

BRATISLAVA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS

**Violence More Profitable Than Peace,
Arms Trade in Israel-Palestine Conflict
BACHELOR THESIS**

Bratislava, 2020

Krištof Sucha

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare, that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All utilized literature is properly attributed and cited in the bibliography.

In Bratislava, February 15, 2021

Krištof Sucha

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Abstract

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As a "securocracy", Israel is the most militarized nation on the face of Earth, with security issues penetrating to the very core of public, political and economic life. This securocratic nature is a consequence of the long-spanning conflict between Israel and Palestine. But – as militarization goes hand-in-hand with weapons and military technology manufacturing & development – arms trading could also be listed as one of the key causes of the conflict's perpetuation. that is the reason as to why the corporations want and need to keep the conflict going. For this reason, this thesis examines how and to what extent the private security sector contributes to the ineffectiveness of the peace process concerning Israel and Palestine. This research's goal is achieved by empirically assessing corporate involvement with relevant political elites in the region and analyzing it via Mikler's (2018) "Three Faces of Power" model.

Abstrakt

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Ako tzv. "sekurokracia", Izrael je najmilitarizovanejší štát na svete, kde otázky bezpečnosti prenikajú do samotného jadra spoločenského, politického a ekonomického života. Tento "sekurokratický" charakter je následkom neutíchajúceho konfliktu medzi Izraelom a Palestínou. Avšak, tak ako ide militarizácia ruka v ruke s výrobou a vývojom zbraní a vojenskej techniky, tak by sa aj dalo poukázať nato, že obchod so zbraňami je jeden z hlavných dôvodov prečo tento konflikt stále pokračuje. Z tohto dôvodu, táto práca skúma ako a do akého rozmeru prispieva Izraelský súkromný bezpečnostný sektor k neefektívnosti Izraelsko-Palestínskeho mierového procesu. Cieľ tohto výskumu je zrealizovaný empirickým posúdením korporátneho vplyvu na relevantné politické elity, pomocou modelu "Troch tvárí moci" od Johna Miklera (2018).

Table of Contents

Declaration of Originality	
Acknowledgements.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Abstrakt.....	iii
Introduction.....	6
1. Literature Review and Research Rationale.....	9
1.1 Overview of the Literature on the Conflict	
and the Peace Process.....	9
1.2 Arms trade in the conflict.....	13
1.3 Israel's weapons	14
2. Theoretical Foundations.....	16
2.1 Peace And Conflict As Concepts And Peace Process.....	16
2.2 Non-state Actors And Private security companies (PSCs)	19
2.3 Influence of Non-state Actors on State Policies.....	
And The "Three Faces of Power" Model	21
2.4 Why Traditional IR Approaches Do Not Work	24
3. Method and Empirical Analysis.....	27
3.1 Method	27
3.2 Empirical Analysis	30
3.2.1 Israel's Defense Establishment.....	30
3.2.2 Israeli Private Security Companies.....	32
3.2.3 Influence On Israel's Policies &.....	
Ramifications For The Rest of the World	34
Conclusion	37
Resumé.....	38
Bibliography	41

“Haman... persecutor of the Jews, had planned to destroy the Jews...

But when Esther came to the king, the king ordered decrees that the evil plans he had plotted against the Jews be visited upon him instead, and he and his sons were hanged from the gallows.”

Book of Esther

Introduction

Over the course of the last 70 years or so there has been much written about the Israel-Palestine conflict. Combining multiple social science fields and intersecting its disciplines the scholars have put forward ever-growing body of literature dealing with the military dispute about the Judea territory, issues of Israel's statehood, its Arab adversaries in the region and about the continuing struggles of Palestinian Arabs against the Jewish ethnostate occupation. The conflict has changed from periods of open all-out warfare (Six Days' War of 1967, Yom Kippur War of 1973 etc.), to armed revolts (Intifadahs) and to the asymmetrical warfare between Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian militant organizations (Hamas, Hezbollah etc.) but remains in a stalemate to this day.

To make sense of the conflict, the history of it needs to be studied accordingly. Boutwell (2002) and Neumann (1995) articles serve as a solid point of departure for this. Speaking in much simplified terms and synthetizing the two articles, the main narrative of Israel's birth, existence and struggle is the Zionist idea to reclaim Judea, the holy homeland of Jews after their suffering during the Holocaust. From the onset of this quest it was known that it will only be achievable through violence, *i.e.* military means. This certainly pertains the militarized nature of Israel's existence due to the fact that Israel's military- the Haganah (later IDF) predates Israel itself. The notion of "a few pitted against the many" is ever-present in Israel's history, epitomized by the Independence War (1948), Six Days' War (1967), Yom Kippur War (1973) during which Israel defended itself against the coalition of neighboring Arab states. Another key notion in the conflict's history is Israel's pursuit of "big power" allies, first the U.K., then Soviet Union and France and since 1973 the U.S., which has established itself as the closest partner of Israel and is giving the state billions of dollars in military aid. Another thing to keep in mind is that Palestinian or Arab history in the conflict is always reflective of that of Israel; to simplify it, the more Israel gains, the more Palestine loses and the more its populace suffers. Since both of the articles are quite dated, they are optimistic about the peace process following Camp David Accords in 1978 and Oslo Accords (1993-1995), but the conflict only changed from open war to asymmetrical guerrilla warfare symbolized by Intifadas, Palestinian uprisings in 1987 and 2000. Since then, Israel has had the upper hand, through major victories during Operation Cast Lead (2009) and Operation Protective Edge (2015).

The Israel-Palestine conflict, as the longest-spanning and still ongoing political and military dispute about the Judea territory, is one of the most studied phenomena among the social science scholars of various schools. International relations, international law, religious studies and security studies has hitherto tried to assess "why" of the conflict and have come up with offerings for the solution, *i.e.* bringing peace to the war-torn territory with relative success due to the complexity and longevity of the conflict. As was discussed in the introductory part of the work, the sought for outcome is peace between the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs. But there is a key hindrance to the peace process, which is carefully hidden in plain sight, that is unaffected by any negotiations between the official political representatives of the belligerents, irrespective of UN efforts to tone down the violence and certainly bypasses the numerous ceasefire agreements. The scholars have repeatedly focused on the populist policies of Israel's PM Netanyahu, the weakness or unwillingness of the U.S. to serve as mediator, Iran for the continuous arming of Palestinian militants or the political and religious leaders invoking identity politics, thus bringing primitive ethno-religious urges to the populations. That may all be true but as this work will claim, those are only contributing factors. The work will try to focus and assess as to how much of a hindrance is money, namely the money of big weapons trade and development corporations making billions of dollars from human suffering. The following paragraphs will constitute a discussion of the literature sources, utilized to come up with this provocative, yet possibly very real research interest.

This work's primary focus is to put another factor in the forefront – economic gains of private security companies (PSCs) of Israel and to research how and in what scope do they affect the peace process behind the scenes, in other words how are they pushing the elites to keep the conflict in its current stalemate while filling their pockets. This factor is rarely discussed in the scholarly literature about the conflict with only handful of scholars taking it into an account, hence the possible inadequacy of explaining why the conflict persists. Stated differently, how and to what extent does Israeli private security sector contribute to impotency of peace process concerning Israel and Palestine and the perpetuation of the conflict is the thesis' research focus.

This thesis will examine how and to what extent the private security sector contributes to the ineffectiveness of the peace process concerning Israel and Palestine. This research's goal is achieved by empirically assessing corporate involvement with relevant political elites in the region and analyzing it via Mikler's (2018) "Three Faces of Power" model. It will offer a discussion of some key concepts when studying conflict, such as scholarly definitions of peace,

just peace and just war. It will also explore the phenomenon of private security companies in the international relations under the larger rubric of non-state actors. In order to conduct the empirical assessment of the data (both qualitative and quantitative), it will be fetched from scholarly sources studying the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict and then it will be analyzed from a different point of view. This is called secondary analysis and some of its advantages and limitations will be discussed in the third chapter of the work.

1. Literature Review and Research Rationale

1.1 Overview of the Literature on the Conflict and the Peace Process

Now that the historical overview of the Israel-Palestine conflict has been laid out, it is possible to proceed to the contemporary issues in the conflict itself that the political science scholars of various disciplines attend to. At the heart of scholarly inquiry is to find answers to two very simple yet very complicated questions about the dispute: How come that a conflict that dates back to the aftermath of the World War Two still rages on? Is peace between the belligerents attainable? If so, how? This indeed is a conundrum that lingers around the conflict.

Therefore, scholarly literature have tried to view the conflict for Judea from as many angles as possible, combining conflict studies theories and intersecting disciplines. In the post-Intifada era, the conflict is in a deadlock with the Nobel Peace Prize appraised efforts of Oslo Accords in shambles. There is a consensus among the scholars that there are six major political issues keeping the peace hostage and the process of negotiations in a chokehold. These are: a) the establishment of Palestinian state, b) the location of a land for the Palestinian state, c) the evacuation of Israeli settlements, d) the partition of Jerusalem, e) Palestinian supervision of the Temple Mount and f) refugees (Lewin & Bergh, 2016).

