

**BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS**

**Energy Security in the EU: The effectiveness of the European  
Commission in the securitization of energy**

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## **Declaration of originality**

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is my own work and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature and other sources are attributed and cited in references

Bratislava, February 15, 2019

Jonathan Pavelka,

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

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## **Energy Security in the EU: The effectiveness of the European Commission in the securitization of energy**

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### **Abstract**

The European Commission is attempting to securitize energy through communication to the member states. Through Discourse analysis, placed within a securitization theoretical framework this work gathers and analyzes communication between the European Commission and the member states and judges how effective the European Commission is in securitizing energy. The results suggest that the member states largely reject the securitization offered by the commission and they prefer to follow their national economic and political interests. The only time that the Commission is successful in securitization is when the priorities of member states align with the suggested strategy proposed by the Commission. Therefore, it seems that the European Union does not have a securitizing actor that could effectively raise security issues, to which the member states would unitedly and effectively react.

## **Energetická Bezpečnosť v EU: Efektivita Európskej Komisie v sekuritizácii Energie**

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### **Abstrakt**

Európska Komisia sa pokúša o sekuritizáciu energie skrz komunikáciu s členskými štátmi EÚ. Použitím diskurznej analýzy, ktorá bude zasadená do teoretického modelu sekuritizácie sa táto práca venuje akumulácii a analýze komunikácie Európskej komisie s členskými štátmi. Následne bude posudzovaná efektivita komunikácie medzi Komisiou a členskými štátmi a bude zvažované ako úspešná bola sekuritizácia energie. Výsledky analýzy naznačujú, že členské štáty zväčša odmietajú sekuritizáciu Európskej komisie a preferujú nasledovať ich národné ekonomické a politické záujmy. Sekuritizácia Komisie je úspešná len v prípade, že sa priority členských štátov zhodovali so stratégiou sekuritizácie, ktorú Komisia predostrela členským štátom. Z toho vyplýva, že Európska Únia nemá sekuritizačného aktéra, ktorý by bol schopný efektívne navrhovať sekuritizačné podnety, na ktoré by členské štáty reagovali jednotne a efektívne.

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## **Introduction**

After the end of the second world war, Western European states that were not under control of the USSR realized that they must introduce a mechanism that will create a community of states that will be able to work together in a more cohesive manner and thus benefiting all member states involved. They needed to prevent another conflict and in the bipolar world dominating throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the European countries needed a mechanism to stay relevant as global actors. The embodiment of this realization was the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The very first article of the treaty on ECSC tells us that this beginning of the European project was “based on a common market, common objectives, and common institutions.” (European Coal and Steel Community, 1951).

The European project from its inception had to address cooperation that involved dealing with energy and fuel as well as external relations with other actors. Abundant supply of energy is what makes modern day industry possible and without a modern industry, the EU would be left behind in the era of rising superpowers such as the U.S and USSR. Without a reliable supply, there can be no guarantee that the industry of a state will be productive and thus it becomes vulnerable. Every member state must address its energy demands, otherwise its sovereignty can become compromised. Energy is a central condition to existence of an industrial society.

This thesis will address securitization of energy security in the European Union. The first chapter will provide an insight into the dynamics between the actors in the field of energy and their approaches to energy security. The second chapter provides a theoretical framework for analysis. Most importantly, the second chapter will provide definitions based on which the discourse analysis will be able to draw conclusions. The third chapter is a discourse analysis facilitating a dialogue between the European Commission and the member states and how do they react to the securitization offered by the commission and whether the communication of the Commission is successful in securitizing energy.

## 1. Dynamics of EU energy security

To be able to gain insight into current events of the EU energy sector, one must understand the nature and history of the European project. Throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, The European project has been moving from an economic union to also being a political Union. In its current form, under the Treaty of Lisbon, where policy is concerned with multiple policy areas, the Directorate General for Energy is responsible for drawing up legislation to prop up the Energy union. The mission of the Energy Union is to ensure that European Union is on the right track to meet the sustainable development goals as well as modernizing its economy the short description of competences provided by the DG for energy states: “This Commission department is responsible for the EU's energy policy: secure, sustainable, and competitively priced energy for Europe” (Directorate General for Energy, n.d.). What is more, the energy Union is supposed to bring interconnectedness and cooperation in energy amongst member states. “Undisturbed production and distribution of power is of vital importance to the EU and significant power failures could be damaging. An essential element for countering hybrid threats is to further diversify EU's energy sources, suppliers and routes, in order to provide more secure and resilient energy supplies” (POLICY, 2016). Just as it was important to stay relevant in the bipolar era of international relations, it is equally relevant to stay relevant in the rising multipolar world of 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the current global order, trade and movement of resources is key towards proper functioning of international actors and the actors rely on each other for goods, resources and services.

European Union remains one of the largest importers of Natural gas and thus it needs a stable supply to guarantee stability. Russia, on the other hand is the largest exporter of natural gas and due to its proximity, it is only natural that the largest percentage of natural gas imported by the EU comes from Russia. This makes the two powers reliant on each other and it creates leverage for one another alongside with a potential point of conflict.

This point of contention was never more obvious than during the gas shortages in 2006 and 2009 when the supply of Russian gas was halted due to a dispute between Russia and Ukraine. This realization was later on cemented by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 where both United States and the EU sanctioned Russia for the trespass onto the Ukrainian sovereignty. This led the EU Commission to fully realize the vulnerability of their position

with having majority of the member states gas supply being provided by Russia. With this realization, the term energy security has gained new relevance. In the year 2018, when the Russian military ceased Ukrainian ships during the Kerch strait incident, it further created doubts about the reliability of energy supply coming from Russia, an actor with a radically different set of values than the European Union.

As this work will prove, The Commission communicated the direction of the threat. What this work will analyze is how exactly did the Commission communication look like and how did the member states respond to this impetus. What we will see is how did the member states respond to the communication of the Commission act upon the recommendations and proposed policy by the Commission. The DG for energy has highlighted that if Energy security is to be achieved, there needs to be a continual investment by the member states into the infrastructure that will A: connect the member states so that they can move energy amongst each other and B: so that the infrastructure is ready and efficient enough for introducing new energy sources such as renewables. The strategy, if adhered to, is sound. The question is how will each member state interpret the strategy? Every government is accountable to its citizens and therefore acts in a way it deems the most beneficial for it. If there is a strategy that for a member state makes more sense to follow than the strategy devised by the commission, it is very probable that it will choose that course of action. Beneath all the debate about gas pipes and electricity grids, there is the ever-present and ongoing battle of wills between the national sovereignty and the interest of the community as a whole. The differing motivations and different positions that the member states are coming from make the consensus on certain issues seemingly unattainable, which is then possibly undermining the energy security of the entire community. This work is interested in the effectiveness of the European Commission in securitizing energy. The definition of securitization along with the framework of analysis will be provided later in further chapters of this work.


The core of the debate revolves around the difference between national policy and the EU law. As noted by the Professor of philosophy Jurgen Habermas “European treaties have established a direct legal relation between the institutions and the citizens of the Union, and have thereby created an autonomous level of law independent from the law of the member states.” (Habermas, 2012). However, with regards to Energy security, the Directorate General for energy is mainly dealing with the governments of the member states, not the citizens themselves. Here we approach an obstacle which is that “If the Union is not authorized to make final decisions, the subordination of national law under

European law actually in effect cannot be explained in terms of the customary hierarchical relation between federal and state law or constitutional law and secondary law” (Habermas, 2012). Since the member states are fully autonomous in their final decision making, the DG for energy cannot simply draft policy and get it accepted on an EU level, it needs to be accepted on a national level which adds yet another level of complication when trying to adhere to an EU wide strategy that will dictate the conditions for energy security in the not so distant future. In order for the member states to accept energy security as a primary issue, they need to be persuaded of its immediate and or potential effect in the future. The difference between securitization and securitizing move (simply calling for securitization) will be discussed and analyzed based on the framework proposed by the Copenhagen school of international relations, relying the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde called Security, a new framework for analysis. The relevance and application of this framework for this thesis will be discussed in the second chapter of this work.

First of all, it would be useful to take a look the current state of energy security in Europe using the overview of secondary literature on the subject as well as primary sources and statistics provided by EU institutions. This overview will give us the ability to ground the work and its findings within the current context.

Over the past 20 years, the energy dependency of the European union has increased by roughly 25% since 1995 (European Commission, 2014). The energy deficit required to supplement the EU energy need has grown since then. This indicates the amount of energy that needs to be supplemented from external sources. The rising necessity to supply energy externally is increasing the dependency on external actors. In the following graph we see the rise of imported energy.

## Energy dependency of the EU



Source: Eurostat, energy, Calculations of the European Commission

The more energy EU has to import, the more leverage external actors possess. Particularly problematic areas begin to form when a member state is dependent on an energy source that is mainly imported from external sources and the energy source is not diversified. EU” import Energy import dependency relates to crude oil (almost 90%), to natural gas (66%)” (European Commisison, 2014). In case of some member states, they become rather vulnerable due to their dependency on one supplier. Supplying of energy is vital for the whole EU community and must be secure. “The most pressing energy security of supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external supplier. This is particularly true for gas, but also applies to electricity: Six Member States depend from Russia as single external supplier for their entire gas imports and three of them use natural gas for more than a quarter of their total energy needs.” (European Commisison, 2014). According to the Commission, this is a definite weak point that needs to be addressed.

The recent events with the alleged murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal show that the regimes in Russia and Saudi Arabia operate on a vastly different set of values than the European Union, who happens to be the most reliant power on natural gas and oil. (Beckman, 2018). By being and continuing to be the biggest importer, EU indirectly supports these regimes by quietly consuming oil and natural gas, imported in vast quantities, providing immense resources for these regimes. Combining this information with the fact that energy reliance is only increasing, we can see the potential issue if EU would want to somehow oppose its suppliers in future

issues. Unless it diversifies and or becomes more self-sufficient, its negotiation power remains weak. “Europe, then, is in a highly vulnerable position on the energy market. The lesson for Europe should be clear enough: its extreme reliance on imports of oil and gas from nations such as Russia and Saudi Arabia provides another very good reason – in addition to carbon emissions – to reduce oil and gas consumption as quickly and as massively as possible.” (Beckman, 2018)

Additionally, the low interconnectedness of member states means that when certain areas of EU suffers cuts and or shortages, the rest of EU will not be able to help due to the lackluster infrastructure. In 2002, EU decided on a goal that by 2020, the interconnection of member states’ energy networks will be at 10%. In 2015 according to the European Commission, some member states were nowhere near the designated target.

- Ireland (9%)
- Italy, Romania, Portugal (7%)
- Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia (4%)
- The United Kingdom (6%)
- Spain (3%)
- Poland (2%)
- Cyprus and Malta (0%)

Source: Euractiv 2015

The logical step to counteract the single supplier issue would be to interconnect with a member state that does not rely on the same supplier as the rest of the EU. The Iberian Peninsula has long been an energy island, with insufficient connection to the rest of Europe due to the lack of energy infrastructure in the Pyrenees mountains. To resolve this, Commission along with Spain, Portugal and even the French pipeline operator Terega proposed the pipeline Midi-Catalonia (MidCat) That would essentially double the strength of the connection between France and Spain. Spain and Portugal are Importing from Algeria, they are not reliant on Russian gas. The interconnection with the rest of Europe would bring sizeable increase in variety of sources that EU could rely on. “The project proposers see the link[MidCat] as important for diversifying gas supply sources into Europe in the future, particularly given Spain's robust import capacity from north African gas producer Algeria and the Iberian peninsula's network of LNG reception points.” (S&P Global, 2018)

However, this project faces major opposition from the French energy regulator “La Commission de Regulation de l’Energie (CRE) has recently declared that the projected gas connection between France and Spain called MidCat, approved in 2015 by the presidents of France, Portugal, Spain and the EU, is actually not necessary. The CRE says that the costs are too high, and adds that Spain already has a number of regasification plants that are functioning at less than 25% of their nominal capacity and can feed all the required LNG to Spain and Portugal.” (Villa, 2016). The French regulatory body is completely disregarding the stance of Spain, Portugal and the energy commissioner European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete. It might be possible that the project might not be valuable purely from an economical perspective, but its contribution to EU energy security is undoubtable due to the fact that Spain is not consuming and not relying on Russian gas.

