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**Israeli Counterterrorism in Dealing with Palestinian Terrorism after
1993: Reactive or Pre-emptive?**

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Tomáš Iliev

Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is the work of my own and has not been published in part or in whole elsewhere. All used literature is attributed and cited in references.

Bratislava, February, 2018

Tomáš Iliev

Signature:.....

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Israeli Counterterrorism in Dealing with Palestinian Terrorism after 1993: Reactive or Pre-emptive?

Author: Tomáš Iliev

University: Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts

Thesis Supervisor: Mgr. Aliaksei Kazharski, PhD.

Chair of Defense: Prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc.

Committee Members: Prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc.; Doc. Samuel Abrahám,
PhD; Dagmar Kusá, PhD.; Prof. PhDr. Iveta Radičová, PhD.

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Abstract

Experts on terrorism and counterterrorism characterize Israeli counterterrorism strategies as reactive or pre-emptive. However, we did not find any expert who would describe Israeli counterterrorism as reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously.

The primary goal of this thesis is to research whether we can find Israeli counterterrorism activities which can be characterized as reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously. Further goals were the characteristics of a political environment within which Israeli counterterrorism operated. Also, Palestinian terrorism was characterized. This thesis is founded upon content analysis and comparison of the selected Israeli counterterrorism activities and their ways of realization. Some of the chosen Israeli counterterrorism activities fulfil the primary goals of reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies simultaneously. Findings of this bachelor thesis create a space for different views on Israel counterterrorism, not only those which label it as reactive or pre-emptive.

Izraelský Boj proti Palestínskemu Terorizmu po Roku 1993: Reaktívny alebo Preventívny?

Autor: Tomáš Iliev

Univerzita: Bratislavská Medzinárodná Škola Liberálnych Štúdií

Vedúci bakalárskej práce: Mgr. Aliaksei Kazharski, PhD

Predseda komisie pre obhajoby bakalárskych prác: Prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc.

Členovia komisie pre obhajoby bakalárskych prác: Prof. PhDr. František Novosád, CSc.; Doc. Samuel Abrahám, PhD; Dagmar Kusá, PhD.; Prof. PhDr. Iveta Radičová, PhD.

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Abstrakt

Experti na terorizmus a protiteroristickú činnosť charakterizujú izraelské protiteroristické akcie ako reaktívne alebo preventívne. Avšak, nebol nájdený žiaden expert, ktorý by opisoval izraelské protiteroristické stratégie ako reaktívne a preventívne súčasne.

Hlavným cieľom tejto práce bolo nájsť izraelské protiteroristické akcie, ktoré môžu byť charakterizované ako reaktívne a preventívne súčasne. Ďalšími cieľmi tejto práce bolo charakterizovať politické prostredie, v ktorom izraelské protiteroristické akcie prebehli, a tak isto aj terorizmus, proti ktorému bojovali. Táto práca používa obsahovú analýzu textu a porovnáva vybrané izraelské protiteroristické akcie a ich spôsob realizácie. Niektoré izraelské protiteroristické akcie spĺňajú primárne ciele reaktívnych a preventívnych protiteroristických stratégií súčasne. Zistenia vyplývajúce z bakalárske práce vytvárajú priestor pre iný pohľad na izraelské protiteroristické akcie, okrem tých, ktoré ich označujú za reaktívne alebo preventívne.

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Introduction

Israel is a country where counterterrorism has been playing one of the most significant roles for decades. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been trying to deal with terrorism and efficiently prevent its inhabitants from terrorist attacks supported by the neighbouring countries. However, one particular source of terrorism has been the most significant challenge for Israel since its establishment. It is terrorism carried out by Palestinian extremists. Palestinian terrorism has left behind hundreds of terrorist attacks and casualties since 1948. In 1993 the Oslo Accords were signed, and a new era of peace and cooperation was supposed to start between Israel and Palestine. On the contrary, Palestinian terrorism became more violent and bloody. Therefore, Israeli counterterrorism had to adjust to a new situation, when Palestinians were expected to be their allies, who indeed secretly and sometimes entirely openly supported Palestinian terrorism targeted on Israel (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015) (Byman, 2011).

This thesis is divided into two sections. The first section discusses theoretical background of terrorism and counterterrorism. It provides us explanation of what terrorism is, what are the primary goals of terrorism and why ordinary people killed by terrorism are only a tool. In addition, definitions are discussed as there is no one definition of terrorism because terrorism is an ever changing phenomenon. It also explains what counterterrorism is and what the primary goals of counterterrorism are. Moreover, it provides a definition of reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies are, what their primary objectives are and how both strategies overlap in Israeli counterterrorism. Also, a goal is to describe how the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies could operate in Israeli counterterrorism simultaneously and to define the chosen sources.

