BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

O TEMPORA O MORES!
THE UNRECOGNISED TENSION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Bratislava, 2019 **Katarína Rožárová**

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Declaration of Originality

I declare that this bachelor thesis is my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, 21 April 2019
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O Tempora O Mores! The Unrecognised Tension Between the Individual and the Community as a Contributing Factor in the Collapse of the Roman Republic

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Abstract

This works focuses on the tension between the individual and the community in the Late Roman Republic, arguing that it played a role in the event surrounding the Republic's collapse and the establishment of the Roman Empire. While this tension was not explicitly recognised, there is an implicit recognition of it in the writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero. It appears in Cicero’s critique of Epicureanism as a dangerous and unethical philosophy and in his position on the assassination of Gaius Julius Caesar. Furthermore, the difference in nature of the deaths of Caesar and Cicero brings forth this problematic and unaddressed conceptualisation of the lack of distinction between private and public relationships. Caesar’s death can be classified as an assassination based on the proposed justification relating to the good of the community, while Cicero’s death is a murder based on personal vengeance.

O tempora, o mores! Nerozpoznané napätie medzi jednotlivcom a komunitou ako faktor prispievajúci ku kolapsu rímskej republiky.

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Abstrakt

Táto práca sa sústredí na napätie medzi jednotlivcom a komunitou v neskorej rímskej republike a argumentuje, že toto napätie zohralo rolu v rámci udalostí počas jej kolapsu a následného založenia rímskeho impéria. Napriek tomu, že toto napätie nebolo explicitne rozpoznané a vyjadrené, v textoch Marka Tullia Cicera existujú znáamky, že bolo pochopené aspoň implicitne. Toto napätie možno vidieť v Cicerovej kritike Epikureanizmu ako nebeznepčnej a neetickej filozofie. Tak isto je prítomné v jeho argumentácii ohľadom zabitia Júlia Caesara. Navýše, samotný charakter usmrtení Caesara a Cicera zdôrazňuje túto problematickú a neadresovanú konceptualizáciu rozdielu medzi verejnými a súkromnými vzťahmi. Zatiaľčo úspešný atentát na Caesara

môže byť odôvodnený dobrom komunity, Cicerova vražda je založená na osobnej pomste.

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First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr Griffith for his help, encouragement, and patience; being, simply put, the best supervisor one could ever wish for. I also want to thank the people close to me for their willingness to support me and listen to more talk about Cicero and Caesar than anyone ever really should. Lastly, I want to thank my cat for not destroying a computer charger or eating any important papers, this time.

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Introduction

The question that begun this thesis is, ‘How are the deaths of Gaius Julius Caesar and Marcus Tullius Cicero different?’ Both men were killed for their public actions but the reasonings for and natures of their deaths are dissimilar. Caesar fought and won a civil war and was assassinated for being a tyrant, the philosophical and ethical justification for this act being provided by Cicero. Meanwhile, Cicero was murdered for the speeches he gave in the turmoil following Caesar’s assassination. The very vocabulary used here shows the difference. When saying ‘Caesar was assassinated’ and ‘Cicero was murdered’, the choice of one’s words is significant. The difference between an assassination, a murder, and a killing, and their connection to the relationship of an individual and the community is explored in chapter II.

For Cicero, Caesar was killed for the good of the Republic, which makes it an assassination. The reasoning for the act centres on the good of the community, making it a public issue. Having defeated all his opponents during the Civil War, Caesar was established a *dictator in perpetuum* by the Senate. This, alongside other events, like Mark Antony’s attempted crowning of Caesar as king, caused the traditionalist factions of the Senate to panic. The fear of tyrannical rule had been present in Roman minds since the overthrow of the last king and the establishment of the Republic. This fear is present in Late Roman Republican invective, in which the accusation of being a *rex* and/or a τύραννος were common and indicated someone not only with autocratic power, but with a ‘total lack of morality’ (Dunkle. 1967. p153). The relationship between the king, the tyrant, and morality is developed in chapters II and III. Dunkle further says: ‘The identification of the Roman king with the Greek tyrant in political invective is first evident in accusations made against Tiberius Gracchus [...]’, placing this connection immediately before the events with which this thesis is concerned (Ibid. pp158-159).

Regardless whether the assassination of Caesar is justified, at least in Ciceronian terms, there is no political reason for the murder of Cicero. By the time he was put on the proscriptions list under the Second Triumvirate, the Republic was coming to the end, if it still

existed at all. Cicero had been put on this list on the insistence of Mark Antony who had to make concessions to Octavian in order to make this happen. Given the already existing personal animosity between Antony and Cicero, exacerbated by the events following Caesar's death, the motivation behind Cicero's murder seems significantly more personal than the one behind the assassination of Caesar. The most notable evidence for the decline of Antony and Cicero's relationship is expressed in Cicero's *Philippics*, a series of speeches against Antony. These were later identified, in for example Juvenal's tenth Satire, as the final straw that caused Cicero's death (Juvenal. 1867. p110).

The deaths of Caesar and Cicero point to a tension between the individual and the community in the Late Roman Republic, which is expressed in the different terms one uses to define their deaths: assassination and murder. This tension is also present in Cicero's critique of Epicureanism. In his *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, Cicero offers an analysis of the four main schools of thought of his time: Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism, and Platonism. There is a significant difference in the way these schools are approached. While Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Platonism are questioned, Epicureanism is absolutely dismissed. Cicero does not even include it in his overview of philosophical schools (see chapter I, Tab. 1). Even if Epicureanism is considered a school of thought on its own, Cicero's attacks on its alleged immorality or lack of ethics are concerned with the importance it places on pleasure. While not outright specified, Cicero seems to equate this focus on pleasure with an individual and his importance, which on his reading places the individual above the community and its good. This criticism parallels Cicero's attacks on Mark Antony in the *Philippics* as a person concerned only with his own base pleasures to the extent that he destroys the community.

Because of this parallel, chapter I explores the ethical theory of Epicureanism and Cicero's critiques of it which are two-fold. He first focuses on Epicurean language and logic, leading him to omit it from his list of philosophical schools. Second, he describes a lack of ethics inherent in the Epicurean position of pleasure being the highest good. Chapter II then establishes the terms and definitions used to describe the events surrounding the deaths of Caesar and Cicero—mainly assassination, murder, and killing—by using the work of Judy E Gaughan, as well as by establishing the proposed relationship between the individual and

community with which this thesis works. The last two chapters focus on the deaths of Caesar and Cicero, respectively, and establish how their deaths differ. Caesar was killed for reasons concerning the good of the *res publica*, thus connecting his death with the public sphere, making it an assassination. Having established the public and political nature of Caesar's death, the chapter looks at the Ciceronian justification for it. On the other hand, Cicero's place on the proscriptions list was an act of personal revenge by Mark Antony, that is, an act of an individual who is not concerned with the community. Thus, it was a private act, i.e., a murder. In conclusion, the tension between the individual and the community was a factor influencing the actions that contributed to the collapse of the Roman Republic. The deaths of two of the era's most important actors were influenced by this tension directly. Other people's fates were connected as well, such as Pompey and Cato the Younger who also died during the Civil War. However, this tension was not recognised other than implicitly in Cicero's critique of Epicureanism, making that critique worth exploring.

Cicero and Epicureanism – A Proto-distinction

The Civil War which Caesar won, ended in 45 BCE, the same year in which Cicero wrote *De finibus bonorum et malorum.* The next year, Caesar was assassinated and Cicero wrote *De officiis* and *Philippics* shortly after. Among other themes, both *De finibus* and *De officiis* focus on Epicureanism and the danger this philosophy poses to society in Cicero's eyes. Epicurean ethics is based on pleasure, and as such is inherently individual. This fact poses a problem for the understanding of society in the eyes of someone like Cicero whose ethics are focused primarily on the good of the *res publica*. In Graeco-Roman antiquity, the community was prior to every other ethical obligation, including the family, since participation in public life is what is proper to man and freedom could only be exercised in the public sphere, among equals. As Hannah Arendt puts it, 'A man who lived only a private life […], was not fully human (Arendt. 1958. p38). A widespread philosophy that based ethics on individual decision and perception is intrinsically dangerous to the status quo. In a volatile political situation dependent on a single man, however virtuous he may be, the community is in danger. Thus, it is not surprising to see Cicero directing his rhetorical powers on Epicureanism, the very epitome of individualism. Even though many of Cicero's friends and acquaintances had been Epicureans, their virtue existed *despite* their philosophical allegiance, rather than because of it (MacGillivray. 2012). Epicureanism's apolitical nature endangers the community inasmuch as *good* men remove themselves from rule, something already Plato has argued against. In this volatile political situation, where individual whims have such a great impact on the good of the community, it is understandable that a person like Cicero would not only defend the established order, but also attack what is the most direct manifestation of a subversive individualism, especially if it is fairly widespread in the circle of people who decide the fate of the community.

In establishing the individual as the unit of utmost importance, Epicureanism represents everything that threatens the Republic. Its philosophy is inherently individualist in a society based on the importance of the community. It places pleasure above any other kind of motivation, including virtue. Where Cicero dreams of a man who puts community first because of virtue, Epicureanism offers an individual who acts according to his own pleasure.

Epicurean Ethics

The greatest good for Epicurus is pleasure, and the greatest evil is pain. However, Epicureanism is not a purely hedonist philosophy, as neither should all pleasures be chosen, nor all pains avoided (Epicurus. 1984. p56). The reason for this is the duality of pleasures and desires: Epicurus makes a distinction between profligate pleasures which depend on the physical enjoyment (such as luxurious food and drink, or sexual pleasure), and the pleasure felt when body and mind are free from pain and anxiety. (Cicero in his overview of Epicureanism introduces into Latin the Greek-derived terms of kinetic and static pleasures, respectively.) Accordingly, desires are divided into vain and natural ones. Vain desires correspond to achieving kinetic pleasures, while natural desires are for static pleasure. As Epicurus says: 'the necessary desires are for health of body and peace of mind; if these are satisfied, that is enough for the happy life' (ibid. p55). Some short-term kinetic pleasures will lead to more pain in the future, and thus should be avoided. Similarly, some short term pains lead to greater pleasures and therefore should be chosen for the sake of one's future well-being. This establishes a hierarchy of pleasures and pains, according to which one acts, since, as Epicurus claims, to ultimately achieve 'freedom from pain and fear, we do everything' (ibid, pp55-56). To avoid falling into the trap of vain pleasures, one should lead a self-sufficient life that generally avoids luxurious pleasures, as the nature of luxuries is such that for them to keep providing pleasure, they need to be more and more elaborate: e.g. foods would have to be more and more exotic and strange, for one to gain pleasure and thrill from them[1]. Furthermore, according to Epicurus, no luxurious good will ever provide as much pleasure as the simple satisfaction of necessary desires; i.e., no luxurious food and drink will provide as much pleasure as simple bread and water will to someone who is starving.