In July 2018, the three nations, France, Portugal and Spain have convened in an energy summit and they agreed on construction of “undersea power line in the Bay of Biscay as they up electricity links aimed at helping the Iberian Peninsula out of its energy isolation.” (Euractiv, 2018). No doubt this is a great move forward with regards to energy security in terms of demand for electricity, especially considering that Portugal is capable of exporting completely renewable energy. “Portugal produced more power from clean energy sources in March than it actually needed, marking the first time in the 21st century that renewables have topped 100% of its production. But a dearth of energy connections with the rest of Europe remains problematic. (Morgan, 2018)” The agreed powerline should address this issue and will contribute towards the EU targets of using renewable energy.

However, the tone of the French president changed slightly when the discussion circled towards the building of MidCat pipeline. His argument revolved around the same rhetoric used by the French energy regulator that questioned the economic viability. Once again, with regards to gas, France is continuing to ignore the needs of the community which is the interconnectedness of the EU. They stick to the economic argument, just as Germany does with regards to the Nord stream 2 pipeline. EU will not be able to continue becoming less energy dependent in the times it needs if two of the strongest member states continue pushing their own national agenda over the benefit of the EU. The need for lower energy dependency is heightening, but that is not about to happen unless the member states take action and adopt policy towards this goal.

The importance of lowering relevance becomes abundantly clear when the European Union has found itself with a worsening relationship with its eastern neighbor, Russia. Russia is employing the tactic of dividing the EU with energy which is only possible due to the current internal structure of the EU and the fact that it is still comprised of individual member states pursuing their own national interest that they can pursue due to national sovereignty. Yet, despite these negative developments such as sanctions against Russia triggered by the Russian invasion of Crimea, some member states still see Russia as a viable economic partner. This provides Russia with the capability to exert influence. The Finnish institute of foreign affairs have identified that Russia is indeed operationalizing the energy market as a means of gaining leverage. Unlike the individual member states with their respective agendas, Russia is a single actor under authoritarian rule that can devise an effective strategy without having to reach a consensus with other parties. The plurality in Russian politics would be outside of the scope of this work but we can safely assume that Gazprom which is a national firm is firmly controlled by the Russian government which is securely under Putin's command. In the study, there is a quote that sheds light onto the Russian mode of operation. "Greater goals and the strategic value of any given resource override corporate or personal economic interests, as noted by a long-time member of Putin's inner circle, Vladimir Yakunin" (Vihma, 2016)

The reason why European Union should take into consideration the geo-economic influence of Gazprom is the fact that Gazprom is constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This underwater pipeline beneath the Baltic sea is the key to Russian influence over Europe.

There are several reasons to believe that geo-economic motivation is at play vis-a-vis the Nord Stream II project. The current capacity of the existing Nord Stream gas pipe is severely underutilized, operating at only 50 per cent of its capacity, and no growth is expected in the European gas market to accommodate an increased supply. In order to fill both Nord Stream I and II after 2019, the existing landlines through Ukraine and Poland would be subjected to much less use. Underwater pipelines are notoriously expensive, and the price tag for Nord Stream II has been estimated at around €10 billion. As a basic commercial principle, it is always more profitable to use existing gas infrastructure than to build new underwater gas pipelines. (Vihma, 2016)



As the study concludes, this would make Ukraine lose the only political leverage it possesses with the Russians. The target market, European single market would be sufficiently nourished with cheap natural gas and it would be serving German economic interest. The eastern pipeline could be cut of, as it happened before, but this time, EU would not be pressured energy-wise by this Russian power move. When the annexation of Crimea happened, Germany was behind the negotiating table. European union, to this day is sanctioning Russia for the incursion into Ukrainian sovereignty. If the Nord stream 2 gets completed, Germany, previously the main negotiator, will have vested economic interest in the matter and it will change the solidarity aspect within the EU. “This would take place by increasing the market share in Germany, as well as giving Germany the key transit country status to European markets. Here, Nord Stream II would act as a carrot-oriented ‘wedge strategy’, creating divergent pressures on EU members and thus weakening the cohesion of the EU.” (Vihma, 2016) Another source presents Russian behavior as inclined towards using the “gas supplies and pricing to divide the political and business communities, dissuade political leaders from taking actions Moscow disfavors, and foment divisions that set the stage for negotiations on Russian terms.” (Collins & Mikulska, 2018). Nord stream 2 is not even finished and already this project created political tensions. A European council discussion happening in 2015 showed that Eastern European countries are protesting it. (Vihma, 2016). Counter-argument of Germany is that this issue is apolitical and only following economic interest stating that “the European partners of Nord Stream II are private companies aiming for profit, with no governmental involvement or advocacy.” (Vihma, 2016). This is technically not a lie, but it doesn’t deny that such a project, though economically profitable might have geopolitical influence elsewhere, more specifically, within the European community. Without a common stance against Russia, member states will not have the power to oppose Russia nor any other potential external circumstance coming towards EU.

In order for Energy security to be established, there needs to be an EU-wide co-operation that would ensure sufficient supplies of energy even during shortages. Collins and Mikulska are suggesting a common geo-economic strategy. “If executed well, the benefits of a gas geo-economics strategy could last for decades and bolster European resilience in the face of potential gas coercion by Russia” (Collins & Mikulska, 2018). Commission advised the member states to start building an energy network that would combat the current vulnerabilities and weak aspects of Eu energy security. A Directorate General for energy

has been established to draft policy and provide insight in how to achieve a common energy market within the EU. One of the DGE (Directorate General for energy) successes was the enforcement of the decision “concerning Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) between Member States and third countries in the field of energy on 2 May 2017. According to the new rules, Member States will have to notify the Commission their Intergovernmental Agreements in the field of gas and oil with non-EU countries before concluding them. Its key objective is to increase transparency on the gas market, make sure Intergovernmental Agreements are in line with EU law and strengthen the EU's resilience to gas supply disruptions.” (Directorate General for Energy, 2017). This was an important step in preventing further bilateral agreements that would further drive member states apart with regards to the energy union. However, this decision doesn't interconnect the energy networks of member states. That decision is ultimately made on national level, due to the sovereignty of member states.

In conclusion, reading through the secondary literature, it seems obvious where the threat to the European energy security lies. The secondary literature is largely saying the same as what the Commission has reported. The question is, how effective is the Commission in communicating its overview of the situation to the member states and to what extent do the member states respond to what the Commission is communicating? This work, using discourse analysis will take a look at the discourse between the Commission and the member states with regards to energy security. The next chapter will be describing a framework that will allow us to place our analysis into the securitization discourse through which our findings will be presented.

## **2. Framework of analyzing Energy security of the EU using the regional security complex theory**

This chapter is providing the thesis with the necessary theoretical backing in order to be able to successfully conduct a discourse analysis that will competently provide findings on how successful the Commission is in securitization of energy. The chapter will deliver the theoretical backing through a thorough inspection and explanation of the framework proposed by Barry Buzan.

### ***2.1 Explanation of the word energy security***

In order to understand what we are analyzing, we need to look at definitions of the phrase in question. Our subject of study “Energy security” is a compound of two separate terms. “Energy” and “Security” For our framework of analysis, we must realize that the term “Energy” is setting limits to the word Security. It is encapsulating the general concept of security and sets the scene for analyzing “security”. When dealing with security, we must predetermine who are the actors, what are the different variables and what are the possible channels of threat that actors can introduce into the system.

When dealing with energy, we must understand the very definition of energy, and we must understand that “All forms of energy are associated with motion” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). Energy in physics “is the capacity of doing work” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). Work on the other hand is the very fabric of our society since without work, nothing would be done or built. When there is lack of energy, there is lack of movement, therefore lack of production and no possibility of growth. No possibility of growth means lack of development and a lack of means to continue standard operation which means that extraordinary measures must be taken in order to restore the functioning of what has stopped working. By standard operation in this case we mean the functioning of the state and all its aspects vital for its self-maintenance. Lack of energy would mean destabilization. Since energy is vital for a member state, it does need to take responsibility for the procurement of energy for the normal functioning of its population.

## ***2.2 State responsibility for acquiring energy***

States are responsible for supply of energy to their citizens, who then utilize it in almost all facets of their daily existence (Industry, transport, housing). States also require energy for providing the basic services to their citizens. We could say that Energy is one of the Existential needs and thus the essential nature of energy is undeniable in modern society.

However, states rarely possess the capability to supply all the energy required from internal sources. Thus, they must reach to external suppliers. Reliance on an external supplier creates dependence, which means potential leverage. This leverage is the control of a vital asset that is connected to the existence of the state.

## ***2.3 Analysis of security***

When analyzing energy Security, we can't take into consideration looking at it through theories that view security in a standard, relatively narrow way. "The end of the Cold War sparked a debate over ideas of security in IR between 'narrowers' and 'wideners'. The narrowers were concerned with the security of the state and often focused on analyzing the military and political stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dissatisfied with this, wideners sought to include other types of threat that were not military in nature and that affected people rather than states. This expanded the security agenda by including concepts such as human security and regional security" (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). Within this debate, Realists perceive only the states and their respective military forces as units of analysis to which security can apply. All other variables are secondary to the analysis of security. "Fairly narrow concept of 'security' is central to the realist tradition. One might argue that this narrow conception of "security" (i.e., protection against violent attack or coercion) has been inextricably linked to realist thought since its inception" (Walt, 2010). Therefore, when dealing with area of security that does not involve conventional means of warfare but rather unconventional means of coercion, we must deploy other theories that promote widening the concept of security to analyze the concept. For that reason, this work is turning to securitization theory, more specifically to the Copenhagen school which is trying to differentiate itself by "a fresh take on the increasingly tiresome debate between those who claimed that threats are objective (i.e., what really constitutes a threat to international security) on the one hand, and those that maintained that security is subjective (what is perceived to be a threat) on the other" (Munster, 2012). This allows for a widened perspective on the concept of security that will

fit the context and the scenario that this work is focusing on. As was mentioned in the introduction, the debate on energy governance emerged along with the first iteration of the European project, the European Coal and Steel Community and with this project came the question of securitization of energy which permeated through time to the contemporary debate on the energy security of the European Union as a regional unit. Looking at EU through the perspective of regions can we assess external circumstances and vectors of influence and correlate them to the internal multi-layer security dynamic of the EU.

### ***2.4 Regional security complex theory framework***

The Regional Security Complex Theory proposed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde allows for looking at security in a multi-level approach and analyze different layers of actors that fall into play. As we are analyzing European Union, we must take into consideration the interplay between different layers, how might they be threatened and how is security viewed and portrayed. “The answer to what makes something an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival “ (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Survival is about taking steps to ensure the continuation of one’s existence. Therefore, in international politics, the question is who is the responsible actor for taking those steps in order to survive, and who is the actor threatening the survival? Even though we are drawing the definition from the narrow realist perspective, we are not strictly limiting ourselves into what can be a source of securitization. As we will argue later, there are many more sources of potential securitization coming from multiple areas rather than simply threat by conventional means through military force. However, the definition of what constitutes a security threat needs to be uniform across all channels of threat so that our analysis is coherent and valid.