As far as Palestinian statehood is concerned, the topic itself is heavily contested throughout the history. An issue of international jurisprudence, epitomized by the United Nations, the people of Palestine and their governing body of Palestinian Authority have found themselves unable to become a full-fledged member of the U.N. General Assembly and are instead languishing as a permanent observer state (United Nations, 2012). Thus Palestine is *de facto* a state but it still does not enjoy the privileges of the full-fledged member which Israel does and still lacks recognition from a handful of states, which is deemed a matter of great political importance in the contemporary international law as the Swiss jurist Bluntschli suggested back in the 19th century: “The newly created State has a right to enter into the international community and be recognized by other States its existence is undoubted and secure...It has that right because it exists and because international law unites the States of the

world into a common legal system..." (Bluntschli, 1878). Although this theory is still largely in use today it is unapplicable for Palestinian reality, since it has fragmented legal power with the Israel's bodies of jurisdiction and its "security" is non-existent, owing to the fact that it is in a state of perpetual conflict since the war in 1948.

Political scientists were tinkering for a long time with the two long-proposed solutions for the Palestinian statehood and its location, namely a) the one-state solution and b) the two-state solution. One-state solution is heavily disfavored by Jewish intellectuals (some of them political scientists themselves) and other leading political science figures such as Noam Chomsky who called it "unrealistic" and "nothing to do with the real world" (Wearing, 2012) and Norman Finkelstein who proclaimed that Israeli Jews would not accept it unless they were completely convinced that they would be in absolute majority and are "fearful of Arab domination" (Weiss, 2012). The one-state solution would in practice mean a return to the political system of the British Mandate Palestine, a bi-national state. It would however undermine democracy, since a lot of Israelis and Palestinian Muslim Arabs would prefer the legal system to be guided by Halakhah and Sharia, respectively. Israel's *raison d'état* would also cease to exist since the one-state solution would go directly against the Zionist vision of an establishment of a Jewish ethnostate (Thrall, 2017). A group of Jewish academics also warn of potential apartheid regime that would be formed, possibly leading even to the genocide of Jewish population (Plaut, 2008).

The other possibility, the two-state solution is on a glance a simple proposition: Israel and Palestine would be two sovereign states with borders stemming from the 1949 Armistice agreement, meaning that Palestine would govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israel would comprise the rest of former Mandate. This solution has the support of public opinion on both sides of the conflict, the international community and was the effort of numerous peace talks (Wearing, 2012). The problem is that it has become unviable and in reality impossible due to Israel's elite rigorous fight against it and its unwavering support of the Jewish settlers in the West Bank. This grave obstruction of peace and the destruction of the two-state solution's viability is one of the reasons of writing this thesis.

The previous paragraph already touched upon the next major issue, as proposed by Lewin & Bergh, the settlers. Another issue that majority of literature on the conflict is concerned with is precisely the Israel's Jewish settlers illegally claiming land in the *de jure* area of Palestine, the West Bank of Jordan and a smaller number of settlements in the annexed Golan Heights

territory of Syria. An overwhelming majority of political science and jurisprudence literature hold the belief that these Jewish settlements in the occupied territories are illegal, a war crime (a breach of Fourth Geneva Convention) and form a "sovereignty vacuum" (Grief, 2008, p. 662). Jews of Israel started to build these settlements after the victorious Six Days' War (1967) for practical reasons: reclaiming their lost homes (minority) but the most settlers moved in for more extremist reasons: to illegally profit from natural resources and out of religious zeal that this land is "the divine land in the ancestral home of Jewish people", therefore rightfully theirs to take. There are currently around 400 000 Israeli citizens living in these settlements with this number increasing every year with no slowing down in sight (Gorenberg, 2007).

The Holy City of Jerusalem and its Temple Mount are another two major issues that scholarly literature seeks to tackle to make sense of the conflict and possibly lift its deadlock, to again, a limited success. Jerusalem is of course of ominous importance for both sides since it is considered the most holy place in both Judaism and Islam. The city is also silently being overtaken and settled by Jewish settlers, particularly the contested East Jerusalem (al-Quds) which is Palestine's sought for capital (currently Ramallah) which links best to the previous paragraph: Israel's authorities are breaching Fourth Geneva Convention by their tacit and/or conscious support of the settlers (Napolitano & Hakala, 2012). Jerusalem is also home to the spiritual ground zero of Judaism and the place of Mohammed's ascendancy in Islam – the Temple Mount. It encapsulates Al-Aqsa Mosque (third holiest Mosque in Islam), the Wailing Wall (the only remaining wall of old Jerusalem) and is said to contain highly concentrated divine presence by the rabbis; prohibiting ordinary Jews to enter there whatsoever. This holy site is an important issue of the conflict on its own: it territorially belongs to the Israel but is in the custodianship of Islamic Waqf (inalienable property which does not generate profit) and only Muslims can pray on the site. It has been kept under this status quo since 1757, therefore everytime that an Israeli politician visits the site it sparks a huge backlash among the Muslim community in Israel and Palestine alike (Dumper & Stanley, 2007). The most fiery such example is 2000 Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visit of the Temple, which is attributed by a handful of scholars as the indirect instigation of the Second Intifadah (also called Al-Aqsa), which transformed the conflict more or less into its contemporary form (Ochs, 2011, p. 6). The powder keg that Jerusalem is and the cold peace that is being kept on the Temple Mount shows the religious and the religious extremist dimensions of the Israel-Palestine conflict that is being studied by the overwhelming majority of contemporary scholarly accounts of which many consider it a key hindrance to the peace process (Mostafa, 2018).

Coming back to Lewin's theorem of the six major hindrances in the Arab-Israeli peace process, this paragraph will be dedicated to the refugees. The Palestinian refugee crisis dates back to the 1948 Nakba ("cataclysm" or "catastrophe") when ca. 300 000 Arabs of the former Mandate left or were expelled by the forming state of Israel, with many of them being murdered by the Haganah Zionist militias (which later became Israel Defense Forces). Another million Palestinians were expelled in the aftermath of Six Days' War in 1967 and another hundred thousands internally displaced both within Israel proper and the occupied territories (Asser, 2010). The generations of this people live until the present day in refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon with majority of them in poverty, stateless and denied basic services. Many scholars argue that Israel's perpetual denial of these refugees' right to return is the greatest obstacle in a comprehensive peace process, but one that is extraordinarily difficult to accomplish (Zakaria, 2010). Israel's authorities consciously fight against UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) resolutions that deem the right of return as inalienable and uncompromisable. Israel's interest lies in the fear that the return of Palestinians to their homes would dissolve Jewish majority needed for their Zionist ethnostate project. Refugee crisis is also expanded by the U.S. withdrawal from UNRWA and the following loss of its financial donations, prioritizing Israel as its greatest political and military ally (Luther, 2019).

Among some of the less conventional prisms that scholars have chosen to study the conflict is emotion. For instance, Gold's 2015 article argues that an obstacle to the peace between Palestinians and Israelis is the heavy emotional burden that both of them have carried and inherited from the bloodshed and fear involved in the long-lasting dispute. However, she acknowledges that emotion is an underdeveloped notion in IR research and is ought to be studied more, because positive emotions can provide the impetus for a viable peace efforts of those directly involved (Gold, 2015). Other scholars focused on the language issues, which enable Israel to preserve its own "moral high ground", enabling it to frame the perpetuation of the conflict as self-defense. Divine (2019) provides an eye-opening argument: "As much as a hardening of the perspective supposedly imposes an indelible stamp of guilt on Zionism and Israel, it also injects in Palestinians a brooding pessimism and passivity suggesting that they cannot control their own destiny because they confront an enmity so implacable and evil in character that without total international mobilization, they will never be given the independence enjoyed by other nations." (Divine, 2019, p. 12) On the other hand, Kelman in Ashmore *et al.* (both 2001) argues that behind the peace talks and warfare lies the real issue:

the bitter struggle between the two parties rooted in national pride and identity. This gives the conflict its zero sum dimension, us or them, and these two cannot be reconciled until their both respective national identities are reevaluated and reformed, so they no longer are based on the direct opposition to one another (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001).

Other such issues that many of the contemporary scholars deal with are encompassed in Daibes' 2015 article. Among these are: the radicalization of Israeli society, particularly after the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009 and the push of whole political spectrum to the right (Daibes, 2015). Second factor is the incompetence, vagueness and inconsistency of the U.S. efforts to act as mediator with 'historic talks' and 'visions for peace in the Middle East' being shoved down the media's throats every few years with very little achievement and a stench of hypocrisy (U.S. is helping Israel to evade responsibility in front of the UN and to justify its nuclear arsenal). Another such factor is the cynical economic profit that Israel gains from the illegal occupation of the West Bank (quarrying, tourism, beauty products etc.). (Daibes, 2015).

To sum, there is a general consensus among the scholars studying the conflict and its development that there is a number of hindrances to the peace process, in other words there is not a single layer of what is causing the perpetuation of the conflict and the breakdown of peace efforts, but a multi-layered framework of explanation consisting of a multiplicity of factors. The proposed factor that this work is concerned with is the arms trade of the conflict, particularly of Israel. The following paragraphs will glaze over this understudied factor that only handful of scholars deal with and will try to demonstrate as to why is it of great importance.