There is a seeming tautology in the reasoning behind what constitutes a necessary good and why vain desires should be rejected – both seem to derive their source of pleasure from a *painful lack*. However, the natures of these lacks differ: the pain one perceives if one's vain desires are not fulfilled is fundamentally different from the pain a person dying of thirst feels.

1 C.f. Plato. *Republic*. Book IX.

In the former example, it is a lack of luxury. By definition, a luxury is something that is neither necessary, nor essential for one's life. Thus this sort of pain, or rather the actions one takes to remove it, can be harmful. In addition to not being essential, the nature of pleasure derived from luxuries comes into play. Since it is always necessary that any subsequent luxury be superior to the preceding one, and that one feels pain if pleasure from luxuries is not gained, one will ultimately come to ruin by trying to improve upon something that can never be perfect. On the other hand, the static pleasure of fulfilling one's necessary needs is just that – necessary. In being necessary the satisfaction of these desires does not run the risk of spiralling out of control in the same way vain pleasure does – for a thirsty person, water will always be sufficient and good and there is no risk of pursuing anything further.

With this in mind, our actions should be guided by φρόνησις, prudence or practical wisdom. Since this prudence is what allows us to differentiate between vain and natural desires, and, therefore, between static and kinetic pleasures, Epicurus claims it is even more important than φιλοσοφία (ibid. p57 & Epicurus. 2011.). Furthermore, prudence guides one's actions in such a way that one avoids the pain of lacking necessary goods, thus providing a happy life. A prudent man pursues necessary desires, keeping the luxuries in his life few and far between, focusing his actions on achieving the τέλος of a man – 'the final end of the blessed life', which is the absence of pain (Epicurus. 1984. p55). In addition, he also reveres the gods, does not fear death, and understands that even though chance and necessity can influence one's life, good fortune is not a necessary prerequisite for a blessed life. One should not fear death for two reasons. First of all, it is unavoidable and to fear it would be to subject oneself to undue pain. Second, death is merely the absence of life, and as such is also an absence of pain. Thus it is nothing to fear. A wise man's actions are therefore 'subject to no power' (ibid. p58).

Cicero's Critiques of Epicureanism

A note should be made that Cicero's position throughout *De finibus* is not internally consistent. The book is best understood as a skeptical exercise divided into three parts. Within each, Cicero is remarkably consistent. However, all three combined do not represent

a single philosophical position and thus they are free to contradict each other. As an Academic Skeptic, he borrows arguments from different schools of thought (Hadot. 2002. p141). Thus, his attacks on Epicureanism (Books I and II) use arguments from Stoicism and Peripatetic philosophy, whilst his critique of Stoicism (Books III and IV) borrows from Antiochean Platonism and Aristotelianism, occasionally even borrowing from Epicureanism. Like Books III and IV, Book V (which focuses on finer points of Antiochus' philosophy and the various differences, or lack thereof, between Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism) is interesting but not fully relevant to this thesis because, all three positions presented: Stoicism, Antiochean Platonism, and Aristotelianism, share the focus on virtue and its attainment. Therefore Cicero accepts them as ethical, unlike Epicureanism. The focus on pleasure, rather than virtue, is what makes Epicureanism immoral in Cicero's eyes, and points to the possibility of a proto-distinction between the public and private interests within the public sphere, or at least a tension between the community and individual qua individual.

Before one looks at Cicero's critique of Epicureanism, it is important to lay out his understanding of what makes different philosophical schools more or less worthy of following. This division is especially important for his criticism of Epicureanism as an inherently immoral philosophy. The basic difference between the various schools of thought lies in their perception of the supreme good: what it is, and whether it is possible to attain. According to Cicero, there are three categories of things that are considered the supreme good, each with an associated philosopher or school of thought:

- pleasure (*voluptas*)
- freedom from pain (*non dolere*)
- enjoyment of the primary goods (*fruendi quas primas secundum natura)*

(Cicero. 2004. p124. & Cicero. 1915. Bk V, 20). Philosophical schools either claim that the ultimate goal of a person is to try to achieve the supreme good, regardless of success in the attempt, i.e. to aim at it; or that the goal is to actually attain the supreme good in question. Additionally, there are three further approaches which Cicero calls 'complex or dual theories of the supreme good': those that combine either of the three supreme goods with morality (Cicero. 2004. p124).

Tab. 1: Cicero's division of philosophical positions based on their view of the supreme good.[2]

	aim at	**attain**	**morality + supreme good**
pleasure	–	Aristippus	Callipho and Dinomachus
freedom from pain	–	Hieronymus	Diodorus
primary goods	*Stoicism*	Carneades*	*Peripatetics and Antiochean Platonism*

Taken from pp38-40 and p124 of *On Moral Ends*.

*Cicero claims that this was not Carneades' opinion but that he merely defended it for the sake of the argument.

In the first category, the only philosophical school of thought Cicero presents is Stoicism, as it is the only one that 'has actually been defended' (ibid). Cicero dismisses all three positions in the second category, as they ignore morality, and thus cannot be considered worthy of pursuit. However, he does not dismiss Stoicism, because the supreme good Stoics try to aim at is morality. Ultimately, Cicero also dismisses the combination of pleasure with morality as well as the combination of freedom from pain with morality. His reasoning here is consistent with his dismissal of the philosophies that focus on attaining the supreme good: 'pleasure must be excluded [from our consideration], since we are born for greater things […]. One can say pretty much the same about freedom from pain.' (ibid.). Despite this, he accepts the attainment of primary goods as an addition to morality, which he claims is the Academic and Peripatetic position (ibid). This gives Cicero two views and three legitimate philosophical schools to consider: morality as sole good, with primary goods to be selected but not sought – Stoicism, or morality with primary good sought after: Antiochean Platonism, and Peripatetics.

Interesting to note is the fact that Cicero does not include Epicureanism in his division of philosophical schools and he does not address this exclusion even in passing, as he does

2 In this division of philosophical schools, Cicero does not include Democritus, since the focus of his enquiry is the *sources* of a happy life, not its definition. He also does not include the theories of Pyrrho, Aristo, and Erillus, which he describes as: 'long discredited, they were never worthy of application' (ibid. p125).

with others (see footnote 2). It could be argued, based on his criticism in first two books of *De finibus*, that Cicero does not consider Epicureanism as a philosophical school of thought on its own. Its physics is derivative from Democritus, and its ethics is incoherent and can be read in two ways: either of those two ways leads one to a different, already established, school of thought, which, Cicero argues, has stronger arguments for its position than Epicureanism ever had.

Cicero sketches out this critique of Epicureanism in Book I of *De finibus* and fleshes it out in Book II. He begins with Epicurean physics, which is largely taken from Democritus. The parts in which Epicurus diverts from him are deeply inferior (ibid. pp9-10). Subsequently, Cicero claims, Epicurus' logic is flawed and he is 'defenceless and destitute' in his argument (ibid. p10). This foreshadows the first part of Book II in which Cicero attacks the Epicurean concept of static pleasure (i.e. absence of pain) as nonsensical, since, according to him, there is a clear and distinct difference between absence of pain and pleasure, and therefore, static pleasure is not a pleasure at all, 'One feels pleasure when dining well, pain when on the rack. Surely, between these two extremes you observe a great multitude of people who are feeling neither pleasure nor pain?' (ibid. p31). If one understands pleasure as a positive feeling, i.e., *feeling* pleasure (synonymous with Epicurean kinetic pleasure), rather than a negative one, i.e. a *lack* of pain (Epicurean static pleasure), Cicero claims that the arguments of the Cyrenaics are superior to Epicurus'. However, he also points out that it is 'the sort of position that seems utterly unworthy of a human being' since 'nature has created and shaped us for better things' (ibid. p11). If pleasure is considered a negative feeling, static pleasure, or absence of pain, this *lack* should not be termed pleasure at all. Thus, Epicurean ideas are either hedonistic and unworthy of being pursued, or their terminology is fundamentally flawed.

Furthermore, Epicurus' position on pleasures is inconsistent in its appeal to people – Cicero claims that, if understood as claiming that ethical actions are 'immediately pleasant in themselves, without a reference to the body, then virtue and knowledge will turn out to be desirable in themselves, and that is something which Epicurus would utterly reject.' (ibid. pp11-12). Since Cicero does not elaborate on this point, one is left to guess. He notes that to consider virtue desirable in itself, one must stop considering only the body. It seems that,

since both static and kinetic pleasures, to use Epicurean language, are inherently connected to one's body, declaring something that is removed from it, i.e. virtuous actions, as desirable in itself undermines the entire system which is focused on *bodily* perceptions. Additionally, it would establish virtue as necessarily superior to bodily pleasures since people acting accordingly would be willing to undergo a great deal of pain to act ethically. Thus, at this point, the author proposes to read *individual* in place of *bodily*. There are two reasons for this reading: both pain and pleasure can be mental as well as physical, which is a distinction Cicero does not make, thus 'bodily' points towards something else: one's individuality. Second, in his moral critique, Cicero focuses a great deal on virtuous actions, and emotional pleasure taken from a virtuous act his not on his list of considerations. Without the distinction between emotional and bodily pleasure, virtuous actions would not be immediately pleasant as such since they have no direct pleasurable effect, lending credibility to Cicero's analysis of Epicurus rejecting this position. This would then negate the desirability of virtuous acts, creating a system based on immediate pleasure based on physical stimuli. This is an ethically repulsive position for Cicero, as well as not being different from any other hedonistic position. If virtuous actions are to have an inherently desirable quality, it must come from somewhere beyond both the body and the individual since one's pleasure from acting virtuously is derived from the virtue of the action itself. Thus, the emotional pleasure derived from virtuous action would, on Cicero's reading be derived from the duty the individual has to his community the importance of which transcends oneself.