Securitization happens, according to Buzan inside a security complex. Such complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). He provides a good explanatory example that can be applied to any actor. “The security of France has no real meaning to analyze if we do not consider its surroundings” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). In case of our analysis of the Energy security of the European Union, can’t be analyzed without considering what is surrounding it. and in our deployment, we want to look at how is it interconnected and therefore affected by external actors, such as Gazprom and Russia, who are projecting political power through energy supply. Energy security of

the European Union cannot be analyzed without considering the biggest supplier of natural gas, a resource upon which many countries are reliant on and are supplied by a single supplier, Russia.

When analyzing security, we need to define who is securitizing, and for whose sake does the securitization happen and against whom is it targeted. The Referent object is the entity that is designated by the securitizing actor. “The referent object is to which one can point and say; ‘it has to survive’ therefore it is necessary to...” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998) take steps and action that ensure the survival and the negation of the existential threat. The existential threat is “when an issue is as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). The issue that is securitized is decided by the securitizing actor. The last piece of the puzzle is the functional actor who is influencing the system without being neither the referent object, nor the securitizing actor. In our deployment of the Theory, The European Union, mainly European Commission is the securitizing actor. Its intention is to securitize energy. They are designating the member states which includes the EU citizens as referent objects “those that have to survive and have energy”. Russia and Gazprom are the functional actors who are affecting the dynamics of the European union. All of these actors are bound by their dependencies and influences of one another inside a security complex. This security complex is created by the fact that the two countries are reliant on each other as the biggest supplier of energy and the biggest consumer of energy.

Within the security complex, the securitizing actor is the one who is trying to push for securitization. This means that the securitizing actor is trying to persuade the referent object and show it that it is in danger. The securitizing actor is trying to push the agenda that the supposed security issue should have priority. However, as we mentioned earlier, there needs to be a strict definition of when is the issue a security issue. “Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political.” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). The difference between the normal and the securitized is in the perception of the audience. Without gaining sufficient momentum, there would be no place for the issue to fight its way to the top of the political agenda. Only when “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat

to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society) “ (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998) and even then, it is not enough. Framing something as an existential threat is only half the way towards securitization. The referent object needs to recognize that the issue presented is an existential threat and needs to grant power to the securitizing actor to accordingly deal with the issue or take matters into his own hands. This is no easy decision since “The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle/existential threats. Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Using whatever means necessary becomes particularly important since securitizing energy would mean vast investment that would have to come from the budget of the member states, an action that would need to be granted by the governments of the member states. Such vote would probably fail unless they perceived the issue as a serious threat or something that needs to be urgently dealt with to prevent some other, unwanted development in the future.

If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).” Thereby, the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (e.g., in the form of secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task). “Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such. (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998)

Regardless of the actual presence of a security threat, the referent object needs to accept it otherwise no special action will be there to adequately address the issue. Thus, the danger of existential threats that have not been securitized is a possible threat to one’s existence (such is the nature of existential threats) “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). The acceptance of a securitization can be proven by showing that the referent object has indeed endorsed the

need for allowing the securitizing actor to act according to the previously mentioned criteria.

For our analysis, by utilizing this framework we are trying to prove that the Commission, the securitizing actor, would like to see the member states (referent objects) heavily investing into creating a truly unified energy grid so that they could avoid having to come under an existential threat of not having energy for their own conduct. The member states however are not budging to the pressure and have definitely not achieved the levels of interconnectedness as would be necessary to help alleviate an energy crisis situation in a member state and possibly the whole union. Shortages resulting from cut offs by a major supplier tend to have wide-reaching effects. The fact that they remain open to such an event and are not focusing on alleviating the situation means that they are clearly not accepting the potential threat that the commission is trying to portray to them.

We might argue that there has been a partial success in securitizing the issue Buzan argues that “the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity.” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). In our practical part, based on this definition, we will try to analyze whether there is such a platform, and if there is something that would resemble it, does it actually fulfill all the criteria of securitization? If not, we will try to give suggestions what would need to happen so that it would be considered more than a securitization move.

Lastly, we need to consider why might the EU view Russian energy policy as an existential threat. The answer lays in Buzan’s definition of an existential threat to an institution such as the EU “The European Union (EU) can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). This means that if we consider the energy union an institution within a regime (EU) and we consider that any action that would help a member state to undo the integration into the energy union, it could be considered a threat to the project. Thus, the reason why the commission is securitizing against a power that is using energy as a means of political influence.



### 2.5 Levels of analysis

A requirement for our analysis is to identify the type of actors that we are dealing with. We need to decide what scope are we dealing with and on what level of analysis will we place our actors. This is decided on the influence that they have on each other and where in the system does the actor reside. It also helps anchor our security complex into a wider perspective and allow us to understand the interaction between the actors. In the following table (table 1), we have shown the type of actors that are present in our analysis according to the framework proposed by Buzan. Here, the framework will show us that the actors are differentiated from the globally present, down to an individual.

Table 1

Levels of analysis:	International systems	International subsystems	Units	Subunits	Individuals
Actors	International community, global market, UN	EU	Member states, Russia, International companies	Communities within the Units: Activists, Lobbyists	The respective populations
Scope	Modern international community spans the globe	Territorial coherency, regionality	Actors composed of various subgroups, differentiated, cohesive enough to be considered as individual actors.	Organized groups that influence the behavior of the unit.	Individual person

Source: Authors interpretation of (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998)

This distinction allows us to locate a sphere of influence of every individual actor and assess the impact of that actor based on the placement in the system. It also means that we have the possibility of assigning a more complex matrix of security dependencies because

at every level, every actor is going to perceive security in a different way and analyze what is threatening in a different fashion, in relation to its sphere of influence. A practical demonstration would be to mention that Russia is often using a different approach to deal with the EU. It separates the member states from the institutions because it knows that the commission does not have a positive stand towards Russia and Russia fully realizes that the member states, which are in the same category (units) as Russia have their own agenda. This means that every member state is in a unique position offering unique opportunities to negotiate. This way, Russia can avoid dealing with the EU as a single unit, due to the possibility of individual approach. The EU commission does recognize this and did introduce policy that hampered the strengthening of bilateral deals amongst states, favoring more universal approach. A second example will be Gazprom, who as a Unit, can also be dealing with individual companies within member states because it is not a government, but a company. Regardless of who controls Gazprom, it is important to note that the purpose of business is to make profit. This can have a role when dealing with local suppliers who simply go for the most competitive price of gas, regardless of the geopolitical aspect it might bring with it. In many countries, there is for the most part, only a single supplier, therefore if the gas industry wants to live, it needs to take from the Russian energy giant. Russia is not a liberal democracy; therefore, it has easier time controlling the actions of its assets. They do so exerting political influence where the EU would only be looking at the same interactions as purely economic. The mismatch in agenda will be addressed later. However, this aimed to show that different levels of interaction create the possibility for incoherence in action of the more splintered entity. Here, Russia as a Unit has an advantage that it is dealing with an international subsystem, the EU. Its quick actions and unified agenda lead by the Russian president who has tremendous autonomy, can easily outmaneuver a bulky bureaucracy that consists of multiple units who themselves have their own bureaucracies and political processes to deal with in order to muster a response.

## ***2.6 Sectors of analysis***

the means of influence that actors use to reach a goal can vary greatly, and we need to distill them into separate categories to assess impact and the way of how different actors interact with each other. Every actor has different ways of creating influence and different tools at his disposal that will aid it to achieve the predetermined goal. These tools are separated into different sectors of influence.

The framework by Buzan utilizes the use of sectors and it aids us with seeing them “as identifying specific types of interaction. In this view, the military sector is about

relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). The sectors are channels of interaction on which influence of actors can travel.

For our analysis, we will primarily focus on the economic and the political sector. The reason why we are not focusing on the military sector is that the EU has relatively low competences within the sector of military, which is still fully in control of member states. Moreover, NATO is the international institution that would deal with a potential military situation, not the EU, who although has mechanisms, would probably not need to be used in case of a military emergency.

The societal sector is also not particularly relevant, due to the actors that our analysis is concerned with. Since we are primarily dealing with the overarching supranational institution, member states and our smallest actors are national firms and lobbies, we can't be taking into consideration the impact of smaller societal groupings.

The environmental sector is of slight importance due to the fact that EU institutions are trying to push the lowering of carbon emissions and the member states have agreed on pre-determined goals to cut their carbon footprint. There, the dynamics of dealing with investment into natural gas, a hydrocarbon, is a controversial one. Logically, the Carbon emissions, Gas usage and dependence on Russia go hand in hand. The lower the consumption, the lower the emission and the lower the dependence, hence less concern with energy security. We will mention the dynamics of this sector in recommendations, since EU has not yet fully moved towards meeting the carbon emission targets. “While all European Union countries signed up to the Paris Agreement, most are failing to work towards delivering on its objectives” (Keating, 2018).

The highest relevance will be shared by the societal and the economic sector. Since the problematic is going to focus on the dynamic of the interdependence of the Russian energy export and European energy consumer market, we will have to consider the dynamics of the economic sector. If the commission is to be identified as making a securitizing move, in energy, making the states the referent object, we must identify in our framework, what would the securitization of states look like. Buzan mentions that “The logic of economic security for states is similar to that for individuals except that in principle (although rarely

in practice) states can form entirely self-contained economic systems. There is, in effect, a state equivalent of basic human needs. Unless a state is self-reliant in the resources required to feed its population and industry, it needs access to outside supplies. If that need is threatened, the national economy can be clearly and legitimately securitized.” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Thus, we have a clear condition which we can look for using discourse analysis. Then, we must identify a clear distinction of what is an existential threat to EU as such. Here, as we have mentioned earlier “The same logic applies to IGOs (International Government organizations). In the economic sector, something like the EU can be existentially threatened by whatever might unglue the rules and agreements that constitute its single market. (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Therefore, we have a clear definition of what is a threat to a member state, and what is a threat to the European Union as such. Based on the conditions of securitization, we can analyze whether the issues are being successfully securitized, and if not, what are the implications. What can also be securitized in the economic sector is the security of supply. Here, he proposes that “The possibility of economic dependencies within the global market (particularly oil) being exploited for political ends is offset by the existence of surplus capacity in nearly all commodities as well as a buyer’s market. (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Thus, we can analyze whether the EU can be threatened or not with the availability of supply of energy from Russia.

The economic sector is heavily intertwined with the political sector. With energy security, almost all threats will be connected to the security of supply used for political means and so that will create the main focus of our analysis. There it will tie to the political sector of analysis since we will assess threat to the political units that will be a part of our focus. The framework provides us with definitions allowing us to define impact of political threats carried out through the economic sector by using economic means for political gains. Buzan defines a threat to a political unit as “threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political; units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions)” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). As we have mentioned earlier, the threat to the EU is done through attacking its integration since “This is exactly the scenario in the EU argument that Europe needs integration to avoid fragmentation” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Thus, if an actor manages to somehow negatively affect integration, it can be securitized. What our analysis will focus on is to assess whether successful securitization has been the case. We can also argue that the commission is securitizing integration so that it would gain urgency and it is doing through energy. Since “When put in the characteristic security form,

the case for integration gains urgency, because its alternative is fragmentation—a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy the European project. Whether “Europe” will exist or not appears to be an either-or question. For Europe, fragmentation becomes an existential threat, because there is a risk of a development that will pass a point of no return at which the project of Europe will be irredeemably lost” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Thus, we can argue that the commission has no other option than to securitize because the member states are not inclined to do so, but also if integration did not happen, fragmentation will.