1.2 Arms trade in the conflict

Harper's (2015) and (Segal in Santos 2018) articles elaborate on the notions of securitization and militarization of Palestinian and Israeli societies, in connection with the arms trade and relationships with foreign powers (particularly those of Israel). Building on this premise and uncovering the "shadow world" of arms trade in the area as a key variable to understanding the conflict and why it continues. Segal's argument is more quantitative based on the facts that Israel is the most militarized state on Earth (Global Militarization Index 2017), it is the sixth largest exporter of weapons, it spends 25% GDP on defense budget and its economy is heavily based on weapons manufacture and development. This is enhanced by the

international arms trade particularly with the U.S. and U.K., wherein the companies like Lockheed Martin, Elbit Systems, Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) intermingle with the Israel Defense Forces and Israeli members of Parliament (Knesset). Both Halper and Segal agree that Operation Protective Edge carried out by the IDF in 2014 which enormously weakened Hamas has boosted this arms trade exponentially since it opened the West Bank of Jordan for even more Jewish settlers. Those areas and the Gaza Strip have become somewhat of a laboratory for development and testing of weapons on Palestinian civilians. This makes Israeli military technology very easily marketable as "battle proven". Halper chiefly explains why the big arms industry wants and needs the perpetuation of the conflict but falls short on explaining how do these companies effect the breakdown of peace process. He calls Israel a "securocracy" - a state which is so heavily militarized that security issues are put to the forefront of policymaking, economy and social life. Further, he describes Israel's matrix of control: a set of highly surveillanced and walled-off areas of the occupation zones, with a cumulative deterrence counter-terrorism policy and militarized policing. Finally Halper also postulates that the issue of Israeli militarism and weapons is exporting mass quantities to tyrannical regimes around the world as well as to the West, where Israel's troops are teaching police forces how to suppress protests and keep the status quo by militarizing the policing.

1.3 Israel's weapons

It is clear based on the consulted literature that at the heart of Israel's state philosophy is security, hence weapons (also on the Palestinian side, but to assume that the Palestinian territories are equals to Israel concerning the arms race would be fallacious). What these weapons are is clearly described in the sources, but most comprehensively found in Halper (2015) and the article from Journal of Palestinian Studies (2009). To mention a few: among conventional small arms; Uzi and Negev submachine guns, X95 and Tavor assault rifles, surveillance systems such as C⁴I (command/control/communication/computer), anti-missile systems such as Iron Dome and David's Sling or Merkava tanks and white phosphorous chemical weapons. Most of these were first showcased during the aforementioned Operation Protective Edge (2014). This vast trove of conventional arms and cutting-edge weapon and surveillance technologies are sold to the highest bidder as Silverstein (2018) suggests. The unhinged trade is clearly epitomized by Israel's absence in the UN Arms Trade Treaty (2014). This enables Israel to export its weapons, surveillance systems and military/police trainings to

some of the most hated and tyrannical regimes around the world, among these the military junta of Myanmar, Duterte's Philippines, Sri Lanka and various oppressive autocracies in South America. This enables Israel to maintain its matrix of control and export its arms to the global periphery. This of course, has strong implications that Israel's weapons are carrying out genocides (1994 Rwanda) and are responsible for police brutality in the West (particularly the U.S. and U.K.). When it comes to the American policy towards Israel, it is more than amicable. This total, unvarnished commitment to Israel's security, as Biden called it, is explored best in Tolan's (2016) article. He calls out the hypocrisy of the U.S. foreign policy supporting the "two-state" solution while at the same time supplying fighter jets and funding Israel. U.S. also turns a blind eye to the Jewish settling of the West Bank and poured gasoline into the conflict by recognizing Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel while simultaneously moving its embassy there.

Now that the overview of the contemporary scholarly literature has been laid out it is clear that the notion of "few pitted against the many" and the widespread belief in putting security above all else is deeply embedded in Israeli society – as well as its Palestinian adversaries. Israel's securocratic model of governance, the economy dependent on arms manufacturing and development and export all indicate that there are actors very much keen on maintaining the conflict ongoing. Though literature certainly conveys this, it does not place arms trade high on the list of hindrances to the peace process (alongside identity or international treaties, for example), nor does it dedicate much attention to explaining the whys and hows behind it. Therefore, this work will attempt to close this gap.

2. Theoretical Foundations

First of all, this work belongs in the realm of political science, under a more narrow rubric of international relations and its nephew; the conflict studies. It primarily deals with three phenomena: conflict (Arab-Israeli), peace process and non-state actors of IR (private security/military companies; PSCs), trying to explain their interlinked relationship and how could the latter third influence or hinder the former two. Therefore, this chapter will discuss some of the theoretical approaches to these three phenomena, already contained in the ever-growing body of literature from various fields of political science and then apply them in the third chapter to empirical data connected to the research question. The theoretical frameworks that take PSCs into account will be discussed rather extensively, while the phenomena of conflict and peace process will be given less attention since they are both already well-studied and established concepts in the political science.

2.1 Peace And Conflict As Concepts And Peace Process

Peace, on the first glance, is something that seems intrinsic for all humans to pursue, after all, it seems logical to want to live in an environment with the absence of violence, abundance of opportunity and harmonious societal relationships. It also enables human society to be cohesive and not be afraid of the most horrific thing as Hobbes called it, the fear of violent death (Shapiro, 2010). But the great degree of philosophical enquiry and scientific interest in the concept over the course of the last two millennia tell that peace is not as straightforward concept as it may seem. Therefore, this section will cover some of the scholarly thought on the concept of peace, jointly with what peace process can be understood as. A fly-over of various scholarly definitions will be provided and then the peace theory chosen to complement the theoretical part of this work will be made explicit.

“Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?” goes the famous quotation attributed to the U.S. President Abraham Lincoln which shows the possibility of reconciliation during the peace process with one’s former enemies (Chicago Tribune, 1940). First of all, it has to be stated that international relations theories are concerned with peace and means to

achieve it among actors (states, non-state actors etc.), not necessarily among individuals as for example Spinoza put it in late 17th century: “a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice” (Spinoza, 1670 in Jehangir, 2012). Hence, realist tradition is skeptical of long-lasting peace, since for them states are always looking for a way to increase their power over the others, demonstrated by the pessimistic Hellenic definition of peace as “an armistice in a war” (Thucydides, 431BCE in Jehangir, 2012). In other words, peace is not profitable for states, therefore “states, in their external relations with one another, exist in a state of nature...hence in a condition of constant war” (Kant, 1767 in Bennett, 2016). Kant is attributed to be the greatest pioneer of peace theory, with liberalism still looking up to his *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch* (1795) as the basis for their approach to peace among nations. According to Kant, six conditions must be met for a “perpetual peace”: a) no conclusion of peace can be made while some of the parties are secretly preparing for war, b) no state can be purchased or gifted by another, c) armies must gradually be abolished d) no “tampering” made with a state’s national debt, e) no state can interfere in another’s constitution during its creation and f) all states must condemn acts of provocation such as assassinations, instigations of treason or breaching of agreements (Kant, 1795 in Bennett, 2016). This illustrates the clear distinction between liberalism and its realist counterpart: for liberals peace is not only achievable, it is desirable.

With that being said, this work has chosen to subscribe to the scholarly esteemed definition of a dichotomy of peace by Johann Galtung. The Norwegian sociologist distinguishes between negative peace and positive peace. The negative peace is the absence of direct violence, thus there is no threat of assault, terrorism, war, rape or riot. This, however, is not enough because it often comes at a cost to compromise on justice. In other words, conflict ends, but not a proper reconciliation of the parties is never realized. On the other hand, the notion of positive peace is something that is much more difficult to realize. Galtung *et al.* (2002) says that it is an absence of structural violence such as poverty, hunger or apartheid. It is similar to the Spinozan notion of peace, since it “...involves the elimination of the root causes of war, violence, and injustice and the conscious attempt to build a society that reflects these commitments. Positive peace assumes an interconnectedness of all life.” (Galtung, 1964 in Tilahun, 2015; Galtung *et al.*, 2002 in Herath, 2016). In addition, Galtung’s dichotomy is further abridged by the “Just Peace” theory. This is a juxtaposition to the famous Just War theory, which shall be discussed in the following paragraph. The first proponent of the justification for war was St. Augustine of Hippo, whose famous *jus ad bellum* had been

later revisited by Aquinas and is still considered the central religious pretext and justification for waging war (Walzer, 2002). Aquinas stipulated three main conditions under which a war can be called just: a) the war effort must be led by a proper authority and not a private individual, b) it must have a just cause ("righting a wrong") and c) the belligerents must wage war only in order to advance a good or avoid an evil (Aquinas, 1485 in von Elbe, 1939, p.5). As far as contemporary accounts go, its most well-known conceptualizations has been laid out by traditionalist and revisionist schools, respectively. Traditionalists' approach is rooted in the Aquinas-Augustinian tradition and try to confine the theory into the boundaries of international law. They argue that war can only be deemed just if it is in a defense of the given state or to overthrow a tyrannical regime (of course, very easy to misuse as the Iraq War experience demonstrated). Traditional framework also forbids the targeting of civilian population, i.e. combatants can only fight enemy combatants, with this notion also finding its way into the Geneva Convention (Lazar, 2017). On the other hand, traditionalists are challenged by revisionists such as McMahan. Him and his peers refuse the morality of war altogether and are skeptical of legal ramification of war. They also question the civilian immunity and stress the need to act based on conscience and not on the law (McMahan, 2008).