The Insufficient Definitions of Pleasure, Pain, and Absence Thereof

Cicero's position on Epicurean language and its defects can be summarised with two quotes: 'As things are, I would claim that Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is', and 'Either Epicurus does not know what pleasure is or the rest of the human race does not know' (both ibid. p28). He considers the Epicurean concept of static pleasure (i.e., the absence of pain) to be nonsensical, since there is a clear and distinct difference between an absence of pain and pleasure. Therefore, static pleasure is not a pleasure at all. He points out the qualitative difference by asking his interlocutor representing Epicureanism if drinking when thirsty is the same sort of pleasure as quenching one's thirst. The answer is that they are different – the former is a kinetic pleasure, whilst the latter is static. Cicero claims that

those two are so dissimilar that one should not use the same name for them. Having one's thirst quenched is a *state* in which one does not feel pain, however, quenching one's thirst by drinking is an *act*, which directly provides pleasure. Even though the source of pleasure is removing pain, it is still pleasurable. However, the difference is that once one has removed the source of pain (thirst), one will no longer feel pleasure. Thus one will enter into a state of the absence of pain *and* pleasure that is fundamentally distinct from feeling either of those. Furthermore, even in this early stage, Cicero's moral objections to considering pleasure not only a good, but the highest good are apparent in his exclamation: 'Why do you need to drag pleasure into the company of the virtues, like a common harlot in a gathering of well-bred ladies?' (ibid. p30). For Cicero, pleasure is a base feeling connected to one's body, which should not take precedence over rationality, which is man's unique feature when compared to other animals. Thus, those who make pleasure the highest of all goods are debasing their own nature.

Cicero's critique boils down to two points: first, there is a difference between an absence of pain and a feeling of pleasure. Using the term 'pleasure' to describe both is, in Cicero's opinion, faulty logic. Second, if pleasure, described as ἡδονή or its Latin equivalent *voluptas*, is the greatest good, Epicureanism would necessarily be a purely hedonistic philosophy, and arguments for hedonism have been postulated before with greater elegance and superior form in Cicero's mind. If it is not, and Epicurean pleasure is regarded as absence of pain, there again philosophers preceding Epicurus have had a better grasp on logic and language. In either case, not only is Epicureanism not a new philosophy, it should not even be considered a philosophy at all, as its logic is vague and leaves one with two options, either of which has been articulated before. Ultimately, however, the issues of language and logic are not the most detrimental aspect of Epicureanism. Morally, it does not matter whether the main goal of Epicureanism is to follow Aristippus or Hieronymus' philosophy. What matters is that in either case it would not be ethical to act according to it. Hence, Cicero concludes that 'the upshot is not that pleasure is not pleasure, but that it is not the supreme good' (ibid. p34).

The Intrinsic Immorality of Epicurean Thought

The shift in Cicero's argument between criticising what he considers a faulty language or logic, and objecting to Epicurean thought on ethical grounds is subtle, but crucial. He defines morality, i.e. *honestum*, which is closely connected to virtue and duty, as 'that which can justly be esteemed on its own account, independently of any utility, and of any reward or profit that may accrue' (ibid. p41). Thus the fundamental aspect here is utility and profit. For Epicureans, a good action is guided rationally towards the end of static pleasure and all possibilities should be evaluated according to their contribution to achieving this goal. Thus, every action performed on this basis is done for a profit, i.e., a life not plagued by pain. According to Cicero's definition of morality, this makes Epicureanism as immoral as the hedonistic philosophers from whom Epicureans claim to be distinct. Thus, when Cicero provides the reader with examples of Romans who acted virtuously, it is not only with the purpose of celebrating the achievements of valiant ancestors, but also presenting ideals of virtuous action to be juxtaposed against Epicurean immorality.

To consider an act as virtuous in Ciceronian terms, its motivation must be external to the individual actor. That is, it needs to lie in the community. A sacrifice is not a sacrifice if it is internal and individual, i.e., done for own sake or pleasure. Thus, to use the example of Decius and his sons, their sacrifice would not only not be virtuous in Roman eyes if done with the view of achieving pleasure from it (e.g. in the knowledge of posthumous fame), it would also be incomprehensible as a concept. Not virtuous because virtue is qualitatively different from pleasure – virtue is the highest thing a human mind can achieve and pleasure is common to man and beast alike. Incomprehensible, because, if done for individual gain (under which category Epicurean pleasure falls), one would gain pleasure from the act. That is hardly possible since any sort of sacrifice includes a not insignificant amount of pain, and pain is evil according to Epicureanism. This is the reason for understanding bodily pleasure as individual pleasure when Cicero pointed out that if virtuous acts were considered desirable on their own, Epicurean theory would collapse. On the example of Decius, his action was desirable in itself, not inasmuch as it was pleasurable in any sense of the word, but because it was the virtuous thing to do. Since physical pleasure is impossible to achieve through these kinds of acts, there remains the question of emotional pleasure. However, any

kind of pleasure of this sort would be achieved because the act performed is ethical. Therefore, any emotional pleasure would be the consequence of the virtuousness of the action itself, and so could not be the motivation for that action in the first place. Thus the question of pleasure and its (lack of a) role in performing virtuous actions concerns not merely the body but the mind of the actor as well and thus can be considered truly individual, not merely bodily.

Given that virtuous acts are separate from pleasure, Cicero's claim that one acts virtuously only *despite* the presence of pain (or absence of pleasure) is valid. This is implicit in the entirety of Cicero's critique, but is most clearly present in this dismissal of Epicurean morality, language, and rhetoric:

> 'Indeed it is the Peripatetics and the Stoics whose vocabulary is on your lips in the court-room and the Senate: ''duty'', ''fairness'', ''worthiness'', ''integrity'', ''rectitude'', ''honour'', ''the dignity of office'', ''the dignity of the Roman people'', ''risk everything for your country'', ''die for your native land''. When you utter these phrases, we dupes gasp in admiration. Meanwhile, you are laughing to yourself. Pleasure has no place in the company of such splendid and distinguished words. I refer not just to what you call ''kinetic'' pleasure and what everyone else – sophisticates, rustics, everyone, in fact, who speaks the language – calls ''pleasure''. There is no room either for your ''static'' pleasure, not that anyone apart from you Epicureans calls it pleasure at all' (ibid. p52).

Or in Latin, with the focus on the vocabulary concerning ethical actions:

> 'at vero illa, quae Peripatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt in iudiciis, in senatu. *officium*, *aequitatem*, *dignitatem*, *fidem*, *recta*, *honesta*, *digna imperio*, d*igna populo Romano*, *omnia pericula pro re publica*, *mori pro patria*, haec cum loqueris, nos barones stupemus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides.' (Cicero. 1915. Bk II, 77; emphs. added).

This passage serves two purposes: it cements Cicero's criticism of Epicurean logic and terms, and, much more importantly, it establishes Epicureanism as a truly immoral philosophy. Not only is the consideration of pleasure detrimental to virtuous action, when speaking in a *public* space Epicureans need to cloak their language in the vocabulary of philosophers who consider virtue, not pleasure, the highest good. Their fault is not simply in language, but also in their morals (Cicero. 2004. p37).

The Proto-distinction

Cicero's thorough criticism and dismissal of Epicureanism invites the question 'why Epicureanism in particular'? Rome's other favourite philosophical school, Stoicism, is also analysed and criticised in two books, but the nature of that discussion is different. Cicero does not call into question the very foundation of Stoicism, nor does he question its ethical principles. Cicero's focus on the practical ethical aspects of Epicureanism, seen in his invocation of heroic acts of Romans and his focus on Epicurean language in the Senate – the public body of Rome – hints at a certain anxiety in Cicero's mind. While the tension between public and private motivations was not really addresses or discussed, it seems that Cicero had had at least subconscious awareness of the issue as it manifested itself as a tension between the individual and the community. Epicurean ethics being inherently individual, the reasons for the focus and ferocity of Cicero's attack become clearer. With the growing popularity of Epicurean thought among elite Roman and the volatile political situation (the work was written in the same year that Caesar emerged victorious from the Civil War), Cicero's concern with virtuous action is logical. According to him, Epicureans who also happen to be virtuous men act ethically despite their philosophical allegiance, 'these people are a living refutation of their doctrines' (Ibid. p53). Thus, a widely popular philosophy based on individual pleasure as the highest good, whose adherents happen to be decent men only despite its teachings, is threatening the remnants of freedom of the Roman Republic in Cicero's eyes. Epicureanism threatens not only the position of wisdom in a man, but also the 'moral rectitude' of the people and thus should be fought out 'with horse and foot', that is completely driven out from the intellectual life of the Republic (Cicero. 1913. Bk III, 116-117).

Since Cicero's aim in opposing Epicureanism is to prove the contradictions and inadequacies intrinsic to its philosophy, his charges of immorality do not seem to be crucial for his aim. However, the prominence that the ethical critique of Epicureanism receives, makes more sense if placed in the context of a proto-distinction between public and private within the public sphere. This proto-distinction is not completely dependent on modern concepts of public and private. Rather it focuses on the tension between the community and the individual within it. Despite the lack of common concepts between Roman and contemporary thought, an individual is easily seen as a precursor to what is now considered private, and community to what is public. The argument here is that there was a tension between what can be described as public and private, and that this tension contributed to the collapse of the Late Roman Republic. Thus, Cicero's anxiety over the inherently individualist nature of Epicureanism is very telling.

Given the political situation of the era in which Cicero was writing, it is understandable that Cicero attacks Epicureanism with more vitriol than any other philosophy. The political system of the Roman Republic is based on exclusion and, theoretically, only the best men get to rule. In practice, it is those with money, influence, and, occasionally, intellectual gifts, as in Cicero's case. However, the apolitical individualism at heart of Epicureanism threatens the very core of the Republic's public political system. Furthermore, the caprice of one ruler is not only dangerous to the freedom of 'the people', i.e., the privileged ones, but also threatens the very existence of the Republic as it stood. Therefore, in Cicero's eyes, individualism, represented by Epicureanism needs to be defeated, for the good of all.