There also needs to be a clear argument for the means of securitizing. “The EU has a formal (though terribly complex) institutional structure” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Which gives it the means to do so, albeit not with great efficiency due to the mentioned complexity.

## ***2.7 Conclusion of the theoretical chapter***

In this chapter, we have described the analytical framework that our argument will be standing on. The regional security complex theory allows for analyzing of multiple layers of actors and their interaction while allowing for simplification of analysis by providing the sectors as tools to be able to strictly define scope. We have defined the conditions for securitization and we have distinguished between a securitization move and a successful securitization. Securitization can only be achieved on existential threats which have to be clearly defined. We have managed to define what would constitute securitization and what are the different parameters of threat for different actors. Lastly, we have mentioned the types of actors in a security complex. This distinction will be relevant in the following chapter, where the actors will be placed inside the framework that we described in this chapter and through the placement and the provided definitions in this chapter, will this thesis reach its findings in answering the question of how successful the is the securitization of energy security by the European Commission.

### **3. Discourse analysis**

The aim of this work is to analyze whether and how successful is the European Commission in trying to securitize energy. Noted from the first chapter which provided an overview of the secondary literature and a thorough overview of the discussed topic, the preliminary expectation is that the Commission is indeed trying to securitize. However, this work is going to look at how effective and successful it is in guiding discourse in the topic area and thus allowing the European Union to reach an agreement on policy in a way how the commission originally envisioned it.

In this chapter, there is going to be a thorough explanation of the method used in the analysis. The utilization of the method will be explained in how it was applied in practice for the purpose of this thesis. Components that were created by applying the method will be explained to the reader so that they can be shown to the reader in the findings section and so that the conclusions will be available for the reader to assess. Furthermore, the findings section is where the two analyses will each be presented and based on them, conclusion will be drawn. The conclusion will summarize the work and the findings and explain the implications that were drawn from the findings.

#### ***3.1 Definitions to ground our findings***

To be able to draw conclusion from our analysis, we need to define what is the criterion for successful securitization. We are going to rely on the definition provided by the theoretical framework, thoroughly explained in the second chapter. There, we see that “security is about survival” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). In Buzan’s framework that deals with security, its definition and understanding, we see that when there is an attempt to change the current security situation by one of the actors in the security complex, there needs to be securitization. Successful securitization has three components and two steps. First, we have the three components: referent object, “to which one can point and say; ‘it has to survive’ therefore it is necessary to” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998) take steps and protect it. Secondly, there is the securitizing actor, the one who designates the referent object and acts accordingly to argue its threatened status. Lastly, there are the functional actors that influence the dynamic of the system and they can either be the threat themselves, or they can be somehow related to the securitizing actor who tries to influence the whole security complex. The first of the two steps is the securitization move. The securitization actor is trying to persuade its audience. This action is called a securitization

move. When the audience accepts this step of the securitization actor, we can call it a successful securitization.

In practice, we are saying that the Commission is the securitizing actor that is trying to protect the European member states and their populations, the referent object, by ensuring their energy security and that everyone has an abundance of energy readily at their disposal. The commission itself has communicated this priority in multiple documents by saying that “we have come to expect secure energy supplies: uninterrupted access to energy sources at an affordable price. We expect to find petrol at the pumps, gas for heating and non-stop electricity, with blackouts too disruptive to countenance” (European Commission, 2014). The Commission also states that “Undisturbed production and distribution of power is of vital importance to the EU and significant power failures could be damaging” The specific use of the phrases “too disruptive to countenance” and “damaging” is suggesting that the scale of impact would be significant enough to raise a security concern about and therefore the European Commission is directly linking a lack of energy with as being an existential threat. The definition of existential threat to the European Union, which we mentioned in the theoretical chapter, is defined by Buzan as follows: “The European Union (EU) can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes” (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). Therefore, any action conducted that might interfere with the integration process might be considered as existentially threatening and therefore it should be dealt with as a security issue. In its communication, the Commission perceives as vital that the member states work towards the adoption of the “security of supply pillar” which includes policies that “create electricity and gas markets, increase competition, diversify sources and supplies, to cut consumption and emissions” (European Commission, 2014) Thus, any source of disruption of adoption of this plan, can be considered threatening to the European Union and in extension to its member states and therefore to the European Citizens. From a simpler perspective, since the referent object is the one that is supposed to survive, a lack of energy that would cause the member states to fall into chaos or its citizens to freeze or lose their means of sustaining themselves (businesses lacking the energy to function) could be considered an existential threat.

The commission, as the Securitizing actor is trying to persuade the audience, the member states, to accept its securitization move. Concrete way in which the commission is trying

to achieve it and how did the member states respond is going to be thoroughly discussed in the findings section of this chapter but to proceed we must define it through the theoretical framework.

Securitization move is only successful when accepted by the audience. If the member states do not perceive the definition of threat similarly to the Commission, we can claim that the securitization of energy has failed. However, the title of this work is 'effectiveness of the European Commission in the securitization of energy'. Thus, we need to look at acceptance of discourse and to what extent do the member states begin to perceive certain aspects of Energy security as true security issues that gain priority. To establish a condition under which we can claim a successful securitization, we need to refer back to our theoretical framework. We once again operate with the concept of existential threat, since its presence is necessary for successful securitization. "The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of securitizing move, not of an object of actually being securitized" (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998). According to this definition, the Commission needs a platform for its securitization to be accepted. What it provides in its communications are assessments of possible threats and causes for securitization. It also provides plausible strategies and solutions that would allow the referent object to be protected against the threats that the Commission has framed. Therefore, we must be able to precisely analyze what the Commission is saying and what is their underlying message. Only when that is done successfully can we answer our research question, by further analyzing the response of the audience, to grasp how successful the Commission was in its securitization move. For a successful and accurate analysis, there is need to choose an appropriate research method that will serve best for the purpose of this work.

The aim of this work is to analyze a response of member states to the European Commission. Therefore, this research question best lends itself to conduct a discourse analysis. In combination with our framework, we will analyze the documents published by the commission that are connected to energy security. Thus, we will be considering only the material that the Commission itself has published and therefore we can look for components of the text that are relevant to our analysis and the part of discourse that proves that the commission is trying to be the securitizing actor that is persuading the audience. The Commission documents are going to be a first corpus of literature out of



two that we need as data for our analysis. Since we are analyzing a response of the audience, and this work is of a limited scope, the response is only going to be gathered from the media that reported on actions of member states in the energy sector. This way, we will be reporting on what the media has picked up, thus we will be monitoring relevant actions and most importantly, we will be looking at discourse and assessing perception, not minute changes in statistics. This work measures response in the discourse, not the change in energy mix of member states. Longitudinal measurement that would compare the commission strategy and member states adjustment of their energy mix according to the strategy would be a valid avenue of further research, however as such, the amount of data required to make this addition would be beyond the scope of this bachelor thesis.

Since we are looking at discourse, we need to devise a method that would allow us to measure the acceptance of discourse within the member states, as they are the audience. The acceptance of discourse is going to be defined based on our theoretical framework which suggests that there be a platform from which the discourse can be accepted. From gaining insight into the secondary literature, we can create categories that will reflect on the different discourse strands. A thorough description of the method used will be present later in the chapter. Looking at the discourse strands apparent from the secondary literature, we can say that the energy union and an acceptance of a truly unified energy market would mean acceptance of securitization. Moreover, we will see in the analysis of the Commission documents that the Commission perceives influence of external actors as a potential threat. This is projected in their view of dependency on a single supplier. The Commission directly and indirectly mentions Russia as a potential hazard to energy security of member states and therefore anything that is done to become less dependent on a single supplier can be viewed as acceptance of the Commission discourse. What is more important, acceptance of discourse is not only what the member states have to say but primarily what are the actions of member states. One of the actions that will be particularly important is the commitment of resources, since this is the primary goal of the commission, to direct the resources of the member states in a fashion that benefits the referent object and thus protect it. All the details, methods, categorization of discourse strands and reasoning behind these criteria of acceptance of discourse will be thoroughly discussed later in this chapter.

### ***3.2 Introduction of the corpus***

In the Discourse analysis provided by this work, we are going to take a look at securitization discourse lead by the European Commission and how it is being received by the audience, the member states. Since this is a discourse, we are perceiving it as a dialogue between the securitizing actor and the referent object or the audience that is responding to the securitizing actor. To do that, we need two sets of literature to serve as our corpus, to effectively act as two parts of a dialogue. For each set, there is going to be separate categories that the analysis is going to be focused on.

The first set is going to be comprised of the commission documents which are communications with the member states. In these, we are going to take a look at securitization and how they present threat to the referent object. Since we are dealing with energy, we needed to establish categories that represent attempts and prompts to securitize. The specific categories will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

For our second set of literature, we needed to look at how the audience received the communication. For this, the analysis relies on independent media articles that report on member state activity in the energy sector. The reasoning behind this source of data is supported by the fact that the member states would tend to frame the report on their activity differently from an independent outlet that is not nationally bound and therefore potentially biased. Moreover, only a few media outlets have strong coverage on the energy sector since it is unlikely to be attracting attention of the average mainstream media consumer. Therefore, the second set relies mainly on articles from the independent media outlet Euractiv. They are an “independent pan-European media network specialized in EU policies” (Euractiv, 2018). They are especially relevant since they have EU coverage on energy policy, which is crucial for the number of articles which can serve as the second set of literature. However, it is important to have more sources of information to support our analysis and therefore the Independent media outlet Politico served as a second point of reference. All the topics that Euractiv covered were checked on Politico as well, to see whether the other source has covered the topic as well. For our third source of reference this work relied on an academic work, published by the Polish-Studies.Interdisciplinary (Pol-Int) “an online platform to exchange and network in the field of scholarly study of Poland” (Pol-Int, n.d.). On the Pol-Int platform a media analysis Funded by the Polish-German science foundation was published, and it looked at media reports on energy security in Poland and Germany during the years 2004 and 2014. It congregated the results into a format that allowed the use for our analysis since it noted the actions, responses and

perceptions of the two member states on different energy related issues. It was especially useful to gain insight into national media coverage that was concerned with energy. Through this publication, the author was able to gain insight into two national debates on energy security and therefore use it in the discourse analysis that looked at the actions and positions of the involved member states. Though arguably this is not a standard source, it gained insight into internal discourse of member states that would normally be accessible only to researchers that commanded the languages of the mentioned member states. Since acceptance of the Commission discourse was assessed mainly on the answers of member states, this insight is an invaluable source, despite its non-standard nature.

### ***3.3 Context of the corpus***

Crucial part of a discourse analysis is establishing the context. In our introduction, we have already provided the overview of the situation that the European Union is in with regards to Energy Security. What we did not establish is how does our securitizing actor, the European Commission perceive the security situation during the time of publishing of the materials that were analyzed. What follows is supposed to provide overview of the Corpus literature used, so that when we mention any of our categories, they are mentioned in context.

#### *European energy security strategy*

The largest piece of source material is The In-depth study of European Energy Security which is accompanied by the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European energy security strategy (European Commission, 2014). The very name of the document clearly addresses the recipients and thus designates the audience. The document is intended for the heads of governments of the member states and the elected members of the European Parliament. In its name we have the words security and strategy. The word security is implying that there is something to be said about the current security status and the word strategy is suggesting that this document has the answer on how to address the security issues that will be presented in the document.

