

Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

**Limits of presuppositions:
Derrida's and Schlegel's critique of Heidegger's hermeneutical circle**

BACHELOR THESIS

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Bratislava, 2020

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature is attributed and cited in references.

In Bratislava, February 15, 2020

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Abstract

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The aim of this thesis is to provide possible criticism of the Heidegger's hermeneutical circle based upon the thought of the Jacques Derrida. This criticism is based upon the critical reading of the primary texts written by Derrida concerning the literature as well as his text concerning interpretation. The main base for this criticism is Derrida's concept of deconstruction that can be seen both as continuation as well as criticism of Heideggerian destruktion, and his thoughts concerning transcendental reading and literarity as an act of reading instead of essential quality of text, which can be seen as both continuation and critique of Heidegger's hermeneutical circle. Furthermore, this thesis tries to argue that, there is a possibility that Friedrich Schlegel's thought can be taken as certain anticipation of Derrida's argument. This connection between Derrida and Schlegel is based on Schlegel's concept of cultivation and cultivated person.

Keywords: Derrida, hermeneutics, Schlegel, literal theory, critique of hermeneutical circle

Abstrakt

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Názov práce: Hranice predpokladov: Derridova a Schlegelova kritika Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu.

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Zámerom tejto bakalárskej práce je preskúmať možnú kritiku Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu založenú na myšlienkach Jacquesa Derridu. Táto kritika je založená na kritickom čítaní primárnych zdrojov napísaných Derridom a zaoberajúcich sa témami literatúry a interpretácie. Základnými konceptami pre túto kritiku je Derridov koncept dekonštrukcie, ktorý je možné brať ako pokračovanie a zároveň kritiku Heideggerovej Deštrukcie, a jeho koncepty transcendentálneho čítania a literárnosti ako aktu čítania, ktoré môžu byť považované za pokračovanie a kritiku hermeneutického kruhu. Táto bakalárska práca tiež argumentuje, že literárne uvažovanie Friedricha Schlegela sa dá chápať ako určitá predzvesť Derridovho myslenia. Táto podobnosť medzi Derridom a Schlegelom je založená na Schlegelovom koncepte kultivovanosti a kultivovaného človeka.

Kľúčové slová: Derrida, hermeneutika, Schlegel, literárna teória, kritika hermeneutického kruhu

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Introduction

I know what I know. You know what you know. If one understands something, they are sure about it. This is what common sense tells us. We do not second guess every piece of knowledge we have. But this common knowledge has been often challenged. At least since the times of Socrates asking Euthyphro about how he knew that he is just, philosophers asked questions about the nature of knowledge and truth. These are questions such as “is our knowledge truthful?”, “how do we gain true knowledge?”, or even “what is truth?” These questions shaped the evolution of human philosophy, science, or even religion.

People in antiquity believed that truth is in possession of gods. To convey this truth, gods send signs. These signs could be hidden in many different forms: a flight of birds, the colour of animal entrails, or the words of prophecy spoken by Pythia. To decipher these hidden signs, priests had to learn how to interpret these seemingly random occurrences. And from this interpretation of signs hidden in nature, the hermeneutics have been created.

Like many other things that existed for a long time, hermeneutics changed. There have been many profound changes within the field. From its beginning in ancient Greece, it moved to protestant theology, then to interpretation of literary texts, and in modern times, hermeneutical thinking covers interpretation of any human interactions. Be it text, spoken discourse, signs, or even rituals.

One of these important changes happened at the start of the twentieth century when Martin Heidegger’s introduced his concept of the hermeneutical circle (Hoy, 1982). This concept criticized the idea that there is something as ideal objectivity when it comes to human understanding and interpretation. As the concept of Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle is still hugely important for the whole field, its possible critique can have a serious implication for it. Due to this, this thesis is exploring one of these possible criticisms. Specifically, this thesis argues that the hermeneutical circle can be criticized by an argument based on Jacques Derrida’s conception of literature. What is more, this thesis will try to support its position by drawing an analogy between Friedrich Schlegel and Jacques Derrida, arguing that Schlegel can be taken as anticipation of Derrida.

I. Methodology

This thesis is based upon the critical reading of the primary sources written by Schlegel and Derrida and then by comparing them to the Heidegger's concept of the hermeneutical circle as well as comparing these two philosophers with each other. As both authors have written a great deal of work concerning many different topics, this thesis will focus only on primary texts that are connected to the topic of literature, interpretation or to the topic of writing in general.

Due to the huge importance of Heidegger for the argument of this thesis, one of the foundational texts that will be used is Heidegger's *Being and Time*. This work will be used as the source to the summarization of the hermeneutical circle as well as the concept of the destruction of history.

For the part of the thesis concerning Derrida, the main source is an anthology of Derrida's works concerning literature called *Acts of Literature*. Works within this anthology will be used to define Derrida's conception of literature as well as to provide some of his opinions about interpretation. To provide Derrida's direct criticism of Heidegger, the text called 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' from *Writing and Difference* is used. As a supplement to these pieces of writing, two of the Derrida's interviews are also used. The first of these is an interview by Derek Attridge called '*This Strange Institution Called Literature*', which is also contained in the above-mentioned anthology. The main part of the interview that will be of interest for this thesis is the part concerning Derrida's concept of transcendental reading and literature as an act of reading. The second interview is called *Positions* and it is used to find the definition of deconstruction. Furthermore, this thesis uses some secondary sources concerning Derrida such as the 'Introduction' of *Acts of Literature* written by Derek Attridge. These secondary sources will be used to provide an additional explanation for the concepts from primary sources written by Derrida.

The argument concerning Friedrich Schlegel is also based upon the reading of primary sources. More specifically, the sub-chapter devoted to Schlegel is an analysis of two of Schlegel's 'Critical fragments'. Other primary sources, which are not directly included in this text but were used during the research, are Schlegel's fragments from 'Athenaeum fragments' and 'On Ideas'. Furthermore, these primary

sources also include Schlegel's essays such as 'On Incomprehensibility', 'Letter about Novel', and 'On Goethe's Meister'. These primary sources will be supplemented by Fichtow's 'Introduction' from the anthology 'Schlegel's Lucinde and Fragments'. This secondary source is used to provide some historical and biographical information about Schlegel and his work.

As the main aim of this thesis is to look upon the different ways how to interpret text, it does not focus upon the historical context of Heidegger, Schlegel's or Derrida's thought. Instead, it looks solely at the concepts within their thinking that are connected to the issue of interpretation and then comparing and contrasting these thoughts.

II. Hypothesis

As already mentioned, Heidegger's concept of the hermeneutical circle played huge importance in the development of modern hermeneutics. This importance can be shown by the fact that most of the modern hermeneutical theories are written either as its continuation or its criticism.