Terms and Definitions

Roman Republic had been experiencing upheavals since at least the early 1st century, or late 2nd century BCE. The question of dating the rise of the problems that had persisted until the collapse of the Late Roman Republic is outside the scope of this work. Regardless whether one starts the dating with the killings of the Gracchi brothers, or the Social Wars, the issue remains: these conflicts were fundamentally centred on the tensions between the public and private spheres in the existing political and social system. For ease of chronology, the author chooses to start with the Social Wars of 91-89 BCE. However, even if one includes the reforms of the Gracchi brothers, the violence had its roots in the question of rights. The Social Wars were caused by the exclusion of other Italic tribes from the citizenship rights enjoyed by the Romans, thus denying them the political rights which enable one to participate in public affairs of one's community. A year later, Sulla's Civil Wars began, which were marked by proscriptions and brutality from both sides – Sulla's and his opponents Cinna and Marius'. The strike of political murders which served to strengthen the positions of generals in charge further destabilised the Republic and remained in the memories of Senators. For more details see Ford. 1985. pp 47-73 and Goldsworthy. 2006. pp 57-72.

This thesis works with a three-fold division of the spheres Roman society. The first, and most pronounced, division is between the public and private spheres. The second exists within the public sphere and will be defined later in this chapter. The private sphere concerns all members of society without access to the political realm and who thus could not directly influence either politics, or the society at large. This section is the largest, and includes slaves, foreigners living within the territory of the Republic, and, until the Social War of the early 1st century BCE, all members the of Italic tribes within that territory. In short, the members of the private sphere all those who are not male Roman citizens.[3] This definition

3 The question of the role of women is too complex to include in this thesis, but for ease of conceptualisation, women will be included in the private sphere. It is indeed true that women had had an influence on the politics of the Roman Republic (and later, the Roman Empire), however, this influence was not direct and did not go through public channels. Thus, despite the power women could occasionally wield, they cannot be considered actors in public sphere.

follows Arendt, who establishes a fundamental division between the public and private realms as axiomatic to all ancient political thought (see Arendt. 1958. p28). Members of the private sphere, could not enter public life and any influence they could wield was indirect, through non-public channels. Simply put, the public sphere concerns the political decisions of the Roman Republic. Membership in the public sphere was highly exclusive. Being male and having Roman citizenship were merely prerequisites. To influence political decisions, one had to have a significant amount of money and contacts. For instance, even though Cicero prided himself on being a *novus homo*, a person who had gained position within the Senate based on own merit, the truth is not that simple. A prospective Senator needed a high-quality education and enough allowance to enter both public life and, after several years, become a patron. So, even though joining the ruling class as a *novus homo* is a significant achievement, it was not possible without a significant amount of wealth behind the scenes.

The few members of the elite who were part of the public sphere, i.e., members of the Senate, were not only ‘public men’. While their role indeed was principally to guard the interests of the nation, they were also people with private, personal interests, affections, and motivations. The dual nature of the role of the Senators can be seen, for example, in the problematic aspect of the *cubiculum*, which was a room in Roman house where the public and private collided. Among the activities conducted in a *cubiculum* are display of art, illicit sexual affairs, murder, and reception of guests and conduct of business (Riggsby. 1997). This duality of roles and conduct brings to light the question of the conflict between the individual and the public within the public sphere, which I shall term ‘sub-private’ and ‘sub-public’. Cicero seems to unconsciously reveal this crucial distinction within the public sphere of the Late Roman Republic. His criticism of Epicurean ethics, explored in chapter I, hints at it. Since the main charge of his criticism of Epicureanism is not fully articulated, it seems that his opposition to Epicureanism was at least partly unconscious. To that extent, due to the lack of a fully conceptualised distinction between the sub-public and sub-private, or an individual agency that could oppose the wellness of community, Cicero was unable to articulate what lay at the core of his criticism of Epicureanism.

A further example of this tension is the relationships between Gaius Julius Caesar and Cicero, and between Mark Antony and Cicero. The realm of the purely private is out of the equation in these relationships—none of them was a strictly private person. By virtue of being members of the Senate, and so members of the public sphere, all of their actions were part of this sphere. However, since it is natural to have personal affections, these may come into conflict with one's public obligations. As they did. Personally, Cicero and Caesar liked each other, but politically, they were opponents and had to act accordingly. To an extent, Cicero's condemnation of Caesar in the *Philippics* reflects this relationship. Cicero never attacks Caesar's affairs as a private person. He does, however attack Caesar's politics as exemplified in his person. This marks a crucial difference between Cicero's denunciation of 'Caesar-as-tyrant' and his denunciation of Mark Antony in all of his private, personal glory. In other words, 'Caesar-as-person' was someone with whom Cicero had a positive relationship, but Cicero's public role, based on his definition of duty to the country, demanded he attack Caesar's political actions. Thus he condemns 'Caesar-as-tyrant' in *De officiis*. On the other hand, Cicero's position on 'Antony-as-politician' was the same as his relationship to 'Antony-as-person', neither of which being positive. With regard to Antony, the issue rested on Antony's inability to sustain the boundaries that this distinction between the sub-public and sub-private had created and which was implicit in the workings of Late Roman Republic's political life.

In other words, Cicero-the-person liked Caesar-the-person, and vice-versa. This is in contrast to their established political positions (Goldsworthy. 2006. p416). Due to external political pressures, Cicero had aligned himself with the faction opposing Caesar. Thus, Cicero-the-politician, needed to oppose Caesar-the-politician, but not necessarily Caesar-the-person. The question of Cicero-the-person and his relationship to Caesar-the-politician is less clear, but Cicero's refusal to join the Triumvirate suggests that Cicero as both a politician and a person was opposed to Caesar's political stance. Had their political views been aligned, Cicero would surely have joined the political alliance, especially as it would have granted him many benefits. However, this political rejection tells one nothing about Cicero's stance towards Caesar as a person. That relationship concerns Cicero-the-person and Caesar-the-person only. Thus, both men, intrinsically tied to the public sphere, are in a certain sense removed from, or even transcend it.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is Cicero's relationship with Mark Antony. Cicero despised Antony in all the permutations mentioned above. Cicero-the-person and Cicero-the-politician were in agreement: both despised Antony. Crucially, there is seemingly a lack of difference between the sub-private and the sub-public on Antony's part. Antony-the-politician equals Antony-the-person. Thus, when Cicero forewent the usual formalities of public discussion in the *Philippics*, it was only after Antony had himself done so in his now lost speeches. For Cicero, Antony's lack of distinction between Antony-the-politician and Antony-the-person was thus cemented even further (Cicero. 2009. p65). So long as Antony's private affairs were not openly attacked and he was treated as a public person, this delicate position in the tension between sub-public and sub-private was in balance. When Cicero, both as the-politician and the-person, attacked not only Antony-the-politician but also Antony-the-person, this balance collapsed, resulting in Cicero's murder and the violation of his remains when his head and hands were exhibited on the Rostra.

The paragraphs above show that while the biggest factor dividing the Roman society was the distinction between the public and private spheres, the tension within the public sphere had more impact on the events of the time. Its importance is granted by the nature of the public sphere, in which decisions are made that influence the entire society. To be able to conceptualise this tension within the public sphere and, based on the differences between the roles and duties of x-the-politician and x-the-person, the author proposes additional two categories as existing within the public sphere: *sub-private* and *sub-public*.

Fig 1. Graph of the tension between public and private spheres.



Due to differences between modern and ancient Roman societies, some terms which have acquired distinct meanings in modern societies can and will be used as synonymous when referring to Late Roman Republic society. Thus, ‘private’, ‘personal’, ‘individual’, and the spheres corresponding to each are used as synonyms, as are ‘public’, ‘political’, and ‘communal’ (that is, related to community) and their respective spheres. Based on these definitions, sub-private and sub-public always relate to members of the public sphere.

Murder, Political Murder, and Assassination

While killing, murder, and assassination refer to roughly the same result—a person dying as a result of someone else’s action—there is a difference. *Killing*, or *homicide*, does not convey anything beyond a circumstance under which someone dies. As Gaughan puts it, ‘Homicide means simply ‘’killing a person’” (Gaughan. 2010. p2). A killing may very well be a chance occurrence: the perpetrator does not choose his victim and the act is not premeditated; the act occurs accidentally. Thus, further on, *killing* will refer simply to the act of ending someone’s life, regardless of the intent or lack thereof. For an act to be a *murder*, there must be a motive and the victim chosen; it is a deliberate act. A murder is ‘a subset of homicide [...] intentional and malicious killing’ (ibid). However, she points out that there is no legislation considering murder in Ancient Roman law. Subsequently, she does not make a

qualitative distinction between a *murder* and *political murder*. Since the author suggests that for the purposes of this thesis, a distinction between a *sub-private* and a *sub-public* action should be considered in the analysis of the collapse of the Late Roman Republic, the author also proposes an additional distinction between *murder*, *political murder*, and *assassination*. Regarding *political murder* as connected in nature to *murder* – and as opposed to *assassination* might be overly simplistic, but seems to be sufficient for the purposes here.[4] Thus, the definition of 'intentional and malicious killing' remains for all three, but the difference is in the source of the motive.

For *murder*, the reason is a personal, i.e., private, grievance. With assassination, the reason for the killing is not personal. The act is done for motives that extend beyond the private sphere and may be in opposition to it. An *assassination* is a political, public act which removes a person who has an impact on the lives of others indirectly (in this case, through one's policies, not direct actions towards the person(s) in question). *Political murder* lies somewhere on the spectrum between the two, being an act done for private reasons but with political consequences. The directness of the action underlies the main distinction between the public and private, as well as the subdivision of public into sub-private and sub-public. A person acting in a way that directly affects another person or persons is acting within the limits of the private sphere. On the other hand, if someone's actions have an indirect impact, such as passing laws, the action transcends the private into the public sphere. Thus, the distinction between a murder (of whatever type) and an assassination is crucial for the topic of the role of the public and private spheres in the collapse of the Roman Republic. Given the scope of this thesis, the concern is with *political murder* and *assassination*, not 'simple murder' which concerns only what is fundamentally the private sphere. This distinction corresponds to the different kinds of relationships within the public sphere established before. In this sense, *murder* corresponds to the private sphere and *political murder* and *assassination* to *sub-private* and *sub-public*, respectively, within the public sphere.