Interesting to note is the time this document was published. The invasion of Crimea happened around February and March of 2014. This document was published on the second of July 2014 which is only a few months after the incident has happened and that the war on Crimea has become widely public. This document also mentions the gas disruptions to Europe which occurred in the years 2006 and 2009. The rhetoric is heavily

oriented towards these incidents and is therefore shaping the wording this document is using to communicate the suggested strategy of achieving energy security or pointing to lack thereof. The other documents in the corpus of analyzed literature also adapted this mode of communication, but in a less noticeable way, therefore the issue of security was not so heavily emphasized but still present. Due to the length and density of coding yielded from this document, it is going to be the centerpiece of our first part of the analysis.

*Energy 2020 A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy*

The second document that was analyzed was the Commission document: Energy 2020 A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy (European Commission, 2010) is also a communication to the audience and uses similar rhetoric to the document published in 2014. This document was published in 2010, a year after a gas disruption caused by a Russian dispute with Ukraine. It utilizes very similar language and we can see that both react to a similar geopolitical situation, albeit in a different time. Since there are the perceived similarities of rhetoric, it was only suitable and relevant to apply the same categories for coding, netting us a usable result from which our finding will be collected.

*Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats*

The third document: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats (European Commission, 2016) was also a communication to the audience, the same way the previous documents are. This time, the document is covering multiple security issues that need to be considered together so that the EU would be able to effectively counter them. It has a dedicated section on energy security and although the prompts to securitize the issue are differently formulated in comparison to the older documents, the very same intentions and meaning can be discerned from the document, only bundled together with other security issues.

This document was released in 2016, in the very year when EU was facing terrorist attacks, the refugee crisis and the Brexit referendum. Jean-Claude Juncker, in his State of the Union introduction speech has stated that “Our European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisis” (Juncker, 2016). This is very representative of the rhetoric that the Commission communications opted to choose. Arguably, the state of the existential crisis might have been present much earlier than 2016, since the older documents carry over the same patterns communicating threat to the same audience. However, since the speech, the Commission, a legislative body of the European union has openly acknowledged the

discourse of existential threats being present, and as will this analysis try to prove, it does try to present a securitization move to the member states, their audience. The 2016 document on hybrid threats is also adding to the discourse a stronger language that more intensively suggests that the European member states should increase their integration efforts to prevent them from being vulnerable. As we will show, the securitizing move is placed in the persuasion of member states to join forces and relieving decision making to the European level. Moreover, the document still shares similarity with the older documents, therefore we can apply the same coding as we did with our previous documents, netting us compatible material for our discourse analysis.

*Second Report on the State of the Energy Union*

Last but not least we have a document from the Directorate general for Energy called Second Report on the State of the Energy Union. This body of the Commission was established to promote integration of the European energy grid and the energy market. It is the key player in negotiating with member states and facilitating of discourse on moving forwards with Energy related matters. More importantly for us, they are the main proponent of the Energy Union and their arguments are coming from economic benefits as well as a boosting the Energy security of all European member states in case the energy union policies are complied with and are realized. They also are responsible for managing the projects of common interest that have something to do with energy infrastructure and if successful, it is supposed to be the main vehicle to gain investments from the member states with regards to projects and investments that guarantee energy security and European energy market integration.

From the perspective of our analysis, and looking back at our framework and the related definition of a platform that is to be established for the audience to accept the securitization move, the energy union and the DG (Directorate General) for energy are the platform that was established by the commission so that member states have a way of accepting the securitization move of the commission. Therefore, any mentions of investment and policy adaptations, are a sign of success in this matter. Moreover, there are still the same patterns and the same rhetoric used as with the previous documents, thus we can use the same coding that will yield usable results for our analysis.


To address our second part of the ‘dialogue’ between the Commission and the member states, we rely on media articles that have been and are covering the events and action of different actors in the European Union. In our analysis, the media serve as an independent observer from whom we can take reliable data that is related to responses of member states that answer to the securitizing actor. We are only looking for actions and statements of member states and governments of member states, so that we are able to analyze objectively. For this reason, our coding will need to represent that objectivity, so that we do not capture irrelevant information.

In conclusion, both sets of literature have been carefully picked to correspond to each other and to give us a platform to analyze the effectiveness of the communication between the securitizing actor and the referent object. Both the presence and absence of certain parts of discourse will be relevant when we gather our findings.

### ***3.4 Methodology of Coding***

The approach used by this thesis is called Deductive category application. Philip Mayring, in his article called Qualitative content analysis published by the FQS (Forum: Qualitative Social Research) has more closely described the process of deductive category application. “Deductive category application works with prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis, bringing them in connection with the text. The qualitative step of analysis consists in a methodological controlled assignment of the category to a passage of text” (Mayring, 2000) In theory this means that based on the secondary literature, while adhering to the definitions provided by the theory and based on having read all the material before we actually started coding it, gave us the possibilities to create the categories beforehand. What that granted was the ability to look at the corpus, compare it to the theoretical framework and based on that comparison create the theoretical categories (coding categories). These were designed to reflect and capture the features of discourse that the analysis is taking into account. That way, when a statement that fit the category appeared, it was possible to assign it the category. What also proved the categories relevant was the appearance of more categories in one statement. In practice, looking at the commission creating a securitization move. This was defined through the theoretical framework and assigned to specific categories which reflected the attempt each in its unique way due to the presence of multiple issues raised in the discourse. Since we were looking for one

feature of discourse that specified intent of the actor, we could, based on our overview of the topic, assign the different categories. To further illustrate the process of creating the categories, below is the step model of deductive category application created by Philip Mayring.



Source: Step Model of deductive category application (Mayring, 2000)

### **Method utilized to code the securitization attempt**

The method used in this work consisted of having two separate steps of analysis, each utilizing the step model of deductive category analysis. The first step out two was the analysis of the commission documents to find the different components of the securitization attempts that the European Commission is presenting in its communications to the European Council and the European Parliament. To find these components, it was necessary to discern the specific topics on which the Commission presented its securitization. The theoretical categories or coding, that reflected securitization were as follows:

Categories:	number of references in the text
Supplier	45
Investment	36
Reducing the risk	31
Dependency	29
Risk	29
Russia	25
Diversification	23
Disruption	20
Loaded language, Evidentialities	9
Recent events (related to Russia)	6

Here we can see what the categories are and how many suitable references were found in the text that made it through the steps of deductive category application. We can see that the number of references reflects the intensity in which the commission is discussing certain issues. Each coding category had certain parameters according to which statements were assigned to it and how it was defined and created. Following is a short overview of the categories

*Supplier:* It is the external dimensions of energy security that potentially makes energy a potential security issue. The external supplier is the entity that the EU relies on for energy, thus the supplier has leverage. The Commission realizes this and is communicating it to its audience.

*Investment:* This is the primary indicator to see whether a member state is or is not following securitization. For the Commission it is also a central topic due to the fact that only with investment can once alter the present situation. Commission is trying to make the member states to heavily invest into energy security. Investment is the platform for securitization.

*Reducing the risk, Risk:* In this category, the commission is often stating what is a risk and what should be done to reduce it. By doing so, it clearly states what should be a priority and what poses a potential threat.

*Dependency:* It is a closely related category to the supplier categories and to risk as well as indirectly tied to investment. Dependency in energy means relying on an external source



which as we saw earlier can be a potential risk that is tied with being reliant on a supplier. This can be altered by investment into other such sources. The Commission was keen to highlight every source of energy dependency and by doing so showing what can be improved or what is threatened by remaining dependent.

*Russia:* Russia was mentioned relatively often, both directly and indirectly and it was mostly tied to being a supplier, posing a threat to the audience and being a risk. It was relatively clear how does the commission perceive Russia in the matter of energy security. For the analysis, the mentioning of Russia was connected to the securitizing actor mentioning the functional actor and presenting it to the audience as something to defend against.

*Recent events:* This was a way to mention Russia and more specifically Russian actions that point to the threats to EU energy security.

*Diversification:* Diversification was related to the suggested investment and reducing the risk by reducing the dependency on the suppliers of energy. Diversification was the Commission suggesting where is the best place to invest since that would bring down the risk due to the lessened dependency on the external supplier.

*Disruption:* Was mentioned in connection to events that should raise concern and in potential scenarios whose realizations could lead to disruptions which would be threatening to the European energy security. Disruptions were used mostly to justify investments and taking precautions, reasoning behind securitizing.

*Loaded language, evidentialities:* There were a few instances in the communications where the commission shared a certain perception without necessarily providing empirical data to support that assumption. It clearly specified and pointed to agenda on the part of the commission. Though there were a few, they are worth mentioning.

The last part of the of the step model, the interpretation, will be presented later in this chapter, where we will present our findings. This was the description of the method devised for the first part of the analysis. What comes next is the explanation and description of the second part of the analysis, and the second set of coding using a different corpus, making it a separate analysis altogether but closely connected with the findings of the first analysis.

### **Method utilized to code the audience response to the securitization attempt**

As we have mentioned, this two-part analysis is essentially a constructed dialogue between actors. The first part, the Commission securitizing attempt is a beginning of the dialogue. The second part, of which we are about to describe the method devised, is the response of the member states, our audience. As we did with the first part, the method used is once again the Deductive category application and we are going to utilize the same step model of deductive category application to create our categories, though with a different logic in mind.

When coding the second part of the analysis, where we looked for the responses of the audience, the categories were changed to reflect specific actions that reflected acceptance or denial of the securitization of the commission by the member states. These categories were reflecting on the points of discourse in which the commission designated what it viewed as potential avenues of threat for the member states. According to that perception, the analysis took a look at how the member states responded to this opinion of the commission. The emphasis was on concrete action primarily but also on policy acceptance or rejection and on statements given by representatives of the respective governments. By considering all of these aspects, we should be able to capture what is the response of the audience towards the securitization attempt.

There were two sets of categories of coding in the second part of the analysis. There were the categories that were reflecting acceptance of the Commission securitization and there were categories that rejected the Commission securitization. As we will see in the table presented below, there was an emphasis placed on having these two sets of categories to mirror each other so that we reflect acceptance and denial of securitization in the same areas and according to the same parameters.

<b>Acceptance of Commission securitization</b>	<b>Rejection of Commission securitization</b>
Moving decision making to the EU level	Reproach from moving decision making to the EU level
Discontinuing irrelevant energy sources	Keeping irrelevant sources in operation
lowering energy dependence	Increasing energy dependence
Member states positively contributing to EU energy security	Member states negatively contributing to EU energy security
Boosting interconnection	Lack of investment into interconnection
Moving towards energy targets	Moving away from energy targets (weakening EU energy security)
Acceptance of EU policy	Rejection of EU policy
Introducing relevant sources of energy	Introducing new irrelevant sources of energy
Increasing diversity of sources	Decreasing diversity of sources
Investment into energy security	Refusal of investment into energy security
Total references: 114	Total references: 152

What will follow is a short description of the reasoning behind each and every category. These categories were tailored to reflect on our results from the first part of the analysis, so that the results of the second part are relatable to our findings in the first part. What this means is we are looking at what did the members accept what the Commission was saying in the communications or whether they rejected it and to what extent. The

Pavelka: Energy security in the EU

explanations of reasoning behind the categories are going to be in pairs, since they both reflect on the same thing but from a positive and from a negative point of view.

*Moving decision making to the EU level / Reproach from moving decision making to the EU level*

This category reflected whether the member states did or did not move the decision making to the EU level on issues and mechanisms where the Commission stated that it would be more beneficial if the mechanism was controlled by the EU, rather than by each individual member state. This category usually came up in the text where there was a rejection from a member state give up more sovereignty and decision making.