Although this work is concerned with a modification of the just war theory, its interest lies more in its application on asymmetrical warfare conflicts. The greatest contribution to this issue is provided by Weiner (2017) who builds on Michael Walzer's concept of war rights. "In Walzer's view, individuals in war retain their right to life and liberty, but lose it when they choose to bear arms in war; killing in war becomes legitimate against combatants, therefore, but not civilians who do not choose to fight. Nations too have rights, that of territorial integrity and political independence, and can legally and morally defend themselves against aggression by others." (Yoo, 2019) These combatants are protected from harm once imprisoned, even if their side is fighting the war "unjustly", because morally they are more or less equal as the opposing side and only once they execute civilians or use them as human shields can they be treated; and prosecuted as war criminals (Walzer, 1977 in Weiner, 2017). Based on this, Weiner argues that these same rights should be conferred to combatants of non-state groups, if Walzer's conditions are met. Additionally, they should not just be treated as terrorists if the government they are fighting against hastily says so, but only once they actually carry out an act of terrorism such as the aforementioned civilian execution (Weiner, 2017).

As was previously mentioned, the justpeace theory was built as a sort of an addition of the just war conceptualization. Justpeace may be understood synonymously with "true peace",

or as Galtung argues; a state of equity and harmony without trauma and conflict (Galtung, 2015). Justpeace implicates that the moral aspect must be extinguished from all warfare, because no matter what it aims to achieve it still brings immense human suffering (Cahill, 2019). But if war indeed occurs, justpeace may be realized under conditions Allan and Keller (2006) constitute and majority of scholars subscribe to their conceptualization. However, these conditions apply only on peace negotiations between the two affected parties and do not take into account the possible mediator. These four conditions, or principles are: a) thin recognition, b) thick recognition, c) renouncement and d) common rule. The first two principles constitute the need for one party to recognize the other's very existence; thin recognition means to being acknowledged as an independent subject within the community of law, whereas thick recognition can be defined as respect for features that make a subject unique (Möller, 2007 in Strömbom, 2013). The third principle, the renouncement of at least some gains that both the sides wanted to gain in the conflict, thus the need for sacrifice and compromise (Allan & Keller, 2006). The last step in just peace process is the common rule, which has to include rules of the settlement, rules of behavior; i.e what is acceptable and what is not and to establish a criterion for both parties and for guarantors to approve of the solutions (Allan & Keller, 2006 in Boursier, 2016). Now that some of the main concepts of peace, conflict and peace process have been confronted, the following section will explore the issue of non-state actors in international relations theory.

2.2 Non-state Actors And Private security companies (PSCs)

International relations theory is a sub-branch of political science that dates itself back to Thucydides and his *History of Peloponnesian War*. Its primary unit of analysis has traditionally been a state, by means of which it could study the context of a war or foreign policy. In other words, it could conceptualize why a state actor behaved a certain way in a certain conflict or it proposed a certain foreign policy. However, the experience of the 20th century spurred some of the scholars to rethink this approach. After all, the essence of conflict and whole concepts of "war" and "security" has undergone a profound transformation following the end of Cold War. The breakdown of a bipolar world, divided by the spheres of influence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union have suddenly rendered the emerging conflicts more blurry and more difficult to

study because of the evidently outdated methodology, having states as somewhat of an ontological basis. After all, the realist strand still more or less believes that state is "an entity capable of ensuring security to its citizens against external threats, as it had previously done the castle or the fortified town" (Herz, 1957). With that being said, the limitations of this belief are quickly and readily recognizable: states in the post-Cold War era are reluctant to be providing military security on their own (if at all) and the enemy is very rarely (almost never) another territorial sovereign state. The other prominent school of contemporary IR, liberalism is also plagued by "state fetishism" because its interest in individualism makes it propose that a state is a sum of collective interest of all individuals (Jaquenod, 2014), while in the reality it is rather a sum of powerful lobby groups interests.

Therefore, it is clear: having states as primary units of analysis is not only insufficient in explaining, but also in describing the real, actual world that international relations is concerned with. This is especially ineffective in the conflict that this work is studying since the conflict's transformation into an asymmetrical warfare in which the IDF is fighting multiple non-state actors with Palestinian affiliation such as Hamas. But these non-state actors are not the main interest of this work, instead it focuses on non-state actors in charge of influencing Israel's security policy. Charles Tilly famously described four functions of state as statemaking (fending off internal threats), warmaking (fending off external threats), protection (of its citizens) and extraction (of tax revenue for profit and standing army upkeep) (Tilly, 1985). In the contemporary world it seems that the state has become inefficient in the first three and therefore outsourcing its security to private companies.

Logically, it follows that the non-state actors have become at least as important as states following the end of Cold War. This rising importance of non-state actors is best described in a book by Krahmman (2005) who correlates it with the decline of interstate wars and deaths related to them. He argues that many more people today suffer unnatural deaths because of ethnic conflicts, proliferation of small arms, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, terrorism and transnational crime. The arising of these new threats are both in larger part caused by non-state actors and it seems that other non-state actors, who are of transnational character are also more suitable to prevent them due to the global dynamic of the contemporary world (Krahmann, 2005).

Logical question to ask would be where do these weapon manufacturing and development companies belong in the larger spectrum of non-state actors in the IR theoretical

frameworks. Krahmman (2005) places them along non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as the new actors of global transnational relations emerging in response to the non-state threats. His book distinguishes three types of these private military organizations: a) mercenary firms that provide private soldiers, b) private military firms which offer training and strategic advice and c) private security firms which provide military support, logistics, maintenance and transportation (Krahmann, 2005, p. 8). These types of companies are employed heavily by the most advanced militaries in the world such as the U.S. and the UK in their military campaigns, for example, there were three private mercenaries for every two U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan in 2008 (Kruck, 2015, p. 121). Kruck (2015) also forms an interesting hypothesis that more does a state engage in neoliberal laissez-faire economic policies the more likely is for it to use the services of private military and security companies for its military efforts and it is more accepted by the political decision-makers and the electorate. To continue, these private military and security companies (PMSCs) can influence the foreign policy of a state considerably more than other economic non-governmental organizations once they successfully access the state's institutions involved in shaping the policy (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 305). Now that a broad overview of the rising importance of the new actors in the international arena (non-state actors; NGOs, IGOs and PMSCs) has been laid out, the following section will be dedicated to a theoretical discussion about the influence of these non-state actors on a state's policy.

2.3 Influence of Non-state Actors on State Policies

And The "Three Faces of Power" Model

The theoretical model chosen to explain the phenomenon of influence that private profit-driven companies have over legislative branch's policies of this section is the so-called "Three Faces of Power". This model was first conceptualized by Fuchs and Lederer (2007) and further enhanced by Mikler (2018) and is comprised of three types of power: a) instrumental, b) structural and c) discursive (Fuchs & Lederer, 2007; Mikler, 2018). This model will be the guide of the theoretical discussion contained in the following paragraphs.

Instrumental power is the most direct form of influencing policies by the private interest and is usually manifested in the form of lobbying. It is the ability of actor A who exercises power over actor B, to get B do something that B otherwise would not necessarily do (Dahl,

1957 in Mikler,2018). To achieve this, private interest spends incredible amounts of money to influence public affairs to further increase its revenue via the means of policy influence. After all, public relations industry is worth almost 7 billion £ in the UK alone (Mikler, 2018). However, Mikler argues that this is only the tip of lobbying iceberg, since much more effective method of private interest is to exercise direct influence over the policymakers. Domestically, in the confines of the particular state territoriality, private sector values corporate representatives which directly shape policy in a way that benefits the business. For example, 46 of the top 50 corporations in the UK have their own representative in the House of Commons, which indicates a profound penetration of corporate interest in public affairs and intertwinement of corporate and political elite (Wilks-Heeg *et al.*, 2012 in Mikler, 2018). Due to the transnational interconnectedness that the globalization has brought about, corporate interest of course lies in the influencing of policy at international level. For instance, Mikler mentions an example of World Trade Organization's agreement on TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). This agreement was concerned with establishing a minimal threshold level of intellectual property protection; including patents, sound recordings, industrial designs and others. Global corporations including "big pharma" created an umbrella lobbying organization called IPC (Intellectual Property Committee) in order to maximize the lobbying effectiveness on the governments involved in the international negotiations of the WTO. TRIPs remains the sole multilateral agreement on the intellectual property rights protection until the present day, but the effect of its implementation remains clear: global corporates involved in the IPC reaped profit, meanwhile access to critical medicine in the developing countries declined (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000 in Mikler, 2018; Stiglitz, 2006; Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, Accessed 2021). Therefore, TRIPs remains the prime example of instrumental power in state-corporate relations on the transnational level, if not the prime example of lobbying as such.