Even though that Heidegger's problematization of the ideal of objectivity allowed for a greater range of interpretations of the any given text, this thesis will try to argue that from the stance of Jacques Derrida, the hermeneutical circle is still restrictive to the number possible interpretations. This is because the presuppositions that are part of the hermeneutical circle cannot be influenced by the reader who is engaged in it. On the other hand, Derrida conception of literature allows for more active engagement with the text and thus it opens up more possibilities for interpretation.

More specifically this thesis is built upon the hypothesis that Derrida's conception of literature can be taken as quasi-continuation of Heidegger's hermeneutical circle. This quasi-continuation lies in the fact that Derrida's concepts of transcendental reading and literature as an act of reading can be seen both as continuation and criticism of the hermeneutical circle. These concepts continue Heidegger by arguing against the ideal objectivity while interpreting the text. Derrida's criticism is that Heidegger's concept is still too restrictive for a number of possible interpretations. Furthermore, this thesis tries to support Derrida's more active stance toward interpretation by drawing an analogy with Friedrich Schlegel's concept of cultivation.

Hermeneutics and Heidegger

This chapter aims to provide a brief overview of the fields of hermeneutics and it is divided into two main sections. The first of these sections explains the origins of the term ‘hermeneutics’ as well as the evolution of this discipline before the twentieth century. The second provides a more detailed overview of Heidegger’s concept of the hermeneutical cycle. This is because this concept is an important basis of the argument presented throughout the whole thesis and thus, it is necessary to represent it as faithfully as possible.

I. Roots and the evolution of the field of Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics as a field has a long history that has its roots in ancient Greece. Like many other things that existed for a long time, hermeneutics changed over time. There have been many profound changes within it. It gradually moved from being concerned with the understanding prophecies through being formed by disciplines connected with reading texts such as biblical studies or classical philology, to studying understanding in general. With the most important recent change happening at the start of the twentieth century by Martin Heidegger’s introduction of the concept of the hermeneutical circle (Hoy, 1982, p. 4).

As already mentioned, the roots of hermeneutics stretch back to antiquity. The word ‘hermeneutics’, as a word that relates to the method or the way of understanding, has its root in ancient Greek words *hermeneuien* and *hermeneia*. These are usually translated as ‘meaning to interpret’ and ‘interpretation’ respectively (Palmer, 1969, p. 12). Furthermore, this word carries a connection with the Greek God Hermes, whose name shares similar etymology (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 1; Hoy, 1982, p. 1; Palmer, 1969, p. 12). Hermes was a god traditionally associated, among other things, with being gods’ messenger. As a messenger god, he helped other gods to communicate with their mortal followers, often by showing mortals various natural signs. These signs could, for example, be in a flight of the birds or colour of entrails of a sacrificed animal. Due to the importance of proper understanding of these messages for war declarations, religious ceremonies or, sometimes, even to individual decisions, an art of interpretation of these signs played an important role for Ancient Greeks.

The importance of above-mentioned words for Greek society can quite clearly be demonstrated by the fact that there are quite a few ancient Greek authors that have used them (Palmer, 1969, p. 12). For example, one of the most important usages of these words in the ancient Greek thought comes from Aristotle, as he has devoted one whole text to the meaning of this word. This text, which was a major part of the Aristotle's '*Organon*', is '*Peri hermeneias*' or, in English, 'On Interpretation' (Palmer, 1969, p. 12). Apart from Aristotle, this term was also used in the works of other ancient philosophers such as Plato, who have used it in several of his works. Other ancient authors who also used this term throughout their work are Plutarch, Euripides, Xenophanes, or Epicurus (Palmer, 1969, p. 12).

After antiquity, the word 'hermeneutics' stopped being used for several centuries (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). But even though 'hermeneutics' as a word was not used, inquiry about nature and correct way of interpretation have not completely disappeared. For example, there have been various ways of interpretation in antiquity, such as the school of Alexandria, that had a huge influence on the medieval catholic interpretation of the bible (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). Due to this difference between the usage of the name 'hermeneutics' and the concept of hermeneutics as such, some authors argue that there should be a certain degree of separation between the word 'hermeneutics' from its meaning as an inquiry concerning interpretation (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2).

Hermeneutics as a separate discipline, even though not under this name, formed during and after the time of Renaissance and Reformation (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). It was formed because protestants needed a way to reach a common understanding of the Bible while avoiding catholic insistence on church authority and tradition (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). This led protestant reformers to put forward a way of interpretation of the sacred texts that were based on *perspicuity*, or clarity, and the self-sufficiency of the sacred texts (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). In practice, this meant that they needed a way to extract this supposedly clear meaning out of the Bible without needing of outside influences that were not contained within the text itself. Probably the most important theorist of this new protestant way of interpretation was Mathias Flacius Illyricus, who, in his book *Clavis Scripture Sacrae*, argued that if the Bible is or seems to be confusing and hard to understand, it is not due to the need of the church's decision to remedy it, but it is due to the lack of

proper hermeneutical and interpretative training and thus it can be changed by undergoing such training (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, he also supported other protestant leaders in the opinion that the Bible is internally coherent and has its own continuity, and therefore to understand it, readers should not rely on tradition and norms set up by the Church, but that they should read every passage while thinking about its place within the above-mentioned continuity.

The first use of the word 'hermeneutics' describing a discipline that is concerned with the meaning and interpretation, dates to 1654 (Palmer, 1969, p. 34). In this year the book written by J. C. Danhauer called *Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrarum literarum* was published (Palmer, 1969, p. 34). With its focus upon providing proper rules for biblical exegesis, this book laid the foundation for the understanding of hermeneutics as a discipline that is concerned with understanding and interpretation of the sacred texts. Its publication also led to the boom of the popularity of the word 'hermeneutics' among German protestant circles, that, as already mentioned, tried to find reliable ways to interpret Bible in absence of the Catholic priest-based dogmatic interpretation (Palmer, 1969, p. 34).

Even though it is easy to see that hermeneutics, as a discipline, has its root in the Reformation and protestant theology that came out of it, biblical exegesis is not the only source that had been important for the formation of the modern hermeneutics (Mueller-Volmer, 2006). Firstly, another important source for this discipline is the philological study of classical works. Humanist scholars with an interest in reading of classical Roman and Greek texts created the collection of the philological instruments called *Ars Critica* (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 2). These philological instruments allowed for very precise grammatical analyses of the text, as well as allowing for testing authenticity or even reconstruction of the original meaning and forms of the text. (Palmer, 1969, p. 39; Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 3). All of which are techniques that have found their use in the modern hermeneutical analysis of a text.