*Discontinuing irrelevant energy sources / Keeping irrelevant sources in operation*

The Commission did suggest which sources of energy are relevant to invest into and which are questionable at best or downright harmful to either the environment or the energy security aspect due to an inherent tendency of this source to be external and therefore relying on external suppliers that, as we know from the first part of the analysis, is considered a potential avenue of threat for the Commission. Due to the Commission communication, we know which sources are relevant and which are not.

*lowering energy dependence / Increasing energy dependence*

Whether a member state is working towards losing dependencies on external sources, or at least increasing the number of separate sources, or whether they do not act in this way or even making a step back in terms of being dependent on external suppliers.

*Member states positively contributing to EU energy security / Member states negatively contributing to EU energy security*

The Commission considers EU energy security as an aspect that touches all member states. Not all member states consider the consequences of their actions on their neighbors and on the EU energy security as a whole. Commission recognized the issue and is trying to communicate it, therefore it is a category in this analysis.

*Boosting interconnection / Lack of investment into interconnection*

One of the important aspects that the Commission is considering is whether the member states are capable in sharing their energy with their neighbors, thus, being able to support each other and making EU more resilient towards potential energy shocks as a result.

Pavelka: Energy security in the EU

Interconnections were heavily emphasized as important investments into EU energy security, and member states show differing opinion on the subject.

*Moving towards energy targets / Moving away from energy targets (weakening EU energy security)*

Part of being in the EU means working towards commonly agreed goals and targets. For example, the member states agreed to reach a certain percentage of the level of interconnectedness to other member states in terms of the capacity to export energy to one's neighbors. This target has been achieved by some and has not been reached by others. Therefore, where we see member states acting towards reaching the goals, or distancing themselves from the target, which is either complying with what the commission has been saying or going directly against it. Acceptance or rejection of the securitization attempt.

*Acceptance of EU policy / Rejection of EU policy*

This is a wider category that allows us to see whether the member states comply or contradict the policy agreed on the EU level, or whether they for or against accepting a certain piece of policy. We are focused on those pieces of legislation that align with the view of the Commission perception of bettering the energy security of the EU.

*Introducing relevant sources of energy / Introducing new irrelevant sources of energy*

In the eyes of the Commission, not all sources of energy are equal, thus we can establish whether member states are working towards relying on the sources that the Commission suggested or whether they are relying on something that either is not that helpful in terms of bolstering security or downright lowers it. The prime candidates for relevant sources are renewables, that are viewed as positive on almost all accounts and the prime evil is either gas or coal. Gas is strengthening the dependency on external suppliers and coal is a heavy pollutant, which is also inefficient for energy creation, both aspects that the commission is trying to go against and which the member states themselves are starting to condemn due to the Paris agreement and the rising awareness of climate change.

*Increasing diversity of sources / Decreasing diversity of sources*

Especially in its 2014 report on energy security, the Commission emphasizes the importance for the EU member states to have more sources of energy at their disposal. Recognizing that the majority of EU member states are energy importers, it is important for them to have more sources of energy to rely on if some stop being available. Especially

the countries that do not have a diverse energy mix (low diversity of sources) should invest into broadening their sources, according to the Commission strategy on energy security. Whether the member states do so or ignore this parameter, is a sign of either acceptance or refusal of securitization.

*Investment into energy security / Refusal of investment into energy security*

A broad category that allows us to capture the overall action of member states and the relation to the Commission securitization attempt in terms of them investing into being secure or whether they refuse to do so despite the Commission suggestion to do so.

In conclusion, this section discussed and explained the method devised to analyze our corpus of literature and how it was organized. The analysis falls into two parts that together create a dialogue. The first part is the Commission, our securitization actor that is talking to its audience. From the findings and conclusions about what is the agenda of the Commission in the first part, we move to the second part of the analysis, which is the response of the audience, our referent object, that is to be protected by accepting the securitization attempt of the Commission. In the response, gathered by coding the second part of our corpus, we analyze what are the responses of the audience, and how is the discourse being accepted or rejected by the audience. In the next section, the findings from our discourse analysis will be brought together to show results and point to a conclusion that will bring us closer to our research question. We will be able to assess how effective and successful the European Commission is in securitization of energy. Following sections 3.4 and 3.5 will be the two parts of the analysis and our findings in these sections.

### ***3.5 Analysis of the commission securitization attempt***

Beginning with what turned out to be the most relevant category, as the analysis showed, was the aforementioned “supplier” category. What is important to notice about the category is that it was the most often mentioned category by the Commission thus suggesting that the Commission is trying to point the audience towards intensifying their focus on where their energy is coming from and what is the overall position of the European Union on the energy market. The very first reference about suppliers of energy in the energy security report from 2014 was connected to the statement that European Union, being a major energy importer is reliant on its suppliers (European Commission, 2014). Therefore, diversification of sources and supplies, cutting consumption and increasing efficiency should be a major priority for the union. As the Commission is saying: “These policies not only aim to increase competitiveness and keep affordable prices as well as move towards a more sustainable energy system, but –the EU being a major energy importer- they are equally important for energy security” (European Commission, 2014).

The importance of suppliers for the Commission is immediately explained since in their communications, there are statements that is actively undermine the trust in Russian sources of energy and Russia as an energy supplier. The Commission does this in an indirect fashion, but somewhat openly, since it does not hide its clear designation of the subject its concerned with, being Russia and their energy supply whose disruption could be a potential threat to energy security of the European Union. “Current events on the EU's Eastern border have raised concerns regarding both the continuity of energy supplies and regarding the price of energy. This has provoked apprehension regarding short term access to energy, in particular access to affordable gas supplies in the coming months. It has also raised questions about the adequacy of the measures taken for the medium term” (European Commission, 2014). This statement is setting the stage for the Commission as the securitizing actor, and we can see the commission doing it in all of the documents but each time in a slightly different fashion. They are sending a clear message about who is the referent object, the securitizing actor and who is the Functional actor that is affecting the dynamics of the security complex. What we can also notice is that at the end of the previously mentioned statement there is the sentence “It has also raised questions about the adequacy of the measures” (European Commission, 2014). What this sentence implies is that the current policy, that is supposed to defend the referent object, might be inadequate to the actions of the functional actor, and thus this raises a security concern to

which the member states are supposed to react. In the second stage of the analysis, the statements that refer to member states acting in accordance to the inadequacy of the current policy and accept the new policy will be the sign of success of securitization.

Connected to the perspective of the Commission on the security of its referent object is the diversity of sources and lowering of dependency. There were 23 individual references, out of 270 across all the categories that were connected to diversification. It was often connected with the “supplier” coding as well as with the coding “investment”. The common occurrence along with these two coding categories is no accident since diversification implies introducing new sources of energy, therefore adding a potential supplier but more importantly decreasing overall reliance on one supplier, which is an often mentioned theme in the corpus. Moreover, to achieve diversification there needs to be investment, and thus the acceptance of the platform for securitization is created, if the referent object accepts the decisions to invest. For our securitizing actor, diversity is a great vehicle for pointing to the present situation and the Commission capitalizes on this aspect. An increase in diversity means investment, which in turn means the involvement of the commission who will likely be involved with this investment since the DG for energy is a platform that provides investment into projects of common interest. Thus, when the audience recognizes that the diversity of sources should be increased, they essentially agree and accept securitization by bolstering investment into the sector, giving it a priority. The acceptance of the need to invest can be considered a successful securitization due to the fact that the platform that was established and used by the securitizing actor to act in protection of the referent object, securitizing. The Commission points to the perks of investment, underpinning their maneuver to push for investment by mentioning the benefits of the potential investment made by member states “Medium term Core EU policies already in place steer the EU's energy sector towards a more secure and resilient form in the medium term. Regarding internal energy reserve capacities, the promotion of the development of a wide range of indigenous low carbon fuels can clearly increase the diversity of fuel supplies and thus reduce the risk of both supply and price shocks” (European Commission, 2014).

The Commission handily connects the aspects of security together and offers a ready solution in making energy a priority as it was “identified by the Juncker Commission as one of the 10 political priorities, in which five dimensions are closely interlinked: energy security, solidarity and trust” (European Commission, 2017) The recognition of energy as a priority, would mean a success of a securitization move. Moreover, in multiple cases they



provide adequate strategy to do what is considered by the commission as acting towards the EU energy security. “The European Union also works in regional and bilateral formats to promote the functioning, integration and reform of energy markets, such as the reform process of the Energy Community or a reinvigorated dialogue with Algeria, and to promote diversification projects of strategic importance, such as the Southern Gas Corridor.” (European Commission, 2017)

Moving forward, in all of the documents, there are 60 references out of 270 that report on the category “risk”. There is almost fifty to fifty percent distribution between the references mentioning risk and where commission mentions “reducing the risk”. Being considered by themselves would not lead us to any gainful insight, maybe besides very technical risk connected with certain energy sources. However, what does give us an interesting insight is that in these 60 references, 16 are directly connected with Russian influence and how the heavy dependence on Russian energy sources promotes risk and what steps should be taken to lower the dependence. What is more, the Commission often mentions Russian influence indirectly, such as when mentioning the Druzhba pipeline, or when talking about “recent events” category, impacting on energy security or when talking about the reliance on a single supplier. The statements “Despite the national and European measures and laws in place, current events on the EU's eastern border have raised concerns regarding both the continuity of energy supplies and regarding the price of energy” (European Commission, 2014) and “The EU imports over 60% of its gas, with two thirds of these imports coming from countries outside of the EEA. The Baltic States, Finland, Slovakia and Bulgaria are dependent on a single supplier for their entire gas imports. The Czech Republic and Austria also have very concentrated imported gas supplies” (European Commission, 2014). These statements provide an insight into how the conveying of the same message is done through different means. This message is saying directly and indirectly that Russia is the functional actor influencing the dynamic, and in these examples, we can see that it is not in a positive way. Rhetoric like this is strengthening the Commission discourse on who is the referent object that is supposed to be protected from the functional actor by the actions and strategy of the securitizing actor. It gives of a slightly black and white point of view on who is supposed to be protected and who is the potential threat.

Closely connected to risk and recent events is yet another prominent feature of the Commission discourse and that is the category “disruption”. Once again, out of the 20 references that fell into category “Disruption”, 7 directly mentioned the possibility of a

Disruption of the Russian supply or the disruption caused by cutting of the Druzhba pipeline. It seems as the Commission is once again pointing to a fact that EU member states are too reliant on its biggest supplier, Russia. The other reason why the Commission is mentioning the disruptions can be found in pointing towards a lack of a common strategy or approach to external suppliers and energy partners, thus the commission operationalizes risks associated with low diversity into pointing towards a necessity of EU integration with regards to the energy market. “At an international level, little heed is paid to warnings about tight oil supply in the future. Despite serious gas supply crises that have acted as a wake-up call, exposing Europe’s vulnerability, there is still no common approach towards partner, supplier or transit countries. The potential for further development of EU indigenous fossil fuel resources, including unconventional gas, exists and the role they will play must be assessed in all objectivity” (European Commission, 2010). If the member states take the advice into account, and show a common stance towards external energy suppliers, The Commission will be successful in securitizing the issue through their platform, the Energy Union.

