svetovej vojny a holokaustu. Je však dôležité spomenúť fakt, že myšlienka vytvoriť „židovský štát“ sa objavila už oveľa skôr, pred druhou svetovou vojnou. Inciátorom tejto myšlienky bol Theodor Herzl, človek, ktorý je považovaný za zakladateľa Zionizmu. Herzl hľadal podporu na realizáciu svojho sna aj v medzinárodnom spoločenstve, medzi významnými a vplyvnými ľuďmi. Theodor Herzl zomrel niekoľko desiatok rokov predtým, ako vznikol štát Izrael, pričom v jeho dobe, by bol za verejné predstavovanie takejto myšlienky vystavený posmechu.

Okamžite po podpísaní deklarácie nezávislosti štátu Izrael, musel tento novovzniknutý štát čeliť vojnovým hrozbám zo strany Palestínčanov a ostatných arabských krajín. Všetky vojny ktoré sa medzi Izraelom a ostatnými arabskými štátmi odohrali, boli založené na územných sporoch, týkajúcich sa Golanských výšin, pásma Gazy a Jeruzalema. Postoje Izraelských a Palestínskych najvyšších štátnych predstaviteľov sa ku konfliktu, ktorý medzi týmito dvoma národmi pretrváva už niekoľko desaťročí sa líšia a aj to je jeden z dôvodov, prečo stále nebola podpísaná konečná mierová dohoda.

Pravdepodobne najvýznamnejším krokom, podniknutým zo strany Izraela za posledné dve desaťročia bola výstavba bariéry pozdĺž západného brehu Jordánu. Táto výstavba začala kvôli Palestínskym atentánikom, ktorí páchali samovražedné útoky na Izraelský ľud. Bariéra mala tieto útoky obmedziť do čo najvyššej miery.

V prvej kapitole sa venujem hraniciam Izraela s jeho susednými štátmi. Postupne rozoberám jednotlivé štáty susediace s Izraelom a situáciu ich súčasných hraníc. V polovici prvej kapitoly sa čitateľ oboznamuje s vývojom rozdelenia kompetencií na území pásma Gazy, západného brehu Jordánu a Jeruzalema medzi Izraelom a Palestínskou samosprávou za posledné dve desaťročia.

V druhej kapitole dávam čitateľovi do pozornosti začiatok výstavby bariéry na západnom brehu Jordánu, ktorá sa začala v roku 2002. Kapitola sa zaoberá taktiež postojom

medzinárodných organizácií k výstavbe bariéry a hlavnými dôvodmi prečo sa táto výstavba vôbec začala a či bol takýto krok nevyhnutný. V tejto kapitole sa venujem tiež druhému povstaniu Palestínčanov a výzvam, ktorým musel čeliť, v tej dobe, novozvolený premiér, Ariel Sharon. Dôležitou súčasťou tejto časti bakalárskej práce je aj postoj opozície v Izraelskom parlamente a tiež postoj samotného národa. Názory odporcov Sharonovej politiky a taktiež trasa, pozdĺž ktorej by sa mala bariéra stavať sú tiež obsiahnuté v tejto kapitole.

V ďalšej kapitole dávam do popredia ekonomické, sociálne a hospodárske dôsledky výstavby bariéry. Venujem sa obmedzeniam, ktoré vznikli na oboch stranách bariéry a porovnávam ich so situáciou pred začiatku výstavby.

V závere sa snažím zistiť, či táto bariéra bola vhodným riešením pre zastavenie konfliktu, a či nebolo možné dospieť k spoločnému záveru aj iným, možno menej radikálnym spôsobom.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, E. (2001). *Terrorism: Their and Ours* . Canada: Seven Stories Press.
- Backmann, R. (2010). *A Wall in Palestine*. Picador.
- Bard, M. (2010, July). *Israel's Security Fence*. Retrieved January 2013, from Jewish Virtual Library:
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html>
- Bell, M. (2008). The West Bank Barrier Debate: Concept, Construction and Consequence.
- Bob, Y. J. (2012, 12 13). *Court urges reroute of planned West Bank barrier*. Retrieved February 2013, from The Jerusalem Post:
<http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=295854>
- Gavrilis, G. (2004). Sharon's Endgame for the West Bank Barrier. The Washington quarterly.
- Israel - Palestinian Negotiations*. (2008). Retrieved October 10, 2012, from Israel Ministry of foreign affairs:
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Palestinian%20Negotiations>
- Nusseibeh, S. (2012, February 21). The Pursuit of a Two- State Solution Is a Fantasy. (D. M., Interviewer)
- Patai, R. (1960). *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*. New York: Herzl Press.
- Putz, U. (2011, October 08). *The Wall Around The West Bank*. Retrieved November, 2012, from Spiegel: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-s-anti-terror-fence-the-wall-around-the-west-bank-a-779222.html>
- Q&A: *What is the West Bank barrier?* (2005). Retrieved 2012, from BBC News:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3111159.stm
- Shlaim, A. (2001). *The Iron wall*. Pennsylvania: Norton.
- Schult, C. (2008). *West Bank Withdrawal: Israeli Settlers Look for Compensation to Leave*. Retrieved 2012, from Spiegel Online: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/west-bank-withdrawal-israeli-settlers-look-for-compensation-to-leave-a-574995.html>

Sopócióvá: Israeli West Bank Barrier

Srebro, H. (2012). *The boundaries of Israel today*. Survey of Israel.

Zanotti, J. (2010). *Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two- State Solution*. Congressional Research Service.