Following Mikler's model, another face of power is called structural power. This enhances corporate actor's ability to exercise its instrumental power. It can be defined as a "a devotion of effort stemming from the actor A to shape public values and institutional practices in a way that they can never be used to cause harm to actor A" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962 in Mikler 2018). This power is the most potent when exercised by gargantuan supranational corporations with their large degree of market capitalization, the ability to dictate the market and the people employed directly or indirectly (f.e. a share of labor force in the component suppliers to the automotive industry). Therefore, it is logical that structural power is the most

visible in companies that are "pseudo-monopolies" or they command the market with few others, such as JPMorgan Chase, ICBC and Bank of America in the banking sector (Vala, 2019), Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman in weapon industry (SIPRI, 2020) or Toyota, Volkswagen and General Motors in the automotive industry (OICA, 2014 in Mikler, 2018). Companies with this degree of market share and size are so deeply embedded in the structural frameworks of various states that they can reward or punish states for their behavior towards their investment possibilities. In other words, they are "too big to let them fail" or they provide "too good of rewards" to not complement them. Mikler finds that these supranational corporate giants' structural power capability is the most evident during crises, when governments take extraordinary financial policy measures to save them, even though their relative power is the same or greater than that of (some) states, hence they are *de facto* in charge of international trade and can play state off of each other (Radičová, 2016; Mikler, 2018, pp. 65-67).

The final part of the "three faces" model is the discursive power in the state-corporate relations, as developed by Mikler. This power is possibly the most potent since it not only enables actor A to make actor B do what he does not want to, but he can suggest, indoctrinate or introduce the actor's B wishes and wants. Following, discursive power is the ability to shape public discourse by corporations with politicians acting as something along the lines of "unconscious intermediaries" with the public. Discourse may be defined as Michel Foucault put it, "a complex network of relationships between individuals, texts, ideas and institutions with each "node" having an impact, to varying degrees, on other nodes and on the dynamics of the discourse as a whole" (Rabinow, 1984 in Olsson, 2007). In this Foucauldian conception, the ends of corporate sector is to "boost the output of its node" by taking over the node of institutions and texts in order to minimize the output of the node of individuals and eventually to take over it as well, all with the purpose of the further increasement of the corporates' profit. Therefore, Mikler is quick to realize that this has detrimental effects on the performance of democracy, since "it allows them [profit-driven corporations] to claim their interests are synonymous with the interests of states and their citizens" (Mikler, 2018, p. 67). Indeed, this thoroughly undermines any legitimacy that the government claims to have and the transparency of the democratic governance is reduced to an illusion. In other words, this enables corporate actors to influence both domestic and transnational politics to carve it into an effigy that the politicians present as something "that is in the best interest of the people". For example the neoliberal market deregulation introduced during the 1980s by Ronald Reagan and Margaret

Thatcher has profoundly changed the fabric of the societal framework, turning it into a "pseudo-market". The expensive welfare state was cut down, extensive tax cuts for the wealthy introduced and meritocracy superseded democratic solidarity. It was a dream come true for global corporations because it significantly decreased state's importance on a global scale and established a firm narrative that it was inevitable and should be preserved because it is good. Therefore, Reagan's famous speech that the nine most terrifying words in the English language are "I am from the government and I am here to help" is truly a pinnacle of discursive power exercised by the corporate sector because it demonstrated its core component: what do companies desire to increase their profit is wanted and will benefit the whole of society (Reagan, 1986; Mikler, 2018; Sandel, 2020).

2.4 Why Traditional IR Approaches Do Not Work

The previous sections confronted some of the available theories in the body of IR literature which will be utilized along with empirical data in the third chapter to provide some insight into the research question. With that being said, the theories proposed are hardly something that maybe called "conventional", "mainstream" or "traditional". In some ways the theories contained hereby may be dubbed "institutionalism" but they skew away from some of the central assumptions of this school. Therefore, this section will discuss as to why are the traditional international relations theories; namely the two main proponents, realism and liberalism, are not sufficient or salient enough to explain or analyze the research question on hand and explain why the theories by Mikler and others would be incorrect to label as institutionalism.

The oldest and most traditional scholarly approach to study international affairs is realism. Realist approach has been in the forefront of the IR studies since at least the Renaissance due to its focus on state power, national interests, military might and unitary decision-making (Moravcsik, 1992). Realism of course can be applied to studying Israel-Palestine conflict, since it is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side but it does not fare well with taking into an account the non-state actors, such as private security companies which are in the limelight of this work (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Conflicts definitely are intrinsically linked to power, which is the central point of all different strands of realist theory, with its sober belief that states are selfish actors which are looking to

maximize their relative power (mostly via the means of intimidation, hence military power) (Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2001). With that being said all of the realist strands take a state as their basic unit of analysis, except for neoclassical realism which provides at least some analytical space for private security companies being incorporated as a unit of analysis (Cusmano, 2012) (Laksmna, 2013). Even though, neoclassical realism and non-state actors (in this case private security companies) is largely an uncharted territory in a dire need of further research and discussion. Another defect of this strand of realism is that by non-state actors it usually refers to NGOs and not to profit-driven corporates.

The other major school of IR, respected in the scholarly circles is liberalism. Championed by Joseph Nye, the central argument of this school is that states are in a complex interdependence, arguing that cooperation between states is beneficial for them, helping them to acquire absolute gains (mostly economic), thus diminishing the need for war. Liberalism is often being criticized as idealist, utopian or "mythical" ever since the times of its godfather Immanuel Kant. However, Moravcsik (1992) writes in his defense of liberalism that it actually is normative and positive and postulates its three core assumptions. First, it puts individuals to the forefront by saying that the agents of politics are also members of domestic society, which seek to promote their self-interest. This can be used to positively impact society and bring about what liberals call "progress". Second, the potential for social order and progress can only be channeled by institutions, demonstrating the importance of them for liberals, whereas realists are skeptical about their ability to bring immanent and lasting peace among states (Mearsheimer, 1994). Third, liberals believe that with conditions of minimum individual rights and regulated competition, the necessary outcome is socioeconomic and political development towards greater security and wealth (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 9). Private security companies, as a subcategory of non-state actors, are given great attention by the liberals. These NSAs (non-state actors) are another channels to connect societies transcending the Westphalian framework of states (Keohane & Nye, 1989). Even though liberalism gives space for NSAs in their framework, private security companies that in a cohort with a state feed off of each other by influencing foreign policy and giving the state relative power gains in exchange for monetary profit is still a conundrum for liberals to even attempt to explain.

To sum, this chapter has laid down the theoretical backbone of this work. The first section was discussing key theories of political science when it comes peace as conflict such as just war, just peace, Kant's perpetual peace sketch and Galtung's dichotomy of peace. The second section with the phenomenon of non-state actors, its relations vis-à-vis state and other non-state

actors and paid the most attention to the private military companies (primary focus of this work) and their place in international relations theory by using Krahnmann's conceptualization. The fourth section explored Mikler's Three Faces of Power model in-depth and discussed its implications for state-corporate relations. The final section was a short explanation of why such well-established theories as realism and liberalism are, have no sufficient analysis tools for the purposes of this work. The following chapter will provide empirical data analysis of Israeli private military sector's influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict by using the theoretical frameworks condensed in this chapter.

3. Method and Empirical Analysis

3.1 Method

In order to evaluate the inquiry contained in this work empirically, secondary analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data, present in the previous scholarly works has been consulted. Analysis was then conducted by the means of utilizing secondary analysis.

Halper's *War Against The People: Israel, Palestine and Global Pacification* (2015) and Barak & Sheffer's *Israel's "Security Network" and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach* (2006) serve as the focal point of a secondary source of literature written on the conflict and were invaluable in the forming of the research question. These sources contain Israeli official records concerning military spending and security outsourcing, "visualizing" the deep involvement of arms trade/development in the conflict and the amount of profit that is being made out of it. However, a multiplicity of technical issues were encountered during carrying out of the research.

The first is of course the limited accessibility of the data (due to its sensitive nature of being either classified by the government of Israel or by the companies themselves), therefore they have been fetched by the means of secondary literature (by scholars focused on studying the issue of weapons as such in the Israel-Palestine conflict for decades). The second one is the language barrier, since most of the possible primary sources are in Hebrew, hence the choice was clear; to select most trustworthy scholars studying the topic and are fluent in Hebrew (*note*: this is also the reason why most of the scholars are of Israeli or Jewish American origin). Critics could also bring up the issue of subjectivity, owing to the fact that the research question itself carries *apriori* anti-Israel stance, but it would be false, because as was previously mentioned the hypothesis was largely formed (or rather completed) during the research and the sources were rigorously scrutinized to carry as much objectivity as possible. With having said that, this work does not claim or strive to provide absolute objectivity since it subscribes to Weber's thesis: "There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of [...] "social phenomena" independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes." (Weber, 1904, p. 72) But has done the most that a social sciences research can to

maximize the potential of objectivity for the explanation such as making sure that news reports were as little biased as possible by using *Media Bias/Fact Check* website.