Lastly, some of the sources used imprecise statements and formal comparisons instead of simply providing hard evidence and statistics. This is from the authors perspective, considered as sharing conviction, rather than simply reporting on the subject matter. The relevance for our discourse analysis lays in the fact that these reports appear to have an added quality instead of simply being informative for the audience. Since we are trying to point towards that the Commission is actively trying to securitize energy, we can’t ignore the way how are they conveying the message. In all fairness, in majority of the cases, the use of an imprecise statement was in conjunction with precise statements, but their very presence is part of the message that the Commission is sending which is that energy should be securitized. The following example shows the self-evidence of the statement, and in wider context, is trying to build the argument without providing the actual proof to support the validity of the statement. “And as the European energy market is established, it functions more smoothly and with fewer distortions when regulated at the European level or when national or regional regulatory measures are well coordinated” (European Commission, 2014). The statement "Running more smoothly" gives it a positive spin, while implying that national governance of the energy market is ineffective. No real data or statistics are being provided to back this point up, simply a positive connotation in the language is used to impose the opinion on the audience. This can be interpreted as an attempt of the Commission to persuade the member states to consider giving up their

sovereignty in governing their energy markets, due to the positives that are mentioned earlier. This is a securitization move that tries to get accepted by the audience, establishing a better position for the securitizing actor. The only question remains, and that is: how did the member states respond to the communication of the Commission? And therefore, how successful was the commission in conveying their securitization move to their audience?

### ***3.6 Analysis of the Response of member states***

The categories for analyzing the response of the audience were divided into two opposing sections. There was the coding that related acceptance of the Commission securitization and there was the coding that related to the rejection of securitization. Since there is this binary metric involved, the analysis is done differently from the analysis of the Commission securitization move. Here there is focus on the response of member states in relation to the Commission strategy and key aspects of this acceptance and rejection is going to be closely examined. The differing structure and the different logic of creating the coding groups reflects this logic. Due to this difference of the method on creating the categories, heavy emphasis was placed on the creation of the categories so that the two groups were balanced in number and meaning, therefore for every category that was concerned with acceptance of the securitization, there was a category that looked at the same parameter but with regards to the rejection of that part of securitization. By ensuring this balance, the research will not tend to emphasize one or the other category, but simply analyze what the media coverage has presented the analysis with. It has to be noted that the actual number of references concerning acceptance or rejection is relevant due to the fact that the articles looked at different situations in different member states and had either entertained a positive or a negative topic in terms of states complying with energy security. Once again, it is important to remember that the second part of the analysis is concerned with the audience response. The effectiveness of the securitization will be considered in terms of presence of the discourse strands mentioned by the commission.

What became clear at the very beginning of the analysis was that member states were mostly reporting on energy targets and policy proposals rather than actual progress with regards to energy security. Since energy systems require massive investment and their profound change is slow in deliverance, over the relatively short period of time (2009-2018) that the Commission has started to focus on energy security due to external circumstances and rising EU energy dependency, The member states did not have that many opportunities to radically change their energy habits, especially when there were no reasons or heavy pressures to do so. From what was observed, the longest struggle of

member states is to actually adopt the interconnection targets. As we saw in the energy security report from 2014, when the energy sources are more diverse and come from within the Union, according to the Commission, that is strengthening Energy security. However, for that to happen, the member states need to have infrastructure to share the necessary energy that their neighbor might lack. The Commission has addressed this and is trying to persuade the member states to reach the goal of having 10% of interconnectedness to the energy grids of other member states. The issue comes when after a decade of setting this target, some member states are nowhere near the predetermined goal. “The 10% interconnection target can hardly be seen as new, having already been decided by EU leaders over a decade ago, in 2002. (Aline Robert, 2015) what is more, in 2014 shortly after the invasion of Crimea, the member states agreed on moving away from the 15% interconnection target they were supposed to achieve by 2030. “An obligation for member states to make 15% of their national generation capacity available to other EU nations was ditched from draft summit conclusions” (Crisp, 2014). This not only moves away from market integration, it also by extension furthers the ideal energy security state that the Commission wants to achieve. If we look at our framework, along with the Commission securitization attempt, it shows that there is apprehension to invest into energy interconnections. The perfect example of this is the French-Spanish gas pipe interconnection whose construction was halted due to French apprehension to the project, under the pretext that it would not be economically viable. The position of the Commission is clear on the project saying that “The pipeline is on the Commission’s list of preferred infrastructure projects, and Brussels has already paid about €7 million for pre-construction studies.” (Gurzu, The Franco-Spanish ghost gas pipeline, 2018). The Spanish are arguing that the project is regarded as a means of boosting European energy security, but the French are reluctant to fund the project. What ended up happening was that the project was “shelved thanks to French skepticism, leaving the already-built section abandoned and residents angry about the disruption” (Gurzu, The Franco-Spanish ghost gas pipeline, 2018). This example clearly defines the rejection of the Commission discourse and lack of consideration for European energy security from the perspective of the securitizing actor.

However, the negative stance of France is considering the gas infrastructure does not relate that heavily to electricity. This can be seen in its actions where it agreed on building undersea power cable although only after strong pressure has been exerted. “The power line should start operating in 2025, almost doubling the capacity for electricity exchange

between France and Spain.” (Gotev, 2018) the Connection between the two is also important for Portugal that is only sharing borders with Spain and whose geographical location and current state of the interconnection of the Iberian peninsula means that until the power cable is finished, the interconnection to the rest of the EU will be limited. However, from the perspective of the Commission, and from the perspective of this work, both Spain and Portugal are following along the strategy of the Commission and are open to the Commission discourse. However, an important caveat needs to be mentioned here and that is the fact that the economic agenda of these member states align with the security concerns communicated by the Commission and thus these countries comply. This alignment shows itself when we shift our focus on the other side of the Pyrenees mountains and see that France, with its energy mix being primarily focused on nuclear energy, is not taking active steps to promoting renewables and pushing for building interconnections. We can see the stance in their procedures to grant licensing to wind farms. “Not a single turbine got of the ground since France committed in 2012 to build the country’s first experimental offshore wind farm of the coast of Brittany. The project was frozen recently when French authorities realized the planned construction costs, they had agreed to back in 2012 were now way above competitive market prices” (Robert & Simon, 2019). The French strategy seems to back away from energy security whenever the economic signals tell the French government that the move would not be profitable. This clearly sets a priority of an economic nature rather than following one of a security nature. This is underpinned by the fact that “The lead time for getting new onshore wind projects off the ground in France is currently 6 to 8 years – or double the European average, according to WindEurope” (Robert & Simon, 2019). The slow nature of approval for new projects is only further diminishing the capability of renewable energy project to be economically competitive, essentially making France enforce its own argument by weakening the competitiveness with the approval process. Better yet, there has been cases where a “wind project located 30km from the cathedral of Chartres was successfully blocked when the French ecology ministry brought up the argument of “co-visibility” before the administrative court: wind turbines risked impairing the view of the cathedral, which is classified as a World Heritage Site” (Robert & Simon, 2019). It was not an isolated incident since “The same argument was brought up in the Champagne region, where UNESCO-classified vineyards prevented the construction of a windmill 15km away, on the other side of a hill” (Robert & Simon, 2019). This rather unwilling stance towards renewable energy, in combination with blocking other nations from being more interconnected through other

energy sources brings about the conclusion that France is almost completely ignoring the Commission securitization attempt in favor of its own legislation and economic reasons that are presented as arguments against what is from a Commission perspective, an effort to strengthen energy security of member states. In almost all the discourse strands, France is going against the Commission. The only exception is lowering the carbon emissions. What is questionable though is how is France wanting to achieve this since they keep lowering the capacity or halting projects that will bring them closer to carbon neutrality. “Paris scaled down offshore wind plans to 5 GW by 2028, despite a proposal by local authorities and the wind industry to build 10 GW of offshore wind capacity by that date” (Robert & Simon, 2019). France is blocking the development of renewable energy, which is according to the Commission detrimental to energy security.

However, France is not alone in ignoring the suggestions of the Commission and other member states, that might even fare better in introducing renewables, are diminishing their progress by still relying heavily on fossil fuels. This reliance is highlighted by the coding category “Keeping irrelevant sources in operation” and what it signifies is that the member state is still using a source of energy that is detrimental to the environment and to the energy security goals highlighted by the Commission. The best example of this is Germany who continues to heavily rely on coal. That in itself would not be the largest problem, but Germany relies on coal imported from external sources such as Russia, which the Commission designated as the supplier that is detrimental to the EU energy security. “Today, most of the black coal, also known as hard coal, used in Germany’s coal fired power plants comes from Russia, the United States, Australia and Colombia” (Euractiv, 2018) and although Germany is no longer mining black coal, it is still heavily relying on brown coal and lignite which “To the dismay of environmentalists, Germany still has numerous open-pit mines that extract lignite or brown coal, which is softer, cheaper and more polluting than black coal” (Euractiv, 2018). An Energy expert is explaining the reason why Germany is continuing to rely and mine its own brown coal. “One must not forget: Germany is a traditional “Kohleland”. We have large quantities of brown coal, which is superficially located and can easily be mined. In addition, the prices for climate certificates on the CO<sub>2</sub> exchange are at rock bottom. As a result, you can still produce unbearably cheap electricity in the coal mines in the Rhineland and the Lusatia. (Schulz, 2018). When hearing this argument, it can be connected to the French position on energy security. Germany is doing what it is doing due to economic reasons and France has likewise provided the same reasoning.

However, Germany is not only mining coal to show its rejection of Commission securitization move, it also proceeds in development of a second gas pipe beneath the Baltic sea that will further enhance the energy reliance of energy on Russian gas. In the media analysis provided by the Pol-Int we can see that “The most controversial energy issue in German-Polish relations is clearly the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which allows for direct natural gas deliveries from Russia to Germany bypassing the traditional transit countries, among them Poland. That is why the then defense minister of Poland, Radosław Sikorski, linked the German-Russian pipeline agreement to the Ribbentrop Molotov (Hitler-Stalin) pact. In the summer of 2016 plans to expand the pipeline caused similar tensions” (Andreas Heinrich, 2016). The pipeline will not grant any diversification of sources, and it will simply make some member states a less relevant transit countries for Russian gas, making them more prone to Russian influence. This will also have negative impact on the relations amongst member states, making finding a common stance on policy that much harder. From the Commission perspective, this a shortsighted move by Germany and a calculated move by Russia, the functional actor. It leads to more dependence, increased risk and overall lower energy security for Germany and other member states. Continuing to build this pipeline, it is a complete disregard for the strategy that was laid out by the Commission. We can see that there is once again a conflict between the economic goals of a member state and the political goals of the Commission.

There are member states that do still finance coal and are not doing so out of economic interests but primarily out either geopolitical reasons or simply as a populist ploy to preserve jobs in an industry that would not remain competitive without subsidies. The argument presented by some member states to keep coal mines in operation would be the job loss associated with the shift away from coal. In Slovakia, former “Prime Minister Robert Fico still believes in the future of lignite mining” (Szalai, Slovakia considers exiting coal in 2023, Sefcovic eyes geothermal energy, 2018). The coal mining is framed as “a contribution to the country’s security of energy supplies and electricity balancing, as well as to regional employment. Around 4,000 people work in the mines, but the company claims 11,000 jobs in total depend on the Slovak coal industry” (Szalai, Slovakia considers exiting coal in 2023, Sefcovic eyes geothermal energy, 2018). A similar framing is used by the Polish government that claims that “the economic, social and political costs of moving away from coal, an industry employing 100,000 people, are considered exorbitant. A greater share of renewables in the Polish energy mix would also require expanding and

modernizing Poland's transmission infrastructure, which would generate substantial additional costs” (Andreas Heinrich, 2016). From the Commission’s perspective, this is taking one principle of energy security, accepting it only to defy another one. The Commission does not support the use of coal by member states due to the fact that it is inefficient, polluting, and in some cases, negatively impacts the dependence aspect as some member states import their coal from external suppliers. In case of Poland, the country has its own supply of coal, but the problematic aspect is Poland’s perception of Coal as a source. “Poland emphasizes the geopolitical dimension of energy supply and regards coal as fulfilling many of its short-term needs, with nuclear power – and eventually specific economically viable renewables – regarded as complementary sources” (Andreas Heinrich, 2016). This is a complete opposite of the view of the Commission that is suggesting a gradual phase out of hydrocarbons and replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. Even the adaptation of the power grid to receive renewable sources of energy from their neighbors would not be possible due to the shape of their power grid, as they themselves have stated. Poland is not only relying on the most polluting resource, it is also not considering the non-polluting source as viable. This conviction is demonstrated in the following statement. “a representative of the then Department of Nuclear Energy in the Ministry of Economy claimed, ‘a country on the economic rise, especially one like Poland, cannot afford a relatively expensive investment only because of whims”” (Andreas Heinrich, 2016). Poland, Germany, France and Slovakia are making decisions that are argued on the basis of economic viability and by doing so they are promoting actions that are going against the discourse proposed by the Commission, definitely refusing its securitization and not engaging in embracing its platform, a sign of securitization.