Similarly to a resurgence of interest in interpretation and philological study of classics among humanist scholars that allowed the creation of the *Ars Critica*, the resurgence of interest in Roman law that started during the 12th century and to it connected techniques of jurisprudence provided another important source for the modern hermeneutics. As these legal hermeneutics were closely connected with the

philological reading of the classics, its evolution and with it connected desire to find one common interpretation of Roman Law allowed for spreading of the techniques that have been developed by philologist throughout Europe (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 3).

The last important source for the creation of the modern hermeneutics was philosophy, more specifically, enlightenment philosophy (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, s. 3). Enlightenment's influence has led to drive to systematize and categorize human knowledge that caused scholars to the combine above-mentioned techniques of protestant biblical exegesis, classical philology, and jurisprudence. This combination then led to the investigation of the general concepts that would unite all of these disciplines to understand understanding, and through that, it has created the modern understanding of hermeneutics as the discipline that devotes itself to study of interpretation and meaning (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 3).

As this new combined study of meaning and interpretation had its roots in the ideals of Enlightenment, most, if not all, of the thinkers that worked within this field agreed that texts have one objective meaning that it is possible to extract from them (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 3). This consensus that objectivity is possible became a stable part of the hermeneutical theory, and thus even the romantic philosophers known for their criticism of enlightenment focused more on the question of how one should attain this objective interpretation instead of debating whether it exists (Mueller-Volmer, 2006, p. 3).

II. Problematization of hermeneutics by Heidegger's hermeneutical circle

After their formation, modern hermeneutics has developed into an important part of the German philosophical tradition (Hoy, 1982, p. 3). Due to this importance, there have been several important scholars in the field who have advanced their own theories concerning the question of interpretation. As an example, we can mention the German romantic philosopher Schleiermacher (Palmer, 1969, p. 40). As mentioned above, although there have been many topics over which they have disagreed, all these various scholars of hermeneutics had, in general, one important thing in common. All of their various theories allowed for and sought one definite interpretation of the text that could be objectively identified as truthful or right interpretation (Hoy, 1982, p. 3).

Because of this fact that united if not all, then at least most of the theories within the field, one of the most profound changes in hermeneutics occurred when this possibility of objective interpretation was seriously challenged (Hoy, 1982, p. 2). The one who posed this challenge was Martin Heidegger in his book *Being and Time* with his idea of the hermeneutical circle. The impact of this conception on the field was so profound that most of the work of subsequent scholars in the field can be identified as a reaction to Heidegger and the problem he proposed through his hermeneutical circle (Hoy, 1982, p. 3).

The most important concept for Heidegger's conception of interpretation is what he calls *Dasein*. According to *Being and Time*, *Dasein* is being that is specifically being of a human being (Heidegger, 2001, p. 32). For Heidegger, *Dasein* is 'ontologically different' from other entities (Heidegger, 2001, p. 32). This ontological difference stems from the fact that its being that contemplates its own Being. This creates a relationship between *Dasein* and its Being, and what is more, this relationship itself has its own form of Being. This then causes that for *Dasein* 'there is some way in which *Dasein* understands itself in its own Being and that to some degree it does so explicitly' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 32).

In his explanation of the term *Dasein*, Heidegger notes that it is 'peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 32). Based on this, we can see that *Dasein* has certain circularity as it disclosed itself through its being. Similarly, Heidegger's concept of interpretation is circular as well. For Heidegger the process of interpretation is the process in which *Dasein* 'projects its Being upon possibilities' and through that, it takes the form of *Being-towards-possibilities* (Heidegger, 2001, p. 188). This *Being-towards-possibilities* is itself subjected to the potentiality of being as these potentialities thrust themselves upon the being of *Dasein* in the same way in which *Dasein* thrust is Being upon possibilities. This means that this process of interpretation is existentially grounded in the understanding and so it is not true that understanding would arise from our understanding or that interpretation means acquiring new information of our object of understanding, but it is rather seeing various possibilities that are contained within the understanding (Heidegger, 2001, pp. 188-189).

Jánsky: Limits of presuppositions

Because of this interplay between Dasein, being, and understanding, Heidegger argues that to engage in understanding of something, there is a need for it to be understood before we try to understand it, and what is more, this process of understanding changes our a priori understanding and therefore our next understanding of that something will be different (Heidegger, 2001, p. 194). In practice, this means that to understand something, one needs to approach it with certain presuppositions that can and will change depending on the situation in which presupposition occur. This leads to the circular situation in which we pre-understand something we want to understand in the first place.

Even though it might seem that this circularity can be qualified as a vicious circle, Heidegger argues that one should not try to avoid or circumvent it (Heidegger, 2001, p. 194). This is because, if one tries to avoid it or at least see it as necessary imperfection, they would not understand the true nature of understanding (Heidegger, 2001, p. 194). According to him, this faulty understanding would be caused by misunderstanding the question as objective or ideal knowledge cannot be found if we avoid the circle of understanding. This ideal knowledge is only part of the understanding, and therefore it is not the question how to avoid the circle, but it is more of a question how to enter it in a right way while being aware of our presuppositions (Heidegger, 2001, p. 195).

Derrida and Heidegger

Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutical circle had a profound impact on the field of hermeneutics. Even people who did not agree with Heidegger's conception that seemed to strip the text of all its definite meaning had to, to a certain extent, base their response on his thinking. One of the thinkers influenced by Heidegger was Jacques Derrida. Even the name of Deconstruction, one of if not the most famous of concepts used by Derrida has its root in Heidegger's concept of *Destruktion* (Lawlor, 2006).

As we have mentioned, Derrida's thought has been, to a certain degree, influenced by the thought of Heidegger. He wrote several pieces that have been concerned with Heidegger's work. As one example, Derrida's book *Heidegger: The Question of Being and Time* can be mentioned. Apart from this book, Derrida also mentioned Heidegger in other articles he has written, for example, one part of his book *Writing and Difference* called "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", even though mainly concerned with the work of Lévi-Strauss makes mention of Heidegger as one of the Destructive philosophers (Derrida J., 1978).

Due to these existing connections between the thought of Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger, it is not very surprising that there seems to be sort of quasi- continuation between this concept of deconstruction and Derrida's overall thought and the concept of Heidegger's hermeneutical circle. This quasi-continuation is quasi since Derrida's idea of the deconstruction of literary works not only, in some way, builds upon the Heidegger's ideas, but at the same time, it also provides a quite sharp criticism of the Heidegger's concept. This criticism could be found in the fact that the deconstruction of literary works not only considers our own presuppositions about the text, but it also carefully investigates philosophical presuppositions about the institution of literature itself.