As was previously mentioned, this work utilizes secondary analysis to study the empirical data and from this it tries to draw some conclusions. Therefore, this paragraph will explore some of the classic limitations and also advantages that this particular approach has. First of all, secondary analysis is, in essence, an analysis of data previously collected by someone else, meaning the primary analysis has been conducted by a researcher A, who collected for the purpose A and researcher B utilizes this data for the purpose B. Or, as Glass (1976) put it; “[secondary analysis] involves re-analysis of data for the purpose of answering the original research question with better statistical techniques or answering new questions with old data.” (Glass, 1976 in Burstein, 1978, p. 1) Logically, just as any other method of scientific enquiry this one too has its pros and cons. Among the advantages is of course the further enrichment of the particular scientific field. Every researcher brings their own (and new) theoretical perspectives so it enables the data to be conceptualized from multiple angles and viewpoints that the original researcher could not all encompass and include. This thus expands the well of knowledge in the given field. Second, this method is beneficial for beginner researchers and students who do not possess the breadth and scope of resources (such as money, time and energy), which the data’s original collector usually does (f.e. government agencies), especially concerning the researches conducted over a longer period of time which are very expensive resource-wise (Burstein, 1978). Speaking of government agencies, Hakim (1982) sees an advantage in conducting secondary analysis on government data (f.e. censuses) in the coalescence of research by both government social scientists and their academic peers (Hakim, 1982). Last such advantage of secondary analysis is one of sheer practicality – it takes less time and allows for an access to larger data sets (Dunn et al., 2015).

This paragraph will now turn to some of the disadvantages of secondary analysis. As was mentioned previously, not having the "collector" and the "analyzer" as the same person is advantageous, but at the same time it presents a limitation because “they [the analyzer] are probably unaware of study-specific nuances or glitches in the data collection process that may be important to the interpretation of specific variables in the dataset.” (Cheng & Phillips, 2014, p. 5) Another obvious limitation of this method is that the original research was conducted with another research question in mind, therefore it may not be adequate enough for one’s particular research design. Having previously collected data at hand for secondary analysis also involves a temporal aspect. This means that the data is bound to the time that the collection was

conducted, so it may possibly be “outdated and lack information crucial for understanding research problems in the present day.” (Moriarty, 1999 in Sherif, 2018) Last but not least, scholars are also concerned with ethical implications of utilizing secondary data, because the secondary analysis often does not involve the re-affirmation of the participants’ informed consent. However, because of the nature of data utilized in this work (companies, not individuals and no confidential personal information), this disadvantage or rather a concern is a *non sequitur* (Burstein, 1978; Sherif, 2018).

Speaking in more concrete terms, this work is utilizing what Cheng and Phillips (2014) call a "research question-driven" approach to secondary analysis: meaning that the research question contained in this work has been formulated beforehand and then suitable datasets were looked up to address the question (Cheng & Phillips, 2014). Therefore, in the vein of this previous paragraphs, this work is using data collected by other authors and examining from a different angle by the means of qualitative secondary analysis. It is widely held that qualitative research is the "absence of numbers" as a juxtaposition for quantitative methods. However, the main difference seems to be that qualitative researchers more or less believe that reality is constructed and their findings are not as generalizable as those of their quantitative counterparts, but they “transferred to other contexts, and readers can assess their applicability to their own settings...the results can also be used to extend or modify existing theories...” (Kuper, Reeves, & Levinson, 2008, p. 3). By utilizing the aforementioned method, the following section of the work will try to look for a correlation between profit (of Israeli private security organizations) and the permanence of the conflict (Arab-Israeli status quo). Of course it is important to keep in mind the golden rule of any research: correlation does not imply causation (Tufte, 2006).

3.2 Empirical Analysis

First of all, this section will proceed with the analysis in a following fashion - it begins with the aforementioned research question: How does Israeli military industrial complex/ defense establishment/ private security companies affect domestic politics towards the national conflict with Palestine and its people? In other words, how do these groups (which are intertwined as will later be established) influence policymaking of the Knesset (Israel's legislative branch) in a way that hinders the possible peace and keeps the conflict in a stalemate? First, this larger section will look at what the Israeli defense establishment is. Second, there will be given few examples of the domestic private security companies operating in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Third, the work will focus on how do these elements of Israeli military corporate sector influence the policies that contribute to keeping the conflict going. Fourth, it will offer some implications of what this corporate defense efforts mean for the rest of the world. Just to recapitulate, the work does not mean to claim that this is the sole factor hindering and delaying the peace, but wants to pay attention to this contributing factor and offer some insights into it.

3.2.1 Israel's Defense Establishment

“The State of Israel would naturally prefer to give the world Jaffa oranges, polished diamonds, hi-tech and colorful flowers – which it has been successfully exporting for many years. However, this country's unique geopolitical situation has forced it to also focus on security, and develop state-of-the-art know-how, products, and system related to maintaining alert and security on fighting terror.” (Barak & Sheffer, 2006, p. 8)

This quote from the landmark scholarly piece on the subject, Barak & Sheffer (2006) demonstrates clearly the Israel's interest in defense, arms and military technologies. This "unique geopolitical situation" pertains to the Jewish state encircled by its bitter Arab adversaries. Israel's military miracles during its wars in the 20th century against their sworn enemies and still-enforced compulsory military service (even for women) come as no surprise to the deep militaristic foundations of its society (for a scholarly account of the wars see Bregman, 2002). Various public opinion polls and other researches (see Barak & Sheffer, 2006, p.6) conclude that even though the public of Israel is divided among the ideology cleavages

(left-wing, socialist and right-wing, religious), there is a deep-rooted unifying sentiment for keeping the national security paramount. “These shared values mark the red lines that policymakers cannot cross without risking a total loss of public support, as occurred [in 2000 with Barak’s government collapse]” (Hermann & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002) But who or what keeps the society so mobilized and "militaristic"?

Barak & Sheffer concur that it is what they call Israel’s Security Network. This network may be understood synonymously with what is called the defense establishment in the West. The phenomenon of defense (also military) establishment is well-understood and described in the political science with calling the U.S.’ one “so large compared to other foreign affairs institutions (even if cut in half) and since it possesses staff capabilities not equalled elsewhere in government and is inextricably meshed with foreign affairs establishment, it seems unlikely that military views will ever again go unregarded in Washington” (Yarmolinsky, 1971, p. 20) and in Russia after the 1991 coup d’etat it was observed that “military interests will vociferously demand...that politically, they [must] be recognized as the cardinal guarantors of Russian statehood” (Banerji, 1993, p. 4). In Israel, this establishment or network is composed of security forces officials hailing mostly from Israel Defense Forces, active and retired alike in cohort with various civilian and corporate actors who share the same beliefs and wish to pursue their own vision of security agenda for Israel as such. This group has mostly informal ties and lacks internal hierarchy or a "structure" as such, so perhaps it makes more sense to not call it a network, but a "dark underbelly" of security politics as Halper (2015) calls it. Further, this amalgam of security officials, security corporate delegates and others pose certain underpinnings to the larger Israeli civil society, because this network either overlaps it or nullifies it (Barak & Sheffer, 2006). Indeed, this was already realized six decades ago when Huntington (1964) wrote that Israel already fits the model of military-civilian relations wherein military supersedes the civilian (Huntington, 1964 in Perlmutter, 1968). Majority of scholarly accounts trace the origins of defense establishment to the first PM Ben Gurion who considered the distinctions between military, political and civilian as blurry to be good for the society for the emerging Israeli state and further built up the notion of "nation in arms" (Perlmutter, 1968; Barak & Sheffer, 2006; Halper, 2015).

3.2.2 Israeli Private Security Companies

This section will now turn to offer an overview of the Israeli PSCs. Consulting Global Militarization Index, Israel is ranked first, as the most militarized nation on the face of Earth. Israel spends relatively high percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) of 5% on its military (World Bank, 2019), it carries the highest score in heavy weapons index 3.14, the highest military personal score of 1.75 and the five highest expenditure of GDP on military with the score of 2.38 (Mutschler & Bales, 2019). In 2016, it was reported that Israeli military exports netted the value of \$6.5 billion (Coren & Cohen, 2016). Israel also fills a niche in the unique and smart weapons market with developing and manufacturing f.e. UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), military communication systems (C⁴I- command/control/communication/computer), reactive armors for infantry and others (Halper, 2015, pp. 140-141). For a country of a size of New Jersey and with a population of 9 million these are quite staggering numbers. The following paragraphs will explore who are the key players in this highly valuable Israeli security corporate sector.

The largest private security company in Israel is Elbit Systems. Using Krahmann's typology of PMSCs (which was explained in the chapter 2), it can be categorized as private security firm. This corporation develops highly sophisticated electronic warfare and cybersecurity systems, UAVs, assault helicopters, naval vehicles, electro-optic and night vision systems and helmet mounted systems to name a few. Its sales are worth more than 2 billion USD and has over ten thousand employees (Halper, 2015, p. 143). It is close to the defense establishment in Israel since it enhances IDF transporters with Iron Fist systems (which protects it from missile impact) (Allison, 2020) Outside of Israel, it operates primarily in the U.S. (Israel's greatest military ally) where it supplied Apache Aviator Integrated Helmets (AAIH) for US Army and in 2019 it purchased night vision business of American-owned Harris Corporation (Cohen, 2014; Solomon, 2019). Security business which is at least morally vague, has not stopped Elbit Systems proclaiming their "ethics and conduct" on their website. The company states that it helps communities by greenening their environment as a form of CSR (corporate social responsibility) programs, doing charity work and helping to advance educational opportunities (Elbit Systems, 2021). This seems at least cynical due to reports suggesting that the corporation sold spyware which was targeting Ethiopian dissidents in the West and with Norwegian Finance Minister calling it a "a company that directly contribute to

violation of international humanitarian law”, what Israel denied (Adams, 2009; Marczak et al., 2017).