4 There is a question of the exact nature of a 'political murder' in the context of the events of the 1st century BCE. This problem can be illustrated by the difficulty of characterising the purges of Sulla and Marius, the death of Publius Clodius Pulcher and others, and similar events that have a distinctly political feel, but do not fit strictly under the categories of either 'murder', or 'assassination'. However, this problem of further conceptualisation remains a topic for further research.

While torture and bodily punishment were common in the Roman world, citizens were almost always exempt from it.[5] While political murder and assassination might have been becoming more common, violating the body of a citizen was still largely a taboo. Even criminals were simply beheaded outside the sacred boundaries of the city or sentenced publicly and then killed out of sight, like the Catilinian conspirators (Rupke. 1992. pp63-64). Even Roman citizens convicted of a crime had a basic right to dignity in the sense that their bodies were generally not made into exhibits. Public spectacle was made of defeated enemies, who a) threatened the Republic, and b) were inferior to Roman citizens.[6] Nailing bits of Cicero, a *pater patriae,* to a public space is a gesture that signifies that he, a well-known and distinguished Roman citizen, was worth less than other foreign or domestic rebels. This exhibition of Cicero's mutilated remains, arguably, served Mark Antony's aim—to deny Cicero's humanity in the eyes of their fellow citizens.

Following the established definitions shows a clear difference between the deaths of Caesar and Cicero. Caesar was assassinated, Cicero murdered. The actions of the conspirators were directly influenced by the fear of Caesar's potential tyranny, not private grievances. Indeed, many conspirators owed Caesar their lives for being pardoned following the Civil War. Even Cicero, who had called the events of the Ides a 'most glorious deed' had been on friendly terms with Caesar (Cicero. 2009. p79). The case of Cicero's murder was quite different. Mark Antony and Cicero were never on friendly terms. While their opposition had a political charge as well, it was, fundamentally, a question of personal antipathy. This personal dislike is apparent form Cicero's *Philippics*, as well as the nature of Cicero's death. Apart from being put on a proscription list, his body had been violated following his execution in a

5 For example, when testifying before the court, slaves were always tortured beforehand, regardless of the level of their cooperation, since it was thought a slave would not testify truthfully without being tortured. Similarly, crucifixion was a fairly common punishment, but still limited to slaves and non-citizens. Roman citizen were exempt from violations of their bodies such as these.

6 That is, members of slave uprisings, such as Spartacus', whose crucified bodies lined the Via Appia, or the defeated chieftains and kings who were paraded in the Triumph. Even Vercingetorix, the leader of the last resistance of Gauls against Julius Caesar was killed out of sight. After being paraded in the Triumphal column, he was taken out of sight to be strangled as part of the celebrations. Cleopatra's sister was shown off in the procession, but kept alive for several years. Thus, even though the enemies of the Republic, such as Vercingetorix and Arsinoe, were paraded in front of people while they were alive, their deaths and the state of their bodies afterwards was private.

manner almost unheard of for a Roman citizen[7]. Plutarch describes it as, ‘a sight that made the Romans shudder; for they thought they saw there, not the face of Cicero, but an image of the soul of Antony (Plutarch. 1923. 49, 2).

7 There were cases of people’s heads being exhibited on the Rostra during the conflicts of Sulla and Marius (Goldswrothy. 2006. p56).

The Assassination of Gaius Julius Caesar

Several years after crossing the Rubicon and declaring war on the Republic, Caesar had gained complete control over Rome, becoming its de facto sole ruler. His authority rested not only on his military victory, but also on the fact that, during the Civil War, two of his staunchest opponents, Pompey and Cato the Younger, lost their lives. Given his position as a ruler with no real opposition and given the recent history (the conflicts of Sulla and Marius), there were concerns over the possibility of reprisals against his political and personal enemies since the distinction between the personal and the political had been muddled even more by Sulla and Marius during Sulla's Civil Wars of the 80s BCE. However, Caesar seemingly had no such ambitions. For him, political opponents or enemies did not demand personal enmity. His clemency during the Civil War was in line with the general political workings of the Roman Republic. Everyone had political enemies, but that did not mean they were personal enemies as well, Sulla and Marius were exceptions to this rule.

Furthermore, Caesar's *clementia* was not a new development. He had acted graciously towards defeated enemies in Gaul, despite their not being citizens, and so being considered inferior. The factor of inferiority is important. As Barden Dowling notes, 'The implication of hierarchy in grants of clemency, that the grantor is superior to the person pardoned, prohibits its dispensation to those who are not explicitly of lower status' (Dowling. 2006. p4). Throughout the conquest of the Gauls, Caesar acted with clemency, more leniently than many others would have in his place.[8] Then, throughout the Civil War, Caesar made a point of pardoning the defeated Senators, including Brutus and Cicero. When Pompey was slaughtered on the orders of Ptolemy XIII, Caesar expressed deep regret and anger, crying when presented with Pompey's signet ring and later supporting Cleopatra's claim against her brother on whose orders Pompey was murdered (Goldswothy. 2006. p526). How much the expression of his emotions was an act in front of the public is unanswerable, but the point remains: Caesar's political enemies were not violently persecuted by him, not even when

8 There is the issue of his slaughtering about 40,000 people of one city, Cenabum, but that was following repeated attempts at a rebellion and the slaughter of Roman citizens. Arguably, even this event does not contradict Caesar's *clementia* as strictness, or *severitas,* is a virtue on its own and not an opposite of clemency (Dowling. 2006. p7).

they stood on the opposite side of the battlefield. They were treated as kinsmen. However, despite no obvious reason to fear proscriptions or retaliation from Caesar's side, due to the violence and chaos of the conflict between Sulla and Marius, the possibility still preyed on the Senators' minds.

The main issue with *clementia Caesaris* is that it has been traditionally interpreted as a sign of tyrannical ambition due to the necessary imbalance of power between the one granting mercy or pardon and the one receiving it. The suicide of Cato the Younger is generally interpreted as his rejection of being indebted to Caesar (Konstan. 2005). An echo of this interpretation is found in Dowling's claim that 'clemency remains a quality connected to guilt and its acknowledgement, requiring the abasement of the suppliant before his pardoner' and establishes an obligation on the one being pardoned (Dowling. 2006. p27). Thus, Caesar's *clementia* contributed to fears of his tyrannical power. However, Konstan challenges this established view, making a distinction between *clementia* and *misericordia*, which are often used synonymously but remain different in nature. *Misericordia* is an emotion, while *clementia* is more akin to a habitual trait that can be exercised continuously. Furthermore, he claims that 'no passage in the writings of Cicero, Caesar, or their contemporaries indicates that clementia was anything but a welcome and approved quality of character' (Konstan. 2005. p344). Thus, the correlation between Caesar's clemency and his being perceived as a tyrant is at least not as clear as is often claimed.

Caesar's assassins claimed that they were liberating the Republic from tyrannical rule. Indeed, the faction of the conspirators came to be known as *Liberatores*. Cicero, who was not personally involved in the plot, espouses the same reasoning: Caesar was a tyrant and he had to die for the good of the Republic. This is hinted at in *De officiis*, and more straightforwardly claimed in the *Philippics*, where he calls Caesar a *rex* and claims that 'all decent men killed Caesar' in wishing for his death (Cicero. 2009. p83 & p87). In this sense, the political and the ethical are intertwined as the ethical duty to kill Caesar stems from the duty to one's country that Cicero puts above and beyond all other types, including to one's family (Cicero. 1913. Bk I, 58). The ethical duty to one's country also places Caesar's killing squarely within the sub-public part of the public sphere, making it an assassination. Following the Ides, Cicero became the staunchest supporter of the 'tyrannicide', providing

philosophical and intellectual justification for it in parts of his *Philippics*, which built on his ethical theory espoused in *De officiis*[9]. The question here, then, is if this assassination is in fact justifiable on Cicero's grounds.

Caesar's tyranny?

In *De officiis*, Cicero obliquely refers to Caesar as a tyrant, using the term derived from the Greek, τύραννος, rather than the Latin *dictator* (e.g. Cicero. 1913 Bk I, 112 & Bk II, 23). This signifies both the association of 'Oriental' decadence that had plagued Caesar's political career,[10] and the autocratic element of his rule, an element not yet present in *dictator* (Dunkle. 1967). That is to say, by calling Caesar a tyrant rather than a dictator, his official title, Cicero implies that Caesar is a despotic ruler, one who, by the very fact of his rule, harms the *res publica*. Similarly, in the *Philippics*, Cicero refers to Caesar as a king, deriving this from *regnum* and *rex* (Cicero. 2009. p87). In this way, Cicero associates Caesar with both the tyrannical rule of the deposed monarchs of the Roman kingdom and Oriental tyrants, playing on the Senate's fears. As Dunkle says, 'The Roman king and the Greek

9 Note on translation: As far as I am aware, there are two English translations of *De officiis*, Loeb version from 1913 translated by Walter Miller and William Guthrie's 1820 translation. While the author was working primarily with the Loeb translation, in certain places after a comparison with the Latin text, the 1820 version was followed, mostly due to the philosophical implications of the words used. For one thing, 'essence' or 'essential' used in the Loeb has a distinct philosophical connotations, but is not present in the Latin text (see for instance, Book I, 16, 18, and 70). For another, where the Loeb translates, 'We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar, who, to gain that sovereign power which by a *depraved imagination* he had conceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men,' Guthrie has it as, 'We had lately a glaring instance of this in the presumption of G. Caesar, who, in order to obtain that direction in the government which the *wildness of his imagination* had planned out, violated all laws, divine and human' (Bk I, 26; my emphs.). The Latin is, 'Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse *opinionis errore* finxerat, principatum' (my emph.). *Opiniones errore* and *depraved imagination* are quite distinct.