I. Heidegger's Destruktion of History

In his *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to investigate the nature of Being. He argues that this investigation is necessary since being is 'the most universal and emptiest of the concepts' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 21). This universality of the concept of Being leads to the fact that, even if it lacks a precise definition as a concept there, is a lot of tradition that is tied to it. Heidegger thus concludes that even to formulate the question

of being itself in order to provide a precise definition of being, there is a need to destroy the ontological tradition in which we think so we will avoid being trapped within that tradition (Heidegger, 2001, p. 49). This need is caused by the fact that by this destruction we 'can fully prove that the question of the meaning of Being is one that we cannot avoid' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 49). In other words, this destruction of prior ontological tradition allows us to ask the correct question. If we would connect it with Heidegger's account of interpretation, this destruction of previous ontology, allows us to properly take into the account our position within the hermeneutical circle. This is because this destruction allowed for our exploration of our presuppositions to such an extent that would not be possible without it.

According to Heidegger, the interpretation of the true nature of average kind of Being, the kind of Being that is closest to Dasein, can prove quite tricky as not only it has tendency to 'falling back into its world' and therefore to be interpreted as part of the world in question, but it also tends to be hidden behind the layer of tradition (Heidegger, 2001, p. 42). This means that, during its investigation, the Being can be easily mistaken for the things that are part of its world, and thus we would not investigate the Being in its entirety, but only one fragment of it. What is more, even if the being does not get confused with the part of its own world, our understanding of being as a concept is hidden within the long existence of the tradition of various thinkers that had thought about it, and therefore it is quite easy to mistake this tradition of the Being itself.

If the true nature of Being is in this way wrapped within the layers of tradition, it 'is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 43). This is because, according to Heidegger, in this way, tradition 'blocks our access to primordial sources' which then 'makes us forget that they have had such origin' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 43). This obstruction then causes that our understanding of the being becomes ahistorical, that even the idea of going back through the evolution of the concept is not really comprehensive to us and thus there is no possibility to study the nature of being that is hidden under all the traditions (Heidegger, 2001, p. 43).

To adjust for these concealing layers of tradition, Heidegger proposes that there is a need to 'loosen up tradition' and then that 'concealment that it brought has to be

destroyed' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). To do it, it is necessary to carefully investigate this ontological tradition. This investigation aims at destroying this tradition piece by piece until it is possible to uncover the primordial source on which this tradition stood (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). By doing this, we will be able to display, what Heidegger calls, the "Birth certificate" of this tradition (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). In other words, this means that aim of this destruction is to track down the historical evolution of the concept with the aim to find the building blocks on which this concept and concepts that are preceding it truly stands to uncover the true nature of it.

What is important about this destruction of tradition is the fact that it is not the only relativization of the previous concepts (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). Heidegger's aim is not the destruction of the tradition for sake of destroying it, it is not mere negation. Its aim, at least according to Heidegger, is more positive (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). Meaning that this destruction not only destroys the concept in question but it, in a sense, provides more information about them. More precisely, the aim of this destruction is to find and test the limits of traditions, in order to know on what bases were this tradition build (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). This destruction of tradition within the process of destruction is in the fact that it allows us to get rid of the tradition in our thinking. means that the process of destruction is not aimed at the prior concepts per se, it is not aimed, as Heidegger says, 'into the past' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). The target of this concept is rather to provide this criticism of tradition in order to open possibilities within thinking, that is done in the present time. This then allows for thinking that is free from all the tradition, and therefore, according to Heidegger, it also brings up the possibility of getting to those primal sources of knowledge (Heidegger, 2001, p. 44). Source on which entirety of the ontological tradition is built upon, and who are in turn masked by it (Heidegger, 2001, p. 43).

II. Derrida's critique of Destruction

Even though there is a possibility to see a connection between the thought of Heidegger and Derrida, it would be a mistake to think that Derrida's work is a mere continuation of Heidegger's. Instead, it is more of a quasi-continuation in the way that through his work Derrida provides a serious critique of Heidegger's destruction of ontology while, through the concept of deconstruction having the same aim. Namely, trying to get outside of presuppositions built by the structure of thinking that is prior

for both. This critique can be most clearly seen in Derrida's essay "Structure, Sign, and Play in Human Discourses". Although this essay's main theme is Derrida's reading of the work of Lévi-Strauss, in introduction Derrida provides an explanation why what he calls 'destructive' philosopher such as Heidegger, Nietzsche, or Freud did not manage to destroy the reliance on pre-existing ontological tradition.

One of Derrida's aims is to explore structuralist ideas. But instead of looking at the structure of the world, he is investigating the structure of a structure. Providing exploration of the concept as a whole, not some of its applications. Derrida thus starts this essay by explaining that during the history of the structure as such, history of concept of structure, happened something which he calls the "event" (second quotation included in original) (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278). He argues this 'event' changed the concept due to the fact it caused certain 'rupture' and 'redoubling' within the concept of the structure itself (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278).

For Derrida, both structure as an above-mentioned concept, as well as 'structure' as a word describing this concept is as old as all the sum of Western science and philosophy, the sum which he calls episteme (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278). This age of both the concept and the world is also the reason that they are not only deeply embedded into Western episteme, but also inside of ordinary languages that are spoken in the western civilization (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278). Meaning that even though, we might not realize it, we are, in some way, influenced by our culture's knowledge and language to see the world as organized structure.

This existence of the embeddedness of structure within our thinking and language had been real even before the above-mentioned 'event', but this structure, or as Derrida points out, more precisely 'structurality of structure' tended to be reduced and neutralized by giving it a centre (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278). Or to put it more simply, this structuralist viewpoint was often 'masked' by the fact that we often used words we associated with the centre of the structure to refer to it in its entirety. According to Derrida, this centre could be taken also as 'point of presence, a fixed origin' (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278).

In other words, this structure, or more like the knowledge that there was the structure in the first place, was then hidden behind the point of reference that signified centre of this structure. This centre then, apart from organizing, orientating, and balancing of

the structure also limited the possible play, or the substitution of its elements, within the structure itself (Derrida J., 1978, p. 278/279). It limited this play since even though it allowed for play within the structure itself, it positioned itself as a centre (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). As mentioned before, this positioning in the centre of structure, made this point of presence the organizing, orientating, and balancing element within the structure, and thus it made itself impossible to substitute within the given structure and thus limiting its own ability to play within structure (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). As a play is an option that is possible for other elements of the structure only due to the existence of that centre, this meant the centre could not, by definition, to engage in it.