The crown jewel of Israeli corporate militarism is Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Again utilizing Krahnmann’s typology, Rafael may be defined as both a private security firm (military technologies) and a private military firm (training). Even though smaller than Elbit, it serves as a perfect example of Israeli political and corporate intertwinement. It was founded as an branch of Israeli Ministry of Defense called Science Corps, specialized in R&D (research and development). Although it is still largely a government owned company, it operates as an independent corporate entity. It procures state-of-the-art weapon systems for Israeli Defense Forces which are put into the limelight of Israel’s military arsenal such as Iron Dome (air defense system), David’s Sling (surface-to-air missile system), Spike anti-tank missile and other cutting-edge space systems (Halper, 2015, p. 146). The company has around 8 000 employees, its sales are worth over 2 billion USD and it was even awarded more than 50 Israeli Defense Awards. Similar to Elbit, it also is having its own CSR despite being a corporation that produces weapons. Its website states that it offers "enrichment lessons" for students excelling in science and engineering and develops tools to aid mentally and physically disabled people (Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, 2021). Despite these noble efforts, Rafael is implied alongside Elbit Systems in aiding IDF in its illegal occupation of West Bank territories, when Indian Ministry of Defense scrapped to buy \$500 million worth of military equipment from Rafael, despite India being the largest importer of Israeli arms (Singh, 2017).

The last example of a private security company provided in this section is slightly different – it is an Israeli branch of a transnational corporation, which was originally an Israeli company proper. G4S Israel is an Israeli counterpart of Group 4 Securicor (G4S), which is the largest private security company in the world. This giant transnational corporation employs around 750 000 people and has revenue of 18 billion USD annually (Ragusa, 2020). Its Israeli daughter company (before acquisition it was called Hashnira, a security company of its own) is compliant with Israeli government in oppression of Palestinian population in occupied territories. It provides scanning systems for military checkpoints, security equipment and personnel in illegal Israeli settlements and procures surveillance systems for Israeli prisons in the occupied territories, which are filled up with Palestinian political prisoners (Who Profits Research Center, 2016). Therefore, it seems that G4S Israel fits all the categories of Krahnmann’s PMSCs typology. Even though it operates more in the business of security personnel and surveillance systems in contrast with the heavy arsenal procurement of Elbit

Systems and Rafael, it focuses heavily on its CSR on a global scale. The company signed UN Global Compact that promotes respect of human rights and anti-corruption, International Code of Conduct For Private Security Providers (ICoC) and offers sponsorships for athletes (IFSEC Global, 2010; Magnay, 2011, Diakonia, 2013). Despite this, and its implication in wrongdoings on Palestinian population, G4S also had scandals of mistreatment in the prisons it operated (Birmingham Prison riots 2016) and the infamous Orlando shooter was an ex-employee of the company. G4S was also named the worst company of the year 2013 by Public Eye awards, nominated (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2013) (Halliday, 2016; Keller et al., 2016).

3.2.3 Influence On Israel's Policies & Ramifications For The Rest of the World

Inductively and proceeding from the previous section, there are three identifiable shared trends among the Israeli private security companies mentioned. They procure cutting-edge military arsenal, systems and personnel for Israeli Defense Forces, all of them are implied in perpetrating illegal occupation of the West Bank and the oppression of Palestinian population living there and Israel's government is backing them against the international pressure from various NGOs. This at the very least makes these companies very important for Israel's political elite.

It may also be easily suspected that the officials of these companies (at least some of them) are members of the informal security network lobbying group. This is almost certain in the case of Rafael, which is in part directly subsidized by the government. Following Mikler's (2018) line of argument (which was discussed in-depth in the section 2.3), this Israel's security network (which the companies are most likely part of) exercises vast amount of *instrumental power* over Knesset's policymakers; they spend huge amount of money on CSR (which is the primary instrument of public relations) but they are aware that having representatives of their own in the Knesset and other government branches is the most beneficial instrument of instrumental power as Mikler argues in his book (Mikler, 2018). Consult this example: former Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon (also responsible for the infamous Temple Mount visit) who was also a member of the Network and it was him along with IDF generals and Mossad (Israeli intelligence agency) that promoted invasion to Lebanon in the 1980s as something "in the best

interest of Israeli people". Another prominent representative of the Network in the political sphere Uzi Dayan (the head of National Security Council) is also evident in perpetrating the crimes against Palestinians by marking the area of the separation barrier of the West Bank without consulting any other government officials (Barak & Sheffer, 2006, p. 11). Scholars also argue that the fight between the representatives of the Network and their civilian sphere counterparts about the policymaking has been present throughout the most of Israel's history, with their first representatives already appointed by the first PM Ben Gurion in 1948 (Perlmutter, 1968; Barak & Sheffer, 2006).

Looking at the notion of *structural power* of the Network, its presence and scope is eminent. These companies employ millions of Israelis, supply weapons to the IDF which employs another tens of thousands. The weapon industry market makes millions of dollars domestically in Israel and billions in their export (Halper, 2015) (Trading Economics, 2019). The scope of structural power is therefore evident, they are "too big to fail" and offer "too good of a reward" for Israel's economy as is mentioned in Mikler's notion of structural power. As was mentioned in the section 2.3 this power becomes the most apparent in the times of crisis, when political elites make extraordinary effort to aid these business, which did happen during every major public relations crisis of these companies, as in Israel's a priori dismissal of the global BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions), which is also the primary target of Israel lobby in the U.S. which works with Anti-Defamation League in its efforts to label it as antisemitic and Israel-delegitimizing (Mansoor, 2020).

Discursive power that the Network exercises is also evident and easy to spot once literature is properly consulted. The notion that politicians behave as these "unconscious intermediaries" by promulgating the corporate interests of the companies (selling military equipment) to the public. It is evident with the veil that surrounds pushing aggressive policies towards Palestine via the Network's presence in the policymaking process and political sphere overall (Barak & Sheffer, 2006). Therefore, it is very likely that Network's exercising of discursive power skews the discourse of general population towards continuing enmity towards Palestinians and keeping the conflict locked in the concurrent status quo of "cumulative deterrence", what Halper defines as "the use of limited yet persistent force over time to instill fear and "respect" for the Jewish settlers." (Halper, 2015, p. 72).

In the previous paragraphs it was demonstrated that Israel's Security Network fits Mikler's model of the three faces of power that corporates exercise over political sphere almost

impeccably. It may be therefore concluded that the opposite what scholars such as Cerny argue; that the decline of efficiency of the state (due to the increased efficiency of non-state actors such as the PSMCs) erodes state power, since at least in Israel this private security sector further enhances and reinforces state power (Cerny, 1995 in Avant, 2006).

However, this deep intertwinement of corporate sector, the military and the policymaking has its ramifications for the rest of the world as well. An offshoot of this, is the commerce of human suffering that is Israel's arms exporting. Since Israel's economy is greatly dependent on the weapon industry and security personnel export (mainly the niche smart weapons), its representatives in the intergovernmental bodies try evade and obstruct arms trade treaties. For example, Israel is one of a few countries (along with the likes of Iran and North Korea) that has not signed the UN Arms Trade Treaty that obligates the signatories to limit the arms export and monitor its recipients (UN News, 2013). Indeed, monitoring Israel's recipients would be detrimental towards its image on the world stage owing to its trading with the most tyrannical regimes around the globe. The demand for Israel's arms is immense since Israel marketizes them as "battle-proven" by testing them against the Palestinian population (insurgents and civilians alike) (Halper, 2015, p. 148). This makes the occupied territories somewhat of a "laboratory" for the arms development. Among the recipients of these "battle-proven" military equipment are for example (in the past) the Hutus during the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and also to the regime of South African apartheid. Currently it is selling military equipment to the military junta of Myanmar, semi-dictatorial regime in Sri Lanka and to the Duterte's regime in Philippines, which are all implicit in human rights violations (Segal in Santos, 2018). Therefore, it seems that the Israel's security network is not only complicit in contributing to keep the status quo of the conflict with the Palestine but it is also exporting this globally, by arming authoritarian regimes to fight against any civic disobedience.

Conclusion

To sum, this work was seeking out some insights into how does arms trade affect the peace process between Israel and Palestine and how it contributes to hindering it. The work sketched a brief historical overview of the conflict as well as some of the most important pieces contained in the body of scholarly literature that is concerned with the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. In its theoretical part, the work laid forward some of the key concepts that contributed to its analysis; namely philosophical considerations about peace and conflict, theory of just war and just peace and the international relations theoretical frameworks that take into account non-state actors such as private security companies and it explained why are some of the more traditional schools such as realism and liberalism inadequate to explain this phenomenon. In addition, it provided in-depth discussion about Mikler's model of three faces of power, the power which corporate interests seeks to exercise over policymakers.