On the other hand, these countries have to some extent, embraced some aspects of the proposed Commission strategy and did take steps to ensure their energy security to some degree. France did finally agree on the power cable improving power interconnection to the Iberian Peninsula. Germany is moving towards renewable energy and has closed the last black coal mine. Poland is investing into nuclear energy, even though their main source of energy remains coal and fossil fuels. Slovakia, after some amount of pressure is closing down the subsidized coal mine three years earlier than it was originally planned. The problem is that none of the countries either made a significant step into the direction the Commission would want to, or they made other steps in parallel with the progressive steps that still hold them away from accepting the Commission securitization.



Some EU member states have accepted the Commission securitization to a larger extent. “the Irish energy minister, who also spoke at the event, boasted that Ireland has been “at the vanguard of the energy transition”, saying the Irish grid was now able to cope with up to 65% of electricity coming from renewable sources, mostly wind” (Szalai, ‘Yes, we can’: Franco-Irish research aims to boost green electricity intake, 2018). Not only that they embraced hastened adoption of renewable energy, they also proved the acceptance of the Commission securitization by investing into interconnections with their neighbors, though they are an island nation. “But Dublin also wants to improve energy security and solidarity with the rest of Europe and is supporting two electricity interconnection projects, with the United Kingdom and France, in order to achieve that” (Szalai, ‘Yes, we can’: Franco-Irish research aims to boost green electricity intake, 2018). Ireland is a showcase that is going along with the Commission proposals while showing that remaining economically relevant is possible, even though not a hundred percent applicable for other member states.

## Conclusion

When looking from a perspective and according to the parameters preset in this work, the acceptance of the securitization, according to our analysis has been the most effective in Ireland and Portugal. Both countries are heavily investing into renewables and into interconnection, helping the energy union become a reality. In addition, Ireland is phasing out coal power as a source of energy. The trouble is, that these countries are both relatively small member states and they are both secluded with regards to energy. Ireland is an island nation and Portugal has only one neighbor and is on the Iberian Peninsula. For these countries, it was in their best interest to become energy self-sufficient and to boost their interconnection with the rest of the EU to further decrease the possibility of an energy shortage. Other member states, that are in a relatively more energy secure geographical locations, do not fall under the same pressures as Ireland and Portugal and they are influenced by a different dynamic of issues that is driving their decision making. For this reason, the Commission, when attempting to raise the alarm with regards to energy security and tried a securitization move, encountered a much more entrenched resistance from the member states due to their status quo, which for some member states would be very uncomfortable and costly to break. We can consider Germany and France as main candidates for this category. Then there is central and eastern Europe. The political capital that it would require to move Poland away from coal could be viewed as a political suicide and we are observing how the presidency of Emanuel Macron is under fire when trying to lower subsidies on fossil fuels. V4 as a group is moving towards nuclear power, while still heavily relying on fossil fuels. Although we have been focusing mainly on Slovakia and Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic follow along the same trend with reliance on gas and a focus on switching to Nuclear. All of these countries have a high reliance on gas from a single supplier, and none has shown significant progress in reducing this dependence. In every member state, if the national interest is not currently aligned with the strategy of the Commission, it will compete with the securitization move every step of the way and it has been the most common argument against the strategy proposed by the commission.

A rather unsurprising observation of this analysis is that every member state has differing opinions on the matter of energy and all have different political and economic priorities. There are acceptances and rejections of securitization in almost every member state that this work has mentioned. The problem lies in the diverse nature of the European union, the member states are so diverse that their approaches are equally as diverse. This can be

attributed to the fact that all the member states have different economic, social, geographic and historical conditions that predetermine what will be their course of action. Also, they will always interpret what the Commission will say in a way that is most suitable for them, since the governments have a mandate to their citizens, not to the European Commission. The unified vision of the Commission, when analyzed how it was perceived, is scattered amongst the member states, almost nowhere being preserved intact. They each adopted a certain portion of the vision that was possible, or the member states were willing to adopt. Analyzing the discourse, there was a large shift of perception of threat between the member states and the Commission, each focusing on something else. A very strong indicator that a country is refusing the securitization attempt of the Commission is when the country increased its dependency level on a Russian source of energy after 2014, when it was obvious that Russia is capable of using economic tools to influence politics. From the analysis of the responses of member states, only Poland showed marks of acting in response to the potential Russian threat that was presented by the Commission, and even Poland has not been proactively pushing policy that would significantly lower the country's dependency from Russia. The second common point of refusal was the continuation of the use of energy sources that are either not helping or are potentially hurting the European energy security according to the Commission.

With regards to the common energy market and the boosting of interconnection, there has been some effort in connecting the electricity grid to the other members, although that seemed only like a recent effort since some of the member states are still lacking behind targets determined more than a decade ago. The strengthening of interconnections within the gas infrastructure was either not perceived positively by the member states, was deemed unnecessary, or economically not viable. Regardless, there has not been much discussion in terms of the common energy market, and it seems like the Commission is the only active proponent of the truly European energy market since it would mean giving up sovereignty in energy regulation. What this lack of coordination and seemingly impossible acceptance of one course of action can mean that European Union does not have a securitizing actor in the field of energy that would be able to push a securitization move on the audience. Thus, when an actual threat, not only a perceived threat will be approaching the European Union, there will not be a platform from which the union can respond as a single unit and respond to the threat in the most efficient way. What we are coming back to is the underlying and fundamental problem that is plaguing the Union and that is the dichotomy of actors and their obligations to their subjects. As it was mentioned in the Introduction,

Jurgen Habermas has stated that “If the Union is not authorized to make final decisions, the subordination of national law under European law actually in effect cannot be explained in terms of the customary hierarchical relation between federal and state law or constitutional law and secondary law” (Habermas, 2012). There is explained the space for interpretation and the nature of the EU structure, which every member state decides for itself how and to what extent will it comply with the strategy. As this work has confirmed, this relation and dynamic plays out the same in the energy sector, as it would play out in all the other sectors. Time and time again, such conclusion is a confirmation that the European Commission is not a capable securitizing actor that would be able to manage its audience, so that it would respond to its securitization. The effectiveness of securitization is coincidental with the goals designated by the member states themselves, the audience.

## Resumé

Už od prvotných pokusov európskej integrácie sa komunita členských štátov zaoberala otázkou spoločného spravovania energetických zdrojov v rámci Európskeho spoločenstva uhlia a ocele. V dnešnej dobe Európska Únia čelí výzve ako zabezpečiť svoj dopyt po energii. Veľké percento členských štátov je silno energeticky závislé na dodávkach plynu z Ruska. V roku 2006 a 2009 bola Európskym štátom pozastavená dodávka ruského plynu kvôli nezhode medzi Ruskom a Ukrajinou. Európska komisia eviduje problémy, ktoré vznikajú kvôli energetickej závislosti na jednom dodávateľovi a vo svojej komunikácii s členskými štátmi im komunikuje túto slabinu.

Táto práca analyzuje efektivitu komunikácie medzi členskými štátmi Európskej únie a Európskou komisiou. Metóda výskumu práce je diskurzívna analýza, ktorá poslúži ako nástroj na identifikáciu sekuritizácie v energetickom sektore. Táto práca poskytuje definíciu sekuritizácie na základe teoretického modelu akademikov z Kodaňskej školy medzinárodných vzťahov. Na základe získaných definícií analyzuje a klasifikuje diskurz.

Táto práca obsahuje dve individuálne analýzy diskurzu. Ako prvé sa analýza sústreďí na komunikáciu Európskej komisie mierenú na členské štáty. Skrz definície teoretického modelu táto práca identifikuje prvky sekuritizácie a opisuje prúdy diskurzu mierené na viacero elementov energetickej bezpečnosti Európskej únie. Z komunikácie vyplýva jasný podnet na sekuritizáciu energie a presný postup a nástroje ako to dosiahnuť. Prvá časť analýzy slúži na vysvetlenie toho, čo sa dá považovať za prijatie alebo odmietnutie diskurzu poskytovaným Európskou komisiou, ktorý je mierený na členské štáty. Druhá časť diskurznej analýzy sa venuje odpovedi členských štátov na sekuritizačný diskurz komisie. Na základe výsledkov druhej časti diskurznej analýzy vieme ako členské štáty reagujú na komunikáciu komisie. To umožňuje ďalej posúdiť efektivitu prijatia sekuritizácie prezentovanou Európskou komisiou.

V prvej kapitole sa práca venuje dynamike energetického sektoru v Európskej únii a uvedie čitateľa do témy energetickej bezpečnosti, ako aj spomenie relevantných aktérov v tejto sfére. V druhej kapitole sa práca venuje podrobnému popisu teoretického modelu, na základe čoho táto práca definuje pojmy použité v diskurznej analýze a umožňuje vyvodenie záverov, ktoré sú prezentované v závere práce. V tretej kapitole sa práca venuje diskurznej analýze ako aj popísaniu metódy, ktorú práca používa.

Z vyvoděných závěrů vyplývá, že členské státy se adaptují strategii prezentované Evropskou komisí jen v případě, že se zhoduje s jejich ekonomickými a politickými zájmy. Ve většině případů si každý členský stát vybral, která část strategie mu vyhovuje a podle této části se řídil. Problém s takovou reakcí na sekuritizaci je neschopnost Komise adresovat hrozby a problémy, které vyžadují jednotná řešení přijatá všemi nebo aspoň většinou členskými státy. Silné rovnako ako aj slabé stránky Európskej únie vyplývajú z diverzity členských štátov a ich geografických, ekonomických ako aj geopolitických podmienok. V aktuálnom fungovaní však neexistuje jeden aktér, ktorý by dokázal ovplyvniť smerovanie EU v prípade problému alebo hrozby. Následok neschopnosti dať jednotnú odpoveď a konať ako jeden aktér je sila externých aktérov, ktorí jednajú s EU.

Táto práca slúži ako podklad pre ďalší výskum v energetickom sektore a sekuritizácii EU. Práca poskytuje detailný pohľad na stratégiu Európskej komisie a pohľady niektorých členských štátov na túto stratégiu ako aj mieru, do ktorej ju prijali. Podnet na ďalší výskum by bolo obohatením tejto kvalitatívnej analýzy o detailný kvantitatívny náhľad do stratégie každého členského štátu, ktorý by umožnil dospieť k novým záverom, ktoré boli vďaka metóde tejto práce neodhalené.

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## Appendix B

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