What is more, this then causes a unique position in the centre within the structure itself. This uniqueness is in the fact that, while it is at the same time element of the structure that is not possible to substitute, and therefore structure cannot exist without it inside, it is also in a sense outside of the structure proper as it is not allowed to engage within the play, and therefore, in some sense, it is not part of the structure (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). In other words, as Derrida says 'the centre has its centre elsewhere' meaning that centre itself is a structure which allows for play of its elements (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). This then causes, that, 'the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitution of the centre for centre' (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). This then means that for Derrida, the history of Western thought can be summarized as a 'matrix' in which Being is determined as a presence (as Derrida says 'in all senses of the word') (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279). This presence is then seen in various words and concept that have been used to signify this centre of the structure, words such as, for example, arche, telos, God, man (Derrida J., 1978, p. 279/280).

The apparent end of this historical chain of substitutions is what Derrida named as 'the event', as it is rupture in evolution of the concept of structure that has ended mere substitution one point of presence for another, and instead, it realized the structural nature of the centre itself (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). Derrida does not pinpoint the exact time and place when this break happened. Instead, he associates this change of thinking with several philosophers, whose work can be understood as a result of this conceptual break (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). Among these 'destructive' philosophers, Derrida counts names such as Nietzsche, Freud, and as he says, 'more radically',

Heidegger, whose attempt at the destruction of ontological tradition was described at the start of this chapter (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280).

According to Derrida, during this rupture, the structure of structure repeated. This repetition comes from the fact that these philosophers realized that the centre of the structure is another structure (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). Due to this, instead of continuing the chain of the centre substitutions, these philosophers started to think that the centre of the concept of structure has no natural fixed point within the structure, and thus, instead of substituting another point of presence for this structure, they started to think whether the centre as such ever truly existed (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). By this act, at least according to Derrida, 'language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when in absence of the centre or origin, everything became discourse' (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). In other words, when this break within the history of structure happened, the point that has been previously undisputed by the philosophers, namely, that every structure has to have something at its centre, became questionable and the question of its possible non-existence became worth of discussion. And through this discussion, the concept of centre of the structure, that was in a sense intuitively assumed, had to be put into the realm of language as these philosophers had to have a possibility to talk about it.

But, according to Derrida, these various 'destructive' philosophers, despite their claims, never managed to destroy the structure of the structure. This failure of complete destruction came to be since all of these philosophers and their respective philosophies tended to be trapped in a certain kind of circle (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). The circle that 'describes form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and destruction of the history of metaphysics' (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). This unique kind of relationship comes from the fact that it is not possible to shake the history of metaphysics without the existence of a history of metaphysics (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). What is more, for this destruction through discourse to happen, there is a need for a language that would be outside of the history of metaphysics, a quality that no language possesses (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). This quality is necessary as, without it, any sentence that is aimed at the destruction of the ontological tradition is a product of given ontological tradition and thus, in a certain sense carrying the concepts of that traditions within itself (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280). That way, every destructive utterance would at the moment of its attempted destruction of metaphysics, in a sense,

reaffirm them as it would need them to exist in order to even make sense. This paradox that is hidden within any destructive discourse then causes the fact that there exists no single final destructive philosophy. Meaning that several competing philosophers claim to be one destroying the ontology while being able to call their predecessors and competitors within the field as 'last Platonists', without necessarily saying that in bad faith (Derrida J., 1978, p. 280).

III. Derrida's Deconstruction

As is mentioned above, it is possible to consider Derrida's concept of deconstruction as a sort of pseudo-continuation of Heidegger's thought about the hermeneutical circle as well as the destruction of metaphysics. This continuation is based on the fact that deconstruction, as a general strategy of reading or approach to text or philosophy, tries to look at the limits of tradition and the concept contained within it, the same as Heidegger's destruction. On the other hand, the nature of this continuation as quasi continuation lies in the fact that deconstruction, was conceptualized with the above-mentioned paradox of destructive discourse in mind. This then leads to the fact that deconstruction is neither an exact method nor an argument that aims to destroy the ontological tradition, but as Derrida says, it is more of the general strategy to reading and thinking about concepts (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42).

During his lifetime Derrida defined the concept of deconstruction several times in slightly different ways (Lawlor, 2006). The earliest definition, which is also the definition of deconstruction that this thesis works with was given in Derrida's interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta titled *Positions*. This definition is going to be used since it is roughly from the same period as Derrida's critique of Heidegger in *Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences*. In this interview, Derrida argues that what he calls a general strategy of deconstruction happens in two phases (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 41). The first phase focuses on overturning the binary opposition that exists within the concept that is the aim of deconstruction, while the second phase utilizes this overturning to create the third concept that is free and outside of this binary opposition (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42).

The first phase of deconstruction is aimed at overturning binary opposition that hides within the concept. To do this, there is need to recognize the existence of these

oppositions within the concept that is being deconstructed, and what is more, there is also need to recognize the fact that these oppositions are not in 'peaceful coexistence' with each other (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 41). According to Derrida, these binary oppositions are always in 'violently hierarchical' relationship, in which one of those oppositions governs or at least has precedence over the other (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 41). As a good example of such hierarchical opposition could be used opposition of the speech and writing, in which, since the age of Plato, speech has privileged position (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42). Aim of this phase is then to exchange the hierarchical positions of opposition, meaning that, in our example, writing would have precedence over speech (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42). Not to recognize and overturn this hierarchical position means that any attempt to neutralize this opposition would be locked within its hierarchical relationship and thus it would only reaffirm the opposition instead of neutralizing it (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 41).

But as Derrida says, staying only in the phase of the overturning of the binary opposition, would mean that deconstruction would still be within the opposition, and so it would not be proper deconstruction (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42). It is, therefore, necessary to continue deconstruction with its second phase. The aim of this second phase is taking the overturned hierarchy from the first phase and using it to disorganize the whole opposition by showing that this hierarchy had to come from a conscious decision during the earliest evolution of the concept (Lawlor, 2006; Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42). This then shows the arbitrariness of decision that could be made also in another way. Meaning that if somebody did not decide speech have privilege over the writing, they could have decided that writing would have privilege over speech. This contradiction then leads to the possibility of new 'third' concept to emerge, the concept that is outside of the binary opposition and thus it can deconstruct this opposition without reaffirming it, as would other destructive approaches such as Heidegger's (Derrida J. , 1981, p. 42).

By comparing Heidegger's *Destruktion* to Derrida's *destruction* it is possible to see how Derrida both continue and criticises Heidegger's concepts. More specifically, it shows how both Derrida and Heidegger have the same goal in the mind, to get rid of layers of tradition and to see how given concept evolved throughout its history. It also shows that even though these two philosophers have similar goals, Derrida's work can be used as a criticism of Heidegger's. This is because, on Derrida's reading,

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Heidegger has been unable to completely abandon all the tradition. As he had not realized the structure that is within the language and thus, he stayed within the tradition he tried to destroy.