The second part explains how, when and where the Israeli counterterrorism activities against Palestinian terrorism were carried out. It is divided into four time periods of Israeli counterterrorism. Every phase explains and analyses how Israeli counterterrorism used or did not use the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies simultaneously in dealing with Palestinian terrorism. The first chapter of this part explains the events which took place after the Oslo agreements. It describes the

political environment and Palestinian terrorism against which Israeli counterterrorism fought. It primarily provides examples of Israeli targeted killings which had different backgrounds and consequences. In addition, this chapter tries to find out which goals of counterterrorism strategies were fulfilled.

The next empirical chapter describes Israeli counterterrorism after the electoral victory of Benjamin Netanyahu. This chapter explains how sealing of the Palestinian territories used during the After Oslo period was once again used during the Netanyahu period. Moreover, this chapter provides an example of targeted killing which had significant ramifications for Israel and its fight against Palestinian terrorism. Collaboration with Arafat and consequences for Israeli counterterrorism are also discussed.

Chapter five is focused on Israeli counterterrorism during the Second Intifada. This chapter is split into two sections. The first section describes the early months of the Intifada, which were marked by the Israeli counterterrorism actions which were not efficient at all. The second section discusses the Defensive Shield Operation during which Israeli counterterrorism became more efficient. Moreover, this section tries to show differences between the Israeli counterterrorism actions and their consequences.

The last empirical chapter of this thesis concerns the war against Hamas. This chapter describes the tactics used during the mentioned war. In addition, it tries to explain similarities among various Israeli counterterrorism actions and tactics described in the previous chapters. This chapter also brings a conclusion, which explains how the presence of the IDF influences Israeli counterterrorism.

The primary purpose of this empirical section is to evaluate whether the analysed Israeli counterterrorism actions fulfilled the goals of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies. Moreover, another goal for us is to describe the political environment within which Israeli counterterrorism had to operate. Besides, Palestinian terrorism with which Israeli counterterrorism tried to deal with is discussed.

Therefore, the primary goal of our thesis is to analyse Israeli counterterrorism policies after the Oslo accords and the strategies by which the state of Israel deals with Palestinian terrorism. Besides, this thesis works with a hypothesis that Israeli

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counterterrorism applied at least two counterterrorism strategies simultaneously in the fight against Palestinian terrorism after 1993. However, if we want to understand the strategies and actions of Israeli counterterrorism, at first, we have to explain terrorism and its goals.

Chapter 1: Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Acts of terrorism have been a part of human history. Violent actions, which are an essential part of terrorism, have had different names during the different ages (Barker, 2016) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). Hundreds of terrorist attacks have hit Israel and caused many civilian and military casualties. Israel had to and still has to adjust to new forms of terrorist attacks. However, what the Israeli society perceives as terrorism, its opponents regard as a fight for freedom and rights, which are restricted by the existence of the Israeli state (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015) Libor Gašpíerik, Štefan Jangl and Vladimír Kavický (2015), experts on terrorism and counterterrorism, explain that terrorism is a phenomenon, which is not exactly characterized. They claim terrorism has many faces and many weapons. Terrorism can be understood differently by different actors who try to fight against it or support it. For instance, Palestinian attacks against Israel by Iran are understood as a fight for freedom while the United States and Israel perceive such behavior as terrorism (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015).

The word terrorism is from Latin and can be explained in two ways.. The first one is terror, which means fear or horror. The second possible explanation is terrere, which means to scare or frighten (Barker, 2016) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). From the linguistic point of view, terrorism comprises of fear and frightening. For instance, terrorist organizations carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel have been spreading fear and panic within societies of states for decades (Barker, 2016) (Byman, 2011).

According to the Oxford English Living Dictionaries, terrorism is “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims” (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). This particular definition is not the only one. Professor Edwin Barker (2016) in his video course *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Comparing Theory and Practice* remarks “there’s also a lack of consensus among scholars, policymakers, politicians, experts” (Barker, 2016). Terrorism is mostly about using violence, to scare and to frighten, however, every terrorist activity can have a different form. For example, Gašpíerik, Jangl and Kavický in their book claim that every act of terrorism should be a violent activity carried out to spread fear and panic.

A new Israeli legal definition of terrorism was passed by Knesset in 2016. As defined in law in the 2016 legislation, terrorism is an activity, which is motivated by political, religious or nationalistic motivation. “The offence or a threat are committed with a political, religious, nationalistic or ideological motive” (Ministry of Justice, 2016). Terrorism is also defined as an activity whose goal is to spread panic or to influence the decision making of governments. “It was intended to incite public fear or panic, or to force a government, including a foreign government or an international public organization, to act in a certain way” (Ministry of Justice, 2016). A terrorist organization is defined as a group, which carries out terrorist attacks. However, this definition is extended by groups and individuals, which do not directly plan and carry out terrorist attacks but support terrorism with money, weapons or other material resources (Ministry of Justice, 2016).