10 Early in his political career, Caesar allegedly had an affair with Nicomedes, king of Bythinia. This allegation plagued Caesar's entire career, exposing him to jabs from opponents, such as Bibulus' *Bythinicam reginam*' (Osgood. 2008. p687). In Roman perceptions of sexuality, the 'manliness' (*viritas)* of a man (*vir*) was determined by his active, penetrating, role in sexual acts. Being the passive partner in a homosexual (or any other) sexual intercourse was seen as diminishing one's manliness. *Viritas* was seen as connected to one's ability to rule well. Thus for Caesar to be perceived as the passive partner in relationship with Nicomedes, following the Greek custom of the younger man being the passive one, not only harmed his reputation but was seen as a sign of not being able to rule with the virtues associated with manliness. This then further connected Caesar to the stereotype of the 'Oriental' tyrant (see also footnote 11 below).

tyrant began to represent one stereotype to the Roman mind from the time Rome first became acquainted with the Greek tyrant' (Dunkle. 1967. p158). However, for all the rhetoric, Cicero does not give a straightforward reason or an argument for *why* he thinks Caesar a tyrant and a king.

Associating Caesar with Oriental tyranny served a two-fold purpose. More straightforwardly, the Roman perception of the Orient[11] was as both despotic and effeminate. Despotic autocracy plays up the deeply rooted fear of kingship in Senators' minds (ibid). On the other hand, an accusation of effeminacy was highly damaging to a Roman man's reputation. Effeminate traits were seen as incompatible with the standard to which a Roman *vir* was held. This is another frequent charge in Roman invective, especially present in the poems of Catullus, some of which are addressed to Caesar. In poem 57, for instance, Catullus accuses Caesar of improper sexual conduct with his lieutenant. This puts Caesar into an unmanly, and thus unvirtuous, position (Greene. 2006. p52). The origin of the word 'virtue' lies in the Latin *vir*, that is, a man. The allegations of both tyranny and effeminacy to which Caesar was frequently subjected, were used to point to an alleged deep flaw in his character, lack of virtue, and therefore to an inability to perform his duties as a citizen. They are intertwined, as 'one of the traits of a true *vir* is his ability to exercise *imperium* over foreign peoples' (ibid. p54). In this sense, Caesar is presented as someone who is not manly and *vir*tuous enough, thus threatening the well-being of the *res publica*.[12]

Another thing to note, in light of Cicero's defence of Caesar's assassination, is the mutually warm and friendly relationship the men had (Goldsworthy. 2006 p 416). Cicero comments to his brother Quintus, '[Caesar] is next to you and to our children in my heart; so near, indeed, that he is almost equal to them. I seem to myself to feel thus from judgement; for indeed I ought; but still I am warmed with love for him'. (Cicero. 1891. p73). The comment that Caesar's position in Cicero's affection is only after his brother and their children is significant, since Cicero states in *De officiis* that the order of duty is: gods, country, parents, then the

11 The terms 'Orient' or 'oriental' as well as 'the East' are not well defined but generally refer to Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, and so on.

12 Important to note here is the fact that *ad hominem* was not considered a logical fallacy in Antiquity. The first to articulate it as fallacy was John Locke in 17th century (Locke. 1690. Bk IV, ch 17, ¶21). Thus, what would be now considered as faulty logic was acceptable and even expected in Roman rhetoric, as seen in Ciceronian invective among others.

rest of the family, and then one's kinsmen (Cicero. 1913. Bk I, 58 & 160). These letters seemingly put Caesar into the family bracket, especially when one considers that the highest duty is to 'prove one's gratitude' (ibid. Bk I, 47). All in all, Cicero likes Caesar and considers him 'worthy' even if he is not in complete agreement with all of his political decisions. His position here is similar to his position of Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Platonism in *De finibus,* as opposed to his relationship to Mark Antony and Epicureanism, which shall be explored in the next chapter. This makes Cicero's support of the conspirators paradoxical. He is a beneficiary of Caesar's *clementia,* or at least his *misericordia*, and the men have a mutually warm relationship, yet he supports Caesar's assassination and describes him as tyrant and king, knowing the implications and wider connotations of these terms. This discrepancy points to the tension between the sub-public and sub-private, where Cicero's personal relationship is in opposition to his pubic duty. In the case of Caesar's alleged tyranny, the public duty in question is to defend the *res publica,* and the duty to one's fatherland is highest, after duty to the gods. Thus, it can be said, that given his position, Cicero acted ethically and virtuously, putting his public duty above personal relations.

However, the reasoning behind Cicero's belief that Caesar is really a tyrant or king in the making is still unclear. He seems to derive this judgement from Caesar's military conquest of the Republic and his title of *dictator in perpetuum*. The blame for the start of the Civil War, however, does not rest only on Caesar's shoulders. The refusal to compromise by a faction of Senators who would become allied with Pompey in the ensuing conflict, as well as Pompey himself, and especially Cato the Younger needs to be taken into account as well. This faction of 'distinguished senators loathed Caesar, many of them for *personal* as well as political reasons' (Goldsworthy. 2006. p447; emph. added). Furthermore, during the negotiations with Caesar, the opposition to Caesar's suggestions was so strong that Cicero came to believe that Pompey had wanted war. Meanwhile, Cato was overruling any possible agreements (ibid. 2006. pp447-456). This strengthens Caesar's claim that waging the Civil War was necessary to protect his *dignitas*, one of the most important assets of every Roman man (ibid. p450). So, while Caesar did cross the Rubicon, entering the Republic's territory with an armed force under his command, he is only one of several people involved in the start of the Civil War.

Thus, the question of justifying the assassination on Ciceronian grounds rests mostly on the issue of Caesar as *dictator in perpetuum*. This was a title given to Caesar by the Senate. He did not demand it. Following the Civil War, he had been named dictator for five years, which was not unprecedented (Sulla had been granted similar powers and he did lay down the title and retire). Later, the Senate conferred the title of *dictator in perpetuum* on Caesar, among many, many other honours which he, again, did not demand. Caesar's actions during this time show a dictator, but not a tyrant. He did act with the unlimited power granted to him by the Senate, but used it to quickly push through changes that needed to be made. As Goldsworhty says, 'Caesar did not take over a Republic that was functioning effectively', and it had not been for a while (ibid. 2006. p576). Two such reforms are a change to the corrupt system of giving out free grain to citizens and the reorganisation of the calendar whose festivals were badly out of sync with the times of year they were meant to celebrate (ibid. pp582-584). He did appoint officials based on favours, but this is not wildly out of the Roman custom of patronage. The election of officials had been based on bribery and favours for a long time. Caesar's actions made it more visible, since he was the only one repaying favours and there were many of them. Thus, while Caesar definitely was an absolute ruler who conferred favours to others, he was not a despotic tyrant.

An argument might be made that Caesar should have refused the honours granted to him by the Senate, which he could have done. The number of honours Caesar accepted might be perceived as a kind of vanity and immoderation, both associated with women and effeminacy. However, being granted honours and not refusing them is different from *demanding* honours, which Caesar did not do. Thus, the problem is not so much with Caesar for not refusing these honours as it is with the Senate for granting them in the first place. If Senators tried to ingratiate themselves with Caesar to protect themselves from possible purges, this would point to a lack of virtue in them reminiscent of Cicero's critique of Epicureanism, a failure to distinguish between the sub-public and sub-private in using public positions and honours to protect their personal selves from potential reprisal. It would also demonstrate a focus on the well-being of the self as opposed to that of the community, which is the role of Senators in Cicero's eyes. Thus, the Senators' heaping honours on Caesar is as immoral as Epicurean philosophy. They put their personal selves above the community. This makes Cicero's critique of Epicureanism as immoral all the more ironically apt. The

danger in Epicureanism he sensed, putting oneself above the community, is obvious here. The Senators, in their attempt to protect their individual selves from the faint threat of proscriptions, misused their public roles for sub-private interest.

In conclusion, Caesar was neither a tyrant of the Oriental style, nor a budding monarch. Therefore, his assassination, or ‘tyrannicide’ cannot be justified on the grounds Cicero lays out. The fact that the assassination is not justified, however, does not make Caesar’s killing a ‘political murder’. The justification Cicero provides is clearly concerned only with the public sphere, without the influence of the sub-private aspect. Indeed, Cicero defends the assassination *despite* personal feelings. This purely public nature of Caesar’s death makes it an assassination, just not justifiable one, on Cicero’s grounds.

The Murder of Marcus Tullius Cicero

Staying within the public sphere and focusing on the good of the community, it is possible to make an argument for killing Caesar. His assassination could be described as a ‘tyrannicide’, which served the Republic by removing a monarch-to-be, thus ensuring its freedom. Despite this, as shown in the previous chapter, the justification for Caesar’s assassination on Ciceronian grounds is not sufficient, and Caesar’s actions both during and after the Civil War exonerate him from the charge of tyranny. Regardless, the argument can be and has been made. There is no comparable argument to justify the murder of Cicero. Ultimately, the decision to put Cicero’s name on the proscription list came down to personal animosity. There was no political reason to remove Cicero, and Mark Antony had to barter with Octavian to do so. As Plutarch says, ‘the proscription of Cicero, however, caused most strife in their debates’, referring to the Second Triumvirate of Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus (Plutarch. 1923. 46,3). From a political perspective, if anything, Cicero’s reputation ensured that whoever got his backing wielded a substantial amount of traditionalist authority. Octavian tried to take advantage of this by allying himself with Cicero and trying to protect him from proscription at first.