Derrida's Literature and Schlegel

In the previous chapter, it was possible to see how exactly Derrida's ideas of Deconstruction can be taken as a quasi-continuation of Heideggerian *Destruktion* of history. The main aim of this chapter is to show how, analogically, Derrida's thinking about the reading of what we would define as a literary text, can provide a quasi-continuation of Heidegger's thinking within the field of hermeneutics in general, and application of Heideggerian hermeneutics on the reading of literature in particular. This continuation is based upon, similarly to quasi-continuation that can be seen in case of deconstruction and destruction, Derrida's work concerning literature builds upon the Heideggerian concepts while, at the same time, it poses a serious criticism to it. More specifically, continuation will be in the fact that like Heidegger, Derrida works with the idea of presuppositions that are important for one's interpretation of the text, while the criticism of Heidegger's theory would be in the fact that Derrida argues that the literarity of the text lies in the act of reading itself. This then opens the possibility of more active engagement with one's presuppositions than is possible in Heidegger's concept of the hermeneutical circle.

Furthermore, the last portion of this chapter will be devoted to the argument that the work of the romantic philosopher Friedrich Schlegel could be understood as an anticipation of Derrida's conception of the interpretation. Derrida's connection with Schlegel seems to be based on the fact that Schlegel argues for a more active engagement with the text in a similar way to Derrida's conception of literature as an act of reading. This argument will be based on several of Schlegel's fragments, in which he talks about what it means to be a cultivated person and classical text as well.

I. Derrida and Literature

Before engaging with the question of what exactly literature means for Derrida, there is a need to talk about Derrida's legacy within the tradition of literary criticism. This need comes from the fact that most of the works that claim to use Derrida inspired literary deconstruction are not based on Derrida's work concerning literature. In reality, these literary deconstructions, that can be understood as sort-of reading based on limitless textual freedom, is derived from the Derrida's readings of the texts that are philosophical or are answering some kind of important philosophical question

(Attridge, 1992, p. 8). In practice, this means that instead of being close in their thinking and structure to texts such as 'Before the Law', which is a text in which Derrida reads Kafka's short story of the same name, these literary deconstructions are based on essays such as '...That Dangerous Supplement...' from *On Grammatology*. These texts then try to extract something like Derrida's philosophical method and apply it to literary texts to investigate various oppositions within the text (Attridge, 1992, p. 8). This approach is different from Derrida's own approach to literature since it allows only for the deconstruction of one act of reading, or in other words, by this approach, they can explore only their reading of one given text (Attridge, 1992, p. 14).

On the other hand, Derrida's essays concerning texts that could be defined as literary, are not focused on investigating the oppositions that can be found within the text themselves. These essays focus more on the philosophical question of what literature is and thus read given works of literature in a way that can illuminate some part of the answer to this philosophical question of what is literature (Attridge, 1992, p. 17). This means that Derrida's reading of the literary text is not aimed at the given text but concerns the institution of literature as such and on what this text can say about it.

II. Derrida's Literature

Although this differentiation is not absolute, in his works such as 'Before the Law' Derrida draws a distinction between Literature as such and something he calls belle letters or poetry. This difference comes from the fact that, for Derrida, literature is an institution (Derrida, 1991, p. 40). This means that literature has sets of laws and convictions that govern which acts of reading and/or writing belongs to it (Derrida, 1991, p. 40). As an institution, literature thus has a kind of historical evolution, an evolution that is tied to what is called Western civilization and Europe (Derrida, 1991, p. 40). This does not mean that people outside of these cultural and geographical areas cannot engage in literature, but, for Derrida, that what we call literature historically originates in Europe around the 19th century. This does not mean that other cultures or times did not have works of fiction or writing, but these works and rules that governed them were different from what we, in modernity, understand as works of literature. More specifically, all of these works of writing lacked one of the defining qualities of literature, the ability to say anything (Derrida, 1991, p. 40).

Ability to say anything means that works, which we consider literature, are completely irresponsible of the ideology that governs society in which they are created (Derrida, 1991, p. 38). This does not necessarily mean that these authors should be completely apolitical and should be free from the influence of any ideology. Rather it means that, in society, there is a certain understanding that authors are not entirely responsible for what they write. For example, based on this irresponsibility readers understand that it is not the author that calls for the dissolution of the current political regime, characters in their novel are doing it. Or to put it differently, literature as institutions allows for understanding that these are not my ideas, these are ideas of a character I am writing about, and through it to avoid certain repercussion for these ideas.

This necessarily means that, according to this distinction, Hellenic works of poetry such as Iliad or Odyssey, would not count into Derrida's definition of literature. They would be acts of writing or works of fiction, but they would not be part of the institution of literature, as when they were created, they have not been free from the ideology of society. For example, these works could not support blasphemy against gods, and if Homer would support it, he would probably face some sort of punishment. On the other hand, what would be one of the earliest pieces of literature, Schlegel's novel *Lucinde* is a different example. When this novel was published it created a great deal of public criticism of it being indecent, but Schlegel as an author did not face outright criminal prosecution or censorship (Firchow, 1971, p. 5). As at that time it was understood that it was part of literature, and thus criticism and opposition it faced came from literary critics and other readers, not from the law or ideology of society.

Another important thing about literature as an institution that allows one to say anything is the fact that this irresponsibility exists in principle. This then does not mean that any country in which works of literature are created is completely free from censorship. This means that there is some common understanding of literature as an institution that should encompass this kind of irresponsibility for one's creation, but this principle does not need to, and often it was not, respected (Derrida, 1991, p. 40).

An important concept within Derrida's conception is that literature 'lent itself' to transcendental reading (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). This means that like any other form of

discourse, such as philosophical, scientific, or even conversational, literature is possible to be read both in the transcendental and non-transcendental manner (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). This transcendental reading means that these discourses can be read in a way that goes 'beyond the signifiers and its signified, beyond the form, language' (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). In practice, this means that these discourses can be read in a way that they mean something more than what is written in them. For example, a novel such as above mentioned *Lucinde* can be read for its story. But it can be also read as a criticism of contemporary morals, or as other kinds of allegory.