Terrorism and its definition are continually changing and developing. Thus, to be bound to only one interpretation or explanation could be dangerous for states fighting terrorism. For instance, states dealing with terrorism cannot stay focused only on one type of terrorism. However, they have to perceive terrorism as a threat which uses every possible means to harm. To think about terrorism within the borders of only one definition would be a mistake, which would make states utterly unprepared for terrorist attacks. For instance, the EU states were prepared for terrorism activities designed by Al-Qaeda, which sent its fighters to Europe from the Middle East. However, the EU states are not prepared and able to detect lone wolves who are usually influenced by the ideology of ISIS. Therefore, for states dealing with terrorism, it is crucial to perceive terrorism as a continually changing enemy who can attack by an extensive variety of ways (Barker, 2016) (Byman, 2011) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). Therefore, in my opinion, terrorism comprises any kind of violent activity by which its perpetrators try to achieve their political, social, religious or ideological goals.

Despite the fact there is no standard definition, there are some opinions about terrorism which are agreed by the majority of scholars, experts, and politicians. Terrorism is a very complicated phenomenon consisting of many aspects. Every terrorist group has its modus operandi according to its goals, resources, political situation in a country and many other elements which shape the face and actions of every terrorist organization (Barker, 2016).

The goals of terrorism

One of the biggest myths about terrorism is that the primary goal is to kill as many people as possible. On the contrary, the primary goal of terrorism is to spread fear, panic, and chaos by which the perpetrators want to achieve specific goals. In addition, ordinary people killed by terrorist attacks should catch the attention of those in charge to change something (Barker, 2016) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). Direct targets, usually ordinary people, are not the primary goals of terrorism. The killing of innocent people is a tool, not the final goal of terrorism. Professor Edwin Barker claims “the terrorist strategy is to kill one or two and to frighten millions” (Barker, 2016). There could also appear terrorists who attack because they hate a state they target and do not have any further goal (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). However, the attacks which many times leave behind civilian casualties try to catch the attention of the state leaders by which terrorists want to achieve their own goals. Moreover, terrorist attacks also affect a high number of ordinary people, who can even put pressure on the politicians. “In Israel, the study estimated, terrorist attacks swung the 1988 and 1996 elections to the right-wing Likud Party, which won both by small margins” (Fischer, 2017). Gašpíerik, Jangl and Kavický claim that Palestinian terrorists fighting for freedom not only want to kill ordinary Israelis in terrorist attacks but to influence the state officials using the victims, panic and resulting public pressure. That idea is also supported by professor Edwin Barker who claims that the terrorist aim is to kill people, because it is a way of influencing politicians who can change something that could bring victory to terrorists (Barker, 2016) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). For instance, the primary motivation of a suicide bomber from the Gaza Strip can be his hate toward Israel, or he may want to kill Israelis to influence the decision making of the Israeli politicians or to show the world that Palestinians are so oppressed and desperate they have to carry out such terrible deeds. On the other hand, in Israel, there could be found cases of terrorist attacks motivated by hatred without further motivation (Barker, 2016) (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015).

Counterterrorism

Every action generates a reaction, and the same principle is present in the relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism. Terrorist activities evoke counterterrorism measures which are designed to combat terrorism. Counterterrorism is “the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and acts, both real and imputed” (Barker, 2016). It is a phenomenon comprised of as many elements as terrorism. The most significant difference between terrorism and counterterrorism is that counterterrorism should use only legal means. Counterterrorism is composed of legal norms which should help to define what terrorism is, who its proponents are and what the legal tools of fighting it are. There should be present also counter-terrorist organizations which are institutions created by the Ministry of Interior or Defense, which are focused on fighting terrorism and dealing with its consequences. Another essential component of counterterrorism is units (military or police) trained in fighting terrorism. It is important not to forget intelligence without which counterterrorism would be ineffective and could cause more civilian casualties than eliminated enemies (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015).

Other important aspects of effective counterterrorism are the readiness of citizens connected with a basic knowledge of crisis management, logistics and international cooperation which could help to avoid many civilian casualties during terrorist attacks (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015). Gašpíerik, Jangl and Kavický describe counterterrorism as a phenomenon, which could be understood as every action within the limits of law, which helps to detect and disrupt a terrorist attack. Authors also claim that successful counterterrorism consist of at least three components, which are prevention, legal punishments for terrorism, and counterterrorism units, which fight against terrorists. For instance, states fighting terrorism should try to prevent terrorism, possess legal definitions according to which it is possible to differentiate between terrorism and organized crime to try and punish terrorists and to have police or military units able to combat terrorism and its proponents (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015).