Politically, and/or in public perception, Cicero was *pater patriae* due to his actions during the Catilinarian conspiracy. As he was prone to remind everyone, he arguably saved the Republic from an attempt at tyrannical rule. The actual facts of the conspiracy do not matter as much as the reputation Cicero gained by suppressing it. Whether Catiline was a real danger to the well-being of the Republic, the end result was that Cicero gained the reputation of saving the Republic from an existential threat. In sentencing Cicero to be killed, the Triumvirs’ actions—Mark Antony’s specifically—indicated that, no matter one’s public renown and their actions for the good of the Republic, no one was safe. Most importantly, what puts one in danger is someone’s private animosity, which has nothing to do with the community’s good. In other words, a saviour of the Republic can be killed on the orders of anyone with sufficient influence, regardless of the effect it has on the well-being of the community. In this sense, one’s service to the community does not matter in the face of private spite, making the public good subservient to private feelings. Under the pretence of a

democratic[13] government, killing Cicero was not politically expedient on two counts. First, his approval held sway over others, as has been exploited by the traditionalist faction in the run up to Civil War. Second, his title of the father of the fatherland makes him someone whose removal should carry political repercussions. However, he was murdered. Political and public consideration had given way to private ones. To ensure his own public position, it was more useful for Octavian to work with Mark Antony privately and have Cicero killed than to work with Cicero politically.[14]

Arguably, the reason Mark Antony decided to have Cicero murdered is the Philippics, a series of speeches by the latter against the former. However, Cicero and Mark Antony's mutual animosity preceded this. Cicero claims (as with all of his claims, it cannot be taken at a face value, given his tendency for self-propaganda) that Mark Antony would have killed him in Brundisium after Cicero had surrendered if Caesar had not prevented this. With Caesar dead, Mark Antony was free to act without restraint. Without speculating on their previous personal relationship, it is safe to say that the events following the Civil War show that there was a deep, personal, and mutual animosity between the two men. The origins of their dislike are different. Antony's dislike is purely personal, indicating an absence of the distinction between sub-private and sub-public on his part. The distinction between Antony-the-politician and Antony-the-person is lacking. On Cicero's side, the distinction is present but did not have to be enforced since both Cicero-the-person and Cicero-the-politician were in agreement. The conflict boils down to Antony subjecting public considerations to personal ones, versus Cicero's personal issues being in harmony with his public duty. Thus, this conflict can be characterised as between Antony-the-person and Cicero-the-politician, without any internal conflicts between the respective roles of the men present as was the case in the relationship between Caesar and Cicero.

Interestingly, Antony's personal failings pointed out by Cicero prompt a reaction that in fact demonstrates the accuracy of Cicero's personal dislike as related to the public good. Part of

13 The pretence of a democratic political system would be present for decades even after Augustus took charge as the sole ruler. Augustus styled himself a *princeps*, first among equals, not an emperor.

14 With regards to the political process of the Late Roman Republic, it might be of interest to note that, having established his own rule, Augustus did grant political favours to Cicero's son, and during that consulship took down all statues of Antony (Plutarch. 1923. 49,5.)

Cicero's personal dislike of Antony was related to Antony's wanton lifestyle and lack of moderation. On a famous occasion, after a night of drinking, Antony vomited in the Senate and later, when criticised over his drinking, he wrote a pamphlet boasting of his prowess (Goldsworthy. 2010. p209). Immoderation in personal conduct was long associated with tyrannical tendencies and decadence unworthy of Roman *vir* (see chapter II). Cicero's dislike of Antony points to the role of sub-public and sub-private. It is possible for two men to disagree politically and retain a working, or even friendly, personal relationship, as shown by Caesar and Cicero. This is possible, however, only if both men are respectable. In the case of someone whose sub-private conduct shows immoral actions to the extent that their political decisions harm the community, as with Antony, no political or personal alliance is possible in Cicero's eyes.

This position is indicated by Cicero's language with regard to Mark Antony as opposed to his comments on Caesar. As said in previous chapter, the difference in Cicero's language parallels his attitudes towards various philosophical schools in *De finibus*. The schools of thought which take ethics into account, especially those that make it a foremost priority are treated seriously and with respect, as more or less equal participants in a debate. Cicero was a skeptic, after all, open to different opinions as long as these had an ethical standpoint. Epicureanism is the outlier here. While Cicero begins with a presentation of its outlines, he does not treat Epicureanism as seriously as Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Platonism. He does not consider Epicureanism a cogent philosophical position and his comments about it are often derisive. This contrast of respect for philosophies shown in *De finibus* parallels his treatment of Caesar and Antony. Cicero is not derisive or sarcastic when talking about Caesar, before or after the latter's death. Even in letters to his brother that focus on their position and possible ingratiation with Caesar, there is a certain level of respect for the man. Similarly, Caesar and Cicero exchanged their yet-unpublished writings and provided feedback for each other. Sending one's political opponent unpublished writing and wanting to hear their opinion points to a level of respect or even friendship that is personal and distinct from the respective political roles. Nothing of this sort occurs in Cicero's interactions with Mark Antony.

The animosity between the two was always personal and, as the second Philippic shows, that remained its defining feature. In the absence of Mark Antony's writings, one needs to rely on Cicero. From his comments, it is not inconceivable to say that Mark Antony lacked the willingness or ability to distinguish between public and private relations, which Cicero was willing to do until the *Philippics*. There is of course a danger of bias and misinterpretation by relying exclusively on Cicero here. However, he does insist that he had treated Antony 'professionally' whilst Antony had been focused on their personal dislike (Cicero. 2009. p61). From these claims, the presumption is that Cicero was willing to have a political relationship without a personal one, while Antony refused this due to personal animosity. Cicero's willingness to establish a political relationship following the death of Caesar, despite Antony's moral shortcomings, shows the instability of the situation following Caesar's death.

Regardless, Cicero's comments on Antony in the *Philippics* are similar to his dismissal of Epicureanism. The most notable similarity is in the way he denies to both the ability or capability of forming a well-argued, rational position. Cicero claims that Epicurus confuses his terms, making his logic inconsistent (see chapter I), which Antony does as well: 'But in your witlessness you were fighting against yourself all through your speech, […] you were more in conflict with yourself than with me' (Cicero. 2009. p73). Cicero's contempt for those unable to follow the rules of logic is shown in what amounts to an infantilisation of both the Epicurean position and Mark Antony himself. In the *Philippics*, Cicero repeatedly refers to Mark Antony as 'O wise man, O man not merely eloquent' as well as the more straightforward 'you, O stupidest of all men'. In *De finibus*, the first chapter belittles the Epicureanism position and Cicero claims that Epicurus lacks 'all skill and care in making the points he wants to put across'. Cicero undermines the arguments of both Epicureanism and Mark Antony through this infantilisation, the claim that both lack wisdom and intelligence and thus are not worthy of being argued against with logic but should be dismissed as children who do not know what they are talking about. The consequence of their childishness is an inability to create a coherent argument. The other way Cicero opposes Antony and Epicurus' arguments is straightforward refutation of their incoherence. While in Book II of *De finibus*, Cicero largely abandons the condescending tone, he does not let go of it throughout the *Philippics*, which might be a contributing factor to Antony's reaction.

Given the fact that harsh political invective was not uncommon in Rome and ad was hominem not considered a logical fallacy, Cicero's death seems like an overreaction on Antony's part. After all, Cicero's comments on Caesar were quite harsh as well.[15] When Catullus apologized for his poem (see chapter III), Caesar invited him to dinner (Goldsworthy. 2006. p 286). Unlike Mark Antony, Caesar had neither of those men murdered. He even had an opportunity to kill Cicero during the Civil War and chose not to do so. It seems that, despite the insults, Caesar's sub-private character was respected insofar as he was still treated as an equal, not an inferior. Cicero's treatment of Antony in the Philippics denies Antony this honour and Cicero treats him like a child. While Antony's role in Cicero's death proved an absence of distinction between what is sub-private and sub-public in Antony's mind and proved Cicero right, being right had cost Cicero his life.

Cicero's grounds for the justification of Caesar's assassination were that it was for the good of the res publica. Even though the argument for this claim fails, the fact that Cicero based his argument on the good of the community makes Caesar's death an assassination, even if an unjustified one. There is no such claim to be made about the murder of Cicero and Antony did not try to make one. From what can be gathered from historical sources, Antony's motivation for his insistence on placing Cicero on the proscriptions list is personal due to Cicero's Philippics. This personal aspect makes Cicero's death a murder, but since all involved were part of the public sphere, Antony's motivation falls under the sub-private category, making it a political murder.

15 See previous chapter. Another example is the reminder of Caesar's alleged sexual relationship with king Nicomedes of Bithynia during the proceedings in the Senate. When Caesar was speaking on behalf of Nicomedes' daughter, he mentioned Nicomedes' relation to Rome as well as himself personally, to which Cicero said: 'No more of that please, when everyone knows what he gave to you and what you gave to him.' (Goldsworthy. 2006. p95).

Concluding Remarks

The collapse of the Roman Republic is a complex topic, and the author does not imply that the issues around the lack of distinction between the sub-public and sub-private spheres are the sole reason for its collapse. Rather, due to the nature of political processes within the Republic, this tension may have played a role. The Roman political system was highly exclusive and the membership of the public sphere limited. The few members of the public sphere, however, were still people with private sympathies and antipathies. The distinction between the sub-public and sub-private is where these personal issues should have been articulated. However, the difference between the personal relationships of public officials and their public roles had become muddled around the beginning of the 1st century BCE. A contributing factor to this may have been Sulla's Civil Wars and the terror that followed them, marked by the proscriptions of both Sulla and his opponents Marius and Cinna. These events occurred scarce half a century before the events surrounding the collapse of the Republic, so they were in the living memory of all the important actors, including Cicero, Caesar, and Mark Antony.

Cicero's critique of the immorality of Epicureanism hints at an implicit recognition of this tension. However, he does not articulate it fully. This leads the author to conclude that, while the tension between personal motivations and public duty was present, it had not been fully recognised and, as such, there were no precautions taken against the possibility of an autocratic rule, even after Sulla's tyranny. Cicero recognises the importance Epicureanism places upon the individual in its claim that pleasure is the highest good. The claim that pleasure is the highest good implicitly puts the individual above the community since any act done for the good of the community can derive pleasure only from its status as a virtuous act. However, if virtue is not recognised as the highest good, this argument becomes circular, and no action done purely for the good of the community can be recognised as more choice-worthy than actions that cause direct pleasure in the individual. In this sense, Epicureanism is a popular expression of a trend that is highly dangerous to the *res publica*.

Using this recognition and the commonly accepted terms of public sphere, private sphere, murder, and assassination, one is able to trace out a distinction that seems important to the events leading to the collapse of the Republic. Within the public sphere, which encompasses all the political decisions made, there are still people with personal interests. However, their interests cannot be judged the same as the personal interests of people within the private sphere (i.e. slaves, women, and foreigners). Thus, the author proposes an additional distinction of private and public within the public sphere, here termed sub-private and sub-public. The sub-private refers to the personal motivations of the public individuals involved in the political decisions of the Late Roman Republic, such as Caesar, Cicero, Mark Antony, and others. The sub-public refers to the motivations that are concerned purely with the good of the community, here stemming from the duty to one's country as established in Cicero's works. Following this distinction, one can make a distinction between murder, political murder, and assassination. Murder corresponds to the private sphere, political murder to the sub-private aspect of the public sphere, and assassination is purely concerned with the public good.