Some people inspired by Derrida's work in deconstruction argue that the mark of a literary text is that it resists completely to above mentioned transcendental reading (Derrida, 1991, p. 47). Derrida argues against this conception, as he thinks that no text can completely resist this 'transcendental reading' (Derrida, 1991, p. 47). Instead, he argues that transcendental reading of literature is not complete resisted, but it is obscured or hidden (Derrida, 1991, p. 47). This means that in literature, to perform this transcendent reading is harder than in, for example, philosophical texts as it is, in a certain way, obscured. In practice, this implies that it is easier to read Schlegel's *Lucinde* as only a story instead of looking for hidden transcendent meaning within the text.

Another important part of Derrida's thought about literature that comes from the conception of a transcendental reading is the fact that there is nothing like the essence of literature (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). Instead, the literarity of a given text is hidden within the reader's 'intentional' relation to the text (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). One needs to actively engage in the institution of literature to be able to produce or read literature. This means that a text is counted as literature if it is, in the first place, approached as a literary text. Literarity of the text is then hidden within both acts of inscription and reading (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). This would mean that if the text is written to be literature or is read with the expectation that this is literature, then it could be argued that it is part of literature. This then opens the space for reading everything as work of literature, which, according to Derrida, is a possibility (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). This is also the case with other possible discourses such as philosophical or scientific discourse (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). But this does not mean that every text is the same, as many texts are more rewarding in being read as literary, while others might be better as philosophical (Derrida, 1991, p. 44). This would then mean that even if it is

possible to read a menu of a Chinese restaurant as a work of literature or as work of philosophy, it might not be worth it.

Derrida's notion of literature as an act of reading is interesting in relation to Heidegger's concept of Hermeneutical circle. This is because as explained in the first chapter, there is no possibility to control presuppositions that are part of the circle, there is the only possibility of being aware of them. Derrida's notion of literature as an act, on the other hand, implies that there is a possibility of influencing one's presupposition in some manner. This would mean that there is a possibility of reading discourse as literary, or philosophical, or in some other way. Thus, the reader's conscious decision would influence which set of presuppositions he utilizes to understand this discourse. So, for example, in the case of some short story such as Kafka's 'Before the Law', one could approach it as literary, and they would work with different presuppositions than if they approached it as philosophical work.

III. Schlegel as Anticipation of Derrida

This part of the thesis will be devoted to comparing the thought of Derrida and Schlegel. This will be done since this comparison may help to draw out the main points of Derrida's critique of Heidegger. Furthermore, it also provides an opportunity for subsequent research mapping out a possible connection between Schlegel and Derrida.

As mentioned, there seems to be a certain connection between the thought of Derrida and thought of German romantic philosopher Friedrich Schlegel. This connection is possible to be Schlegel in some form anticipating Derrida thoughts concerning literature and understanding. This part of the thesis will thus focus on the exploration of this relationship as well as the relation between the cited fragments. The main point of analysis in this chapter will be two of Schlegel's fragments from 'Critical Fragments'. Namely Critical fragment number twenty and Critical fragment number fifty-five.

20. A classical text must never be completely comprehensible. But those who are cultivated and who cultivate themselves must always want to learn more from it.

55. A really free and cultivated person ought to be able to attune himself at will to being philosophical or philological, critical or poetical, historical or rhetorical, ancient or modern: quite arbitrarily, just as one tunes an instrument, at any time and to any degree. (Schlegel, 2002, pp. 239,242)

As can be seen, both fragments are united by the idea of cultivation and the cultivated person. As the fragment number fifty-five is the fragment that defines what cultivation means, it will be first analysed since it provides background for the analysis of the second fragment.

As can be seen, this fragment argues that for one's cultivation, it is necessary to be a generalist in one's knowledge. What is more, a really cultivated person should be able to utilize this general knowledge arbitrarily. The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides several possible definitions of the word 'arbitrary'. One that seems as most likely to related to usage in this fragment is 'based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something' (Arbitrary, 2020). Due to this then, it could be argued that really cultivated people are not the only generalist but at the same time, the use of their universal knowledge needs to be influenced, to some degree, by their conscious effort. This then means that the application of this cultivated knowledge should not be restricted based on the essence of the situation or the object on which they are applied. Due to this, if some really cultivated person would read a piece of literary work, based on their cultivation, they would need to be able to read it not only as one who knows literature but they would need to know how to approach it as a philosopher or historian would.

When fragment number 55 is combined with fragment 20, it can illuminate to us how this cultivation relates to texts. As can be seen, fragment 20 argues that a classical text is never completely comprehensive, but a cultivated person needs to always want to learn more from it. In connection with the above-mentioned definition of what cultivation means for Schlegel, this could mean that a classical text should be read with many different approaches such as literal, historical, or philosophical. If it should be read in that way, it is then necessarily true that it can be read with these various approaches.

These two fragments can be then connected to Derrida's thought about literature in understanding. In language that is closer to Derrida, the message of these two combined fragments can be summarized as that to be a cultivated person, one needs to be able to engage with words within different institutions such as literature, history, and at the same time, they should be able to somehow influence what in what

institution they are engaging. Furthermore, connected with fragment number 20, it could be said that due to the incomprehensibility of the classical text, one can never find one unifying reading of the text that would cover all the interpretative possibilities that are within the text. Furthermore, one should, and therefore they are able, to engage with this text within different institutions. And therefore, it could be argued that these qualities of being literary, or for example, philosophical are within a conscious act of reader. This then shows that this conception of a classical text and cultivation are close, in a way, to Derrida's conception of literature as an act of a reader.

Based on this, it could be argued that in some parts of their thinking about literature, Schlegel could be used as anticipation of Derrida. This anticipation is based that both seem to argue for conscious engagement with the text as well as for the possibility of the text be read in more than one way. This then provides critique to Heidegger's hermeneutical circle as in hermeneutical circle there does not exist this conscious engagement and role of the reader is restricted only be able to be aware of their position within the hermeneutical circle.

Conclusion

This work hypothesised that there is a possibility to provide Derrida's based criticism of Heidegger's hermeneutical circle when concerning reading and interpreting of literature. Furthermore, another part of the hypothesis was that there is a possibility to support Derrida's criticism of Heidegger by the thought of Schlegel.

After providing a brief overview of the evolution of hermeneutics as a discipline. This thesis showed how is Derrida's Deconstruction both continuation and critique of Heideggerian Destruktion. This analogy served to provide support to a similar argument concerning Heideggerian Hermeneutical circle and Derrida's conception of literature. More specifically, by a combination of Derrida's concept of transcendental reading and literature as an act of reading one can both criticize and continue Heidegger's concept of Hermeneutical circle.