To continue, the method utilized in this work was described as a "research question-driven" qualitative secondary analysis – utilizing data contained in the works of other authors to look at them from a different angle and address the research question on hand. Among the work's main findings are a description of a large policy network, called Security Network. This amalgam of corporate, political and military actors are negatively impacting the conflict with Palestine, by continuing to "militarize" the society in Israel and promoting the domestic military industrial complex. This negatively impacts the rest of the world as well, since the military equipment tested in Israel is supplied to the most tyrannical regimes around the world.

Therefore, this work sought to offer insight to another contributing factor as to why is the conflict between Israel and Palestine still raging on. Further research on this factor is encouraged, since it is still not exhaustively mapped out and the work also hopes to stimulate further research on the conflict as such. It also encourages students and scholars in the international relations field to endeavor into further research and theoretization of the impact of private security companies on the conflicts around the globe, since their importance is steadily rising and may be the missing piece of the puzzle of the IR theory applicable to the contemporary conflicts.

Resumé

Táto práca sa venuje najdlhšie trvajúcemu konfliktu modernej histórie medzi Izraelom a Palestínou. Väčšina autorov literatúry medzinárodných vzťahov sa snaží vysvetliť tento konflikt a jeho pretrvávanie pomocou viacerých faktorov, medzi nimi aj radikalizáciou izraelskej spoločnosti (najmä po ustanovení Benjamina Netanjahu do funkcie premiéra v roku 2009), neschopnosťou Spojených štátov amerických byť silným mediátorom mierových rokovaní alebo ponúkajú aj konštruktivistické vysvetlenie stretu náboženstiev s pretláčaním nábožensko-etnického naratívu do popredia oboma táborami konfliktu. Táto práca sa snaží vysvetliť a poukázať na ďalší, menej preskúmaný faktor, ktorý brzdí mierový proces a uchováva status quo tohto konfliktu, a tým je vplyv izraelského súkromného bezpečnostného sektoru na izraelské politické elity.

Prvá kapitola tejto práce obsahuje prierez odbornej literatúry o izraelsko-palestínskom konflikte a poukazuje na hlavné problémy ktoré udržujú konflikt v patovej situácii. Medzi ne patrí a) založenie Palestínskeho štátu, b) územie, kde by sa Palestínsky štát mal rozprestierať, c) izraelské osady na Západnom brehu Jordánu, d) rozdelenie Jeruzalemu, e) skutočnosť, že Chrámová hora v Jeruzaleme je v správe islamského vakfu, f) palestínski utečenci a zabránenie ich návratu domov. Prvá kapitola ďalej obsahuje aj argumentáciu iných autorov, napríklad Govreen-Segalovej, ktorá poukazuje na obchod so zbraňami. Tvrdí, že Izrael a jeho zbrojársky priemysel profituje na tomto konflikte, keďže značná časť jeho ziskov je založená na exporte zbraní, predovšetkým do Spojených štátov a Spojeného kráľovstva. Táto téza je podložená argumentom od Halpera, ktorý poukazuje na testovanie špičkovej vojenskej techniky, ako aj ľahkých zbraní na palestínskych civilistoch v okupovaných územiach. Posledná sekcia prvej kapitoly sa zaoberá prehľadom izraelských zbraní a vojenskej techniky využívaných v tomto konflikte ako napríklad útočné pušky Tavor, protiraketový systém Železný dóm alebo sofistikovaný monitorovací systém C⁴I (command/control/communication/computer).

Druhú kapitolu pokrýva obsiahla diskusia teoretických konceptov, súvisiacich s témou tejto práce, ako sú konflikt, mier, spravodlivý mier a spravodlivá vojna. Koncept mieru je vysvetlený pomocou Galtungovej "dichotómie" mieru. Podľa tejto schémy existuje negatívny mier, ktorý je absenciou priameho násillia ako napr. terorizmu, zatiaľ čo pozitívny mier je absenciou štruktúrného násillia ako napr. hladu alebo chudoby. Avšak, ústredným motívom druhej kapitoly je fenomén neštátnych aktérov v medzinárodných vzťahoch. Na vysvetlenie tohto fenoménu, práca využíva konceptualizáciu neštátnych aktérov od Elkeho Krahmanna,

ktorý uvádza, že nešťatní aktéri sa dostali do popredia medzinárodnej politiky po konci studenej vojny, keď štáty začali strácať svoju efektivitu v boji s novými hrozbami, akými sú napríklad medzinárodný zločin, terorizmus alebo etnické konflikty. Dôležitou súčasťou Krahmannovej teórie je typológia privátnych vojenských organizácií, ktorá rozlišuje : a) žoldnierske firmy, ktoré zabezpečujú súkromných vojakov, b) privátne vojenské firmy, ktoré ponúkajú tréning a strategické poradenstvo a c) privátne bezpečnostné firmy ktoré ponúkajú vojenskú podporu, logistiku a transportáciu. Práca, na základe tejto typológie, v tretej kapitole kategorizuje izraelské firmy zaoberajúcimi sa bezpečnosťou, ktoré sú centrálnym motívom tejto práce. Na konceptualizáciu vplyvu korporátneho sektora na politické elity je taktiež do hĺbky rozvinutý a vysvetlený Miklerov model "troch tvárí" moci. Podľa tohto modelu korporátny sektor ovplyvňuje legislatívu a politiku daného štátu pomocou inštrumentálnej moci (lobbying a reprezentanti korporácií priamo v zákonodarstve), štrukturálnej moci (dôležitosť danej korporácie pre ekonomiku daného štátu, t.j. jej zastúpenie na trhu a počet zamestnancov) a diskurzívnej moci ("podvedomé" konanie politikov v prospech korporátneho záujmu, akési "predávanie" niečoho čo prináša korporáciám zisk, zamaskované ako niečo pre "dobro" národa).

Tretia kapitola je rozdelená na krátku diskusiu o metodológii a jadro tvoria závery o vplyve izraelského súkromného bezpečnostného sektora na izraelskú politiku. Ako metódu táto práca využíva kvalitatívnu sekundárnu analýzu, ktorá je iniciovaná výskumnou otázkou, teda používa dáta zozbierané inými autormi a skúma ich z iného uhla pohľadu, zatiaľ čo sa snaží adresovať výskumnú otázku. Jedno z hlavných zistení tejto práce je opis rozsiahleho izraelského "policy networku", nazývaného aj "security network" Barakom a Shefferom. Táto skupina má hlavne neformálne väzby medzi jej členmi a nemá vnútornú hierarchiu alebo štruktúru. Na základe tohto faktu, by možno bolo výstižnejšie ju nenazývať sieťou (network) ale skôr "podhubím" bezpečnostnej politiky Izraelu. Toto "podhubie" má aj negatívne následky pre občiansku spoločnosť v Izraeli, nakoľko ju zo značnej časti prekrýva, ak nie nulifikuje. Táto zmes korporátnych, politických a vojenských aktérov negatívne ovplyvňuje konflikt s Palestínou, pomocou kontinuálnej militarizácie spoločnosti v Izraeli a propagáciou domáceho vojenského priemyselného komplexu. Tento fenomén by sa dal demonštrovať na príklade bývaleho ministra obrany Ariela Šarona, ktorý spolu s generálmi Izraelských obranných síl a príslušníkmi Mossadu propagovali inváziu do Libanonu v 80. rokoch 20. stor. ako akt v "najlepšom záujme izraelského ľudu" a tiež na úlohe, ktorú zohral predseda Národného konzília bezpečnosti Uzi Dayan (ktorý bol tiež príslušníkom "networku") na demarkácii

deliacej bariéry Západneho brehu Jordánu od Izraela, keď konal bez konsenzu vládnych príslušníkov, čo znamenalo začiatok obdobia brutálnej okupácie palestínskych území po druhej Intifáde. Keďže vojenská technika testovaná a vyvíjaná v Izraeli spoločnosťami ako Elbit Systems a Rafael Advanced Defense Systems je exportovaná pre najviac autoritárske režimy na svete akými sú napr. Srí Lanka, Rwanda počas genocídy v roku 1994 alebo Duterteho Filipíny, tým pádom tento "security network" ovplyvňuje bezpečnostnú situáciu nielen v Izraeli a v Palestíne, ale aj vo zvyšku sveta.

Táto bakalárska práca sa snaží poukázať na jeden z faktorov prispievajúcich k pretrvávaniu konfliktu medzi Izraelom a Palestínou. Súčasne chce vzbudiť záujem o ďalší výskum o vplyve privátnych bezpečnostných firiem na tento konflikt, nakoľko tento faktor stále nie je do hĺbky preskúmaný, a taktiež o výskum tohto konfliktu ako takého. Táto práca chce tiež podnietiť študentov a expertov na medzinárodné vzťahy k ďalšiemu výskumu vplyvu privátnych bezpečnostných organizácií aj na svetové konflikty, keďže dôležitosť týchto aktérov kontinuálne rastie a môže byť kľúčom k pochopeniu dnešných konfliktov.

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