With this distinction, one can narrow down the main difference between the deaths of Caesar and Cicero. Whereas Caesar was assassinated, Cicero was murdered. This distinction largely relies on Cicero's ethical theory since he had been the main intellectual power behind the attempts to justify Caesar's killing. Cicero's argument rests on Caesar being a tyrant. However, examining Caesar's actions, it is clear that Caesar was not a tyrant, but rather a dictator, a fully legal position conferred upon him. This makes Caesar's death an unjustified assassination. It is still an assassination, insofar as the justification for it was based on the common good, but it is not justified, since the claims about Caesar's tyranny are false.

Cicero's murder, however, had no possibility of such a justification and was based on purely personal spite. Antony and Cicero's relationship was not amicable, as was the case between Caesar and Cicero. The tension between them was exacerbated by Cicero's Philippics, in which he vehemently attacked Antony. As a result, Antony took offence and had Cicero murdered. Since there is no justification beyond personal animosity, Cicero's death must be considered a murder, but since both Cicero and Antony were members of the public sphere,

it cannot be considered on purely private axis. Thus, Cicero's death is a political murder – the result of a private spite within the public sphere. The language employed by Cicero in his attacks on Antony is similar to his critique of Epicureanism. In both cases Cicero dismisses the claims made by attacking the lack of logic in the arguments presented. His main focus in this dismissal is the unethical position of Epicureanism and the lack of morality in Antony's conduct. The source of this immorality in both is fundamentally the same – putting the individual above the community.

The death of the father of the country, Cicero, signified the collapse of the Republic. In a situation where even the man who had saved the community is not protected from personal animosity, the political system is broken. Similarly, in a system in which a political capital has less value than armed force, the political system does not work. Cicero's death marks both. His contribution to the well-being of the res publica was made unimportant. On the other side of the coin, Octavian's alliance with Cicero had less value than his alliance with Antony, which is why Octavian was willing to compromise about Cicero's death. The toga had ceded to arms. Ultimately, the tension between the personal and the political had come to a conclusion in the rule of Augustus who assimilated both sub-private and sub-public into one, the person of the Emperor.

Resumé

Táto práca je zameraná na udalosti týkajúce sa kolapsu Rímskej republiky a navrhuje, že napätie medzi verejnou a súkromnou sférou v ňom zohralo úlohu. Toto napätie má dve vrstvy – v prvej sa jedná o napätie medzi členmi verejnej sféry, ktorí riadili chod celej republiky a tými, ktorí boli z tejto sféry vylúčení (otroci, ženy, ľudia bez rímskeho občianstva). Napriek tomu, že toto rozdelenie zahŕňa väčšinu spoločnosti, táto práca poukazuje na fakt, že existovalo aj ďalšie rozdelenie týkajúce sa len členov sféry verejnej. Touto druhou vrstvou teda je napätie medzi individuálnymi motiváciami a verejnou rolou senátorov, ktoré zohrávalo kľúčovejšiu rolu v chode republiky, keďže sa týkalo tých ľudí, ktorí vykonávali politické rozhodnutia. Tento rozkol medzi osobným a politickým aspektom života senátorov je tejto práci uvádzaný pojmamy sub-privátne a sub-verejné. Vzhľadom na povahu rímskeho politického života, osobné motivácie senátorov mali aj politické dopady .Preto nie je možné v prípade členov verejnej sféry hovoriť o čisto súkromnej sfére, ale len o sub-privátnej. (Pre ilustráciu tohto rozdelenia sfér spoločnosti, viz. graf na strane 27). Toto napätie v rámci sféry verejnej je poukázané v kritike Epicuranizmu Marka Tullia Cicera a hrá rolu aj v zabitiach Cicera a Gaia Júlia Caesara. Na základe rozdelenia sféry na privátnu, sub-privátnu a sub-verejnú je možné vytvoriť distinkciu medzi rôznymi typmi zabitia. Vražda, politická vražda, aj atentát (úspešný) majú rovnaký výsledok – smrť obete. Rozdiel medzi nimi je určený práve charaktermi korešpondujúcich sociálnych sfér. Vražda má čisto osobnú motiváciu a teda sa zaraďuje do sféry súkromnej. Politická vražda a atentát sú súčasťou verejnej sféry kvôli svojim politickým konotáciám. Zaťiaľ čo motív pre atentát je čisto politický, a teda sa radí do sub-verejnej sféry, politická vražda je motivovaná osobne, ale má politický dopad a teda korešponduje so sférou sub-privátnou.

Napätie medzi sub-privátnou a sub-verejnou sférou nebolo počas rímskej doby explicitne rozpoznané, ale v diele Marca Tullia Cicera je možné vysledovať aspoň implicitnú úzkosť z nebezpečenstva, ktoré hrozí Republike ak je jednotlivec postavený nad komunitu. Z tohto pohľadu táto práca analyzuje Cicerovo *De finibus* bonorum et malorom, ktoré poskytuje prehľad hlavných filozofických škôl neskorej Republiky, teda Stoicizmu, Aristotelianizmu, Platonizmu a Epikureanizmu. V jazyku, ktorý Cicero používa pri tejto analýze je priepastný

rozdiel – zatiaľ čo jeho analýza prvých troch uvedených škôl je triezva a logická, jeho kritika Epikureanizmu je devastujúca. Cicero kritizuje nie len pochybnú logiku Epikureanizmu a problémy s terminológiou, ale hlavne sa sústredí na etické nedostatky tejto filozofie. Cicero naráža na etický problém, ktorý nastane ak je rozkoš považovaná za najväčšie dobro. Napriek tomu, že tento problém nie je explicitne artikulovaný, Cicero zdanlivo zjednocuje osobnú rozkoš s jednotlivcom, oproti cnosti a povinnosti ku komunite. V takomto prípade, ak je jednotlivec postavený nad dobro komunity, rímskemu politickému systému, založenému na etickej superiorite spoločnosti hrozí kolaps.

Cicerova úzkosť z nedostatku morality Epikureanizmu je signifikantná aj z historického pohľadu. Rímska republika bola v temer neustálom stave napätia od konca druhého storočia pred naším letopočtom. Bratia Gracchiovci, ktorí sa snažili o reformy, boli zavraždení, o niekoľko rokov nasledovala vojna o občianstvo, v ktorej sa Italické kmene bez občianstva vzopreli Rímu. Rok po skončení tejto vojny nastali dve Sullove občianske vojny, ktoré boli poznačené perzekúciami a brutalitou. V tejto situácii začínala politická kariéra viacerých kľúčových aktérov poslednej epizódy života Rímskej republiky: už spomínaného Cicera, ako aj Gaia Júlia Ceasara, Gnaia Pompeya a ďalších. Vzhľadom na tieto turbulentné časy a stále prítomných spomienok na násilie Sullových občianských vojen je pochopiteľná úzkosť Senátorov, keď sa Caesar stal jediným vládcom Republiky pod titulom *dictator in perpetuum*.

V *De officiis* Cicero argumentuje, že Caesar ako tyran musel byť zavraždený pre dobro Republiky. Napriek tomu, Cicero neposkytuje argumenty zdôvodňujúce svoje označenie Caesara ako tyrana. Keďže vyvolanie občianskej vojny nebolo jedine Caesarovou vinou, zdá sa, že Cicerovo zdôvodnenie spočíva v Caesarovom titule diktátora ako aj mnohých iných hodnostiach, ktoré mu boli udelené Senátom. Napriek množstvu hodností a ocenení, ktoré Caesar získal, nestalo sa tak na jeho želanie. Tieto tituly mu boli udelené Senátom, ktorého členovia mali v živej pamäti Sullove čistky. Ak senátori udeľovali Caesarovi hodnosti s účelom zavďačiť sa mu a ochrániť samých seba v prípade politických perzekúcií, poukazuje to na presne ten istý problém ako Cicerova kritika Epikureanizmu, to jest, postavenie jednotlivca a jeho motivácií nad dobro komunity. Pre Senátorov bolo vlastné dobro dôležitejšie ako dobro republiky. Každopádne, vzhľadom na Caesarove činy pred, počas, aj po občianskej vojne, nedá sa hovoriť o ňom ako o tyranovi. Ale keďže Cicerova

argumentácia pre zabitie Caesara operuje s dobrom komunity a teda v sub-verejnej sfére, dá sa hovoriť o Caesarovej smrti ako o atentáte aj keď nedostatočne odôvodnenom.

Opak je pravdou pri Cicerovej smrti. Nie je možné postaviť argument, ktorý by vravel, že Cicerova smrť bola pre dobro komunity. Marcus Antonius, ktorý trval na proskripcii Cicera, sa o to ani nepokúsil. Pravdepodobným dôvodom Cicerovej smrti boli jeho Philipiky – séria ostrých rečí atakujúcich Antonia. Antoniova reakcia znova poukazuje na napätie medzi sub-privátnou a sub-verejnou sférou. V rámci rímkej invektívy, ostré osobné útoky boli bežné, keďže ad hominem nebolo ešte rozoznané ako chyba v logike. Napriek tomu, invektívy nekončievali smrťou rečníka. To, že Antonius trval na umiestnení Cicera na proskripčný list a teda de facto na jeho zavraždení poukazuje na nedostatočné rozdelenie medzi osobnými motiváciami a verejnou službu v Antoniovom prípade. Znova bol jednotlivec postavený nad dobro komunity. Tento osobný charakter motívu pre zabitie Cicera zo strany člena verejnej sféry definuje tento ak ako politickú vraždu.

V konečnom dôsledku Rímska republika zanikla a bola nahradená Rímskym impériom, v ktorom toto napätie už nebolo dôležité, keďže sub-privátne a sub-verejné sféry sa asimilovali do postavy jedného človeka – cisára. Táto práca netvrdí, že toto napätie bolo jediným, alebo čo i len hlavným, dôvodom kolapsu Rímskej republiky, ale vzhľadom na dané udalosti to je aspekt, ktorý si zaslúži bližšie preskúmanie.

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