Continuation between Heidegger and Derrida is based on the fact that Derrida's concept of transcendental reading, similarly to the hermeneutical circle, argues against one ideally objective interpretation of the text. On the other hand, Derrida also provides valid criticism to Heidegger as his conception of literature as an act of reading allows for more active engagement with the interpreted text. This is because Derrida's conception allows for engaging with the given text by different approaches, while Heidegger's concept only allows for knowing one's presuppositions without any possibility of influencing it. In practice, this means while in Heidegger every interpretation is governed by sets of presuppositions that are not possible to change them. Derrida's concept, on the other hand, allows for the text being read as, for example, literary, philosophical, or scientific. And by these different readings, it allows influencing one's presuppositions that are governing an interpretation of the text.

Furthermore, this thesis tried to show that Friedrich Schlegel can in be understood as anticipation of Derrida when it comes to their conception of literature. This analogy is based on Schlegel's concept of cultivation and a cultivated person that allows for a conscious reading of a text in various ways, thus being similar to Derrida's concept of literature as an act of reading.

As Derrida's conception supports Heidegger's critique of ideal objectivity. It allows for greater freedom of interpretation. This freedom then allows for discussion of interpretation to move from trying to establish one dogmatic ideal, that will be sooner or later changed for another and opens up the possibility for more open discussion of the text that can lead to more equal and earnest understanding of both the text and also between parties involved. Understanding that can bring forward solutions and interpretations that would not be thought of while pursuing one ideal truth. This principle is then possible to apply not only to the field of literature but also on other fields of human life in which hermeneutics can be applied. This application then can possibly lead to a greater shared understanding of differences and less dogmatic outlook on the world of human interactions.

What is more, Derrida's approach quite effectively accounts for possible criticism of Heidegger's theory. More specifically to the fact that Heidegger hermeneutical circle disallow to reach any common understanding as it is based on very individual presuppositions, that cannot be controlled or even influenced. By seeing the literature as a conscious act of reading, Derrida's conception allows for a common point from which interpretation can begin without restricting the freedom of interpretation, maybe even enlarging it. Namely, that interpreters can agree that they will read this text as literary, and thus provide themselves with a common base of presuppositions that are tied to the institution that is called literature. What is more, after reaching and sharing their understanding they can repeat the process again by reading text differently, for example as philosophical text or scientific text, and come to even more possible interpretations that can be used while having possibility to reach a common understanding based on their conscious choice of engaging with the text in a given way.

Resume

Zámerom tejto bakalárskej práce je preskúmať možnú kritiku Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu založenú na myslení Jacquesa Derridu a Fridricha Schlegela. Práca je členená do troch kapitol, pričom kapitoly sú následne rozčlenené do podkapitol.

Prvá kapitola sa nazýva Hermeneutika a Heidegger. Zámerom tejto kapitoly je predstaviť vývoj hermeneutiky ako oblasti filozofického bádania a podrobne predstaviť Heideggerov koncept Hermeneutického kruhu. V súlade s týmto zámerom je kapitola rozčlenená na dve podkapitoly. Za úvodom je zaradená podkapitola venovaná stručnému sumáru historickej evolúcie hermeneutiky. Začína krátkym zhrnutím etymológie slova „Hermeneutika“, pričom sa snaží zmapovať postupný vývin teórie interpretácie, ktoré sú pod týmito pojmami v prítomnosti známe. Druhá podkapitola sa venuje analýze Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu. Táto analýza je založená na tom, čo Heidegger píše o chápaní vo svojej knihe *Bytie a Čas*.

Druhá kapitola sa nazýva Derrida a Heidegger a snaží sa zmapovať vzťah medzi Derridovým a Heideggerovým myslením. Je rozdelená na tri podkapitoly. Po úvode kapitoly nasleduje podkapitola ktorá, sa venuje Heideggerovmu konceptu deštrukcie dejín. Táto podkapitola je venovaná Derridovej kritike tohto konceptu a nachádza sa v druhej podkapitole. Tretia podkapitola predstavuje jednu z Derridových definícií konceptu dekonštrukcie a argumentuje, že dekonštrukcia je pokračovaním a zároveň kritikou Heideggerovej deštrukcie.

Tretia kapitola sa venuje Derridovej konceptualizácii literatúry a mysleniu Friedricha Schlegela. Prvá podkapitola tretej kapitoly sa venuje Derridovmu vzťahu k literatúre. Nasleduje podkapitola s cieľom analýzy niektorých dôležitých kvalít, ktoré Derrida pripisuje literatúre. Týmito kvalitami sú možnosť transcendentálneho čítania, literatúra ako inštitúcia a na to naviazaná literárnosť ako akt čítania. Tretia podkapitola sa, na základe dvoch Schlegelových fragmentov, snaží ukázať podobnosť medzi Schlegelovým a Derridovým myslením. Táto podobnosť je založená na Schlegelovom koncepte kultivovanej osoby a kultivovanosti. Pričom kultivovanosť umožňuje, rovnako ako Derridova koncepcia, čítať jeden text ako filozofický, historický, literárny, atď.

Po tretej kapitole nasleduje záver, ktorý ukazuje že, Derridova koncepcia literatúry môže byť chápaná ako kritika a zároveň pokračovanie Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu. Tento vzťah je analogický ku vzťahu deštrukcie a dekonštrukcie. Rovnako ako keď Derrida svojou dekonštrukciou pokračuje v a zároveň kritizuje deštrukciu, jeho koncepcia literatúry pokračuje v a kritizuje hermeneutický kruh. Náväznosť medzi myslením Deridu a Heideggera je v tom, že obaja odmietajú ideál objektívnej interpretácie a obaja budujú svoju interpretáciu na základe predpokladov, ktoré sa menia. Obe koncepcie teda umožňujú množstvo rovnako správnych interpretácii jedného textu.

Derridova koncepcia však umožňuje väčšiu slobodu čítania a otvára možnosť väčšieho množstva rôznych interpretácii pre jednotlivca. Je totiž založená na literatúre ako na akte čítania. To znamená, že čitateľ vedome číta text ako literárny (a teda vie ho vedome čítať aj ako filozofický, vedecký, atď...). A práve vďaka tejto skutočnosti má možnosť ovplyvniť predpoklady, ktoré formujú výslednú interpretáciu čítaného textu. Takéto ovplyvnenie nie je možné v rámci Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu, kde je jednotlivcova interpretácia založená na predpokladoch, ktoré nemôže ovplyvniť a môže ich len spoznať.

Výsledkom tejto bakalárskej práce je teda poznanie, že Derridova koncepcia literatúry je pokračovaním, ale i kritikou Heideggerovho hermeneutického kruhu. Súčasne ukazuje na možnosť podporenia Derridovej koncepcie argumentami založenými na filozofii Friedricha Schlegela, ktorého myslenie môže byť brané ako predzvesť toho Derridovho.

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