Goals of counterterrorism

The primary goal of counterterrorism is to protect people by legal means against terrorist attacks and activities connected with it. Counterterrorism aims to eliminate terrorism and its proponents, to gather information about terrorists and their activities, to disrupt terrorist organizations and ties among them and to cut the resources sustaining terrorism. Despite the fact, many countries are fighting terrorism, the strategies for successful counter-terrorism are few. Legal norms, special units, counterterrorism centers, international cooperation and sharing of information, crisis management, and few others are the essential components without which counterterrorism would not be effective (Gašpíerik, Jangl, Kavický, 2015).

Reactive and Pre-emptive Counterterrorism Strategies

The reactive and pre-emptive strategies dominate Israeli counterterrorism. Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (2014) claim that the primary goal of the reactive strategy is to act after a terrorist attack, what means to find perpetrators and allow the state institutions to apply the law which could be embodied in arrests, imprisonments or eliminations of terrorists. “Reactive counter-terrorism focuses on bringing to justice individuals who are suspected of committing criminal offenses in regards to the law” (Jarvis, Lister, 2015, p.158). Moreover, Scott Stewart (2009), a terrorism analyst at Stratfor provides a definition which is very similar to the definition of Jarvis and Lister. Stewart explains reactive counterterrorism as a strategy “where authorities respond to a crime scene after a terrorist attack to find and arrest the militants responsible for the attack, it is customary to focus on the who, or on the individual or group behind the attack” (Stewart, 2009). For instance, Israel started to seal the Palestinian border to arrest the Palestinian terrorists trying to get into Israel and to bring them in front of a court (Byman, 2011).

The second counterterrorism strategies are preventive or pre-emptive. The main aim of that strategy is to make acts of terrorism the least feasible for its designers and perpetrators. In the case of the pre-emptive strategy, Jarvis and Lister characterize it as a strategy, which is “geared toward anticipating and preventing the terrorist act from happening” (Jarvis, Lister, 2015, p.158). For example, if a terrorist is eliminated (killed or imprisoned), he is not able to continue perpetrating terrorist acts, and that is the main goal of the pre-emptive strategy. The pre-emptive strategies seek to use force as a tool

for preventing a terrorist attack. In addition, they also rely on cooperation with the communities within which likely perpetrators and designers of terrorist attacks can live and operate. A significant component of that strategy is an intelligence activity that plays a crucial role in obtaining the information that can help to detect potential perpetrators (Byman, 2011) (Jarvis, Lister, 2015).

Counterterrorism in Israel

In Israel, there is at least one more possibility. That is the possibility of a direct elimination (targeted killing) of the perpetrator(s). “Israel's high court upheld Thursday the military's right to assassinate members of groups the state defines as terrorist organizations” (Wilson, 2006). Besides, the elimination of terrorists by the IDF soldiers is the application of the Israeli laws. IDF soldiers are legally allowed to use force if it is necessary for their missions. “The IDF servicemen and women will use their weapons and force only for their mission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain their humanity even during combat” (Israel Defence Forces, n.d.). For instance, Israeli prime minister with military officials can order targeted killing or the IDF soldiers can kill a Palestinian terrorist trying to perpetrate a terrorist attack in Israel. These two laws play a significant role as embodiments of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies.

Connection to Israel

However, when most experts speak about these tactics in relation to Israel, they isolate them. Daniel Byman (2011), a professor at Georgetown University and an expert on the Middle East, characterizes Israeli counterterrorism as reactive without long-term plans. He writes about the targeted assassinations carried out by Israel as activities, which kill certain terrorists. However, Byman opines that those actions do not prevent Israel from Palestinian terrorism and only provoke Palestinians to continue their terrorism (Byman, 2011). The author also writes about Israeli counterterrorism actions, how, where and when they were carried out, and whether it helped to protect Israel from Palestinian terrorism. “Israel put thousands of Palestinians in jail, keeping them off the streets and thus preventing them from swelling the ranks of militant organizations” (Byman, 2011, p.160). Moreover, Byman explains what type of law is used for putting accused Palestinian terrorists on trial. Byman explains that Israel used both civilian and military

courts to try terrorists. For instance, in the case of Marwan Barghouti, a young Fatah leader, Israel “believed that his prominence made it necessary to try him in a civilian court so that the verdict would be accepted internationally” (Byman, 2011, p.161).

On the other hand, Adarsh Aravind (2016) a research scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations of Manipal University, supports a theory that Israeli counterterrorism strategies and actions are mostly pre-emptive. Their goal, he argues, is to disrupt Palestinian terrorism. “Israel’s counterterrorism system mainly focuses on preemptive strikes, gathering information and preventing the Palestinian infiltrators from entering into Israel’s sovereign territory to carry out violence” (Aravind, 2016). Moreover, Edward H. Kaplan, a professor at Yale University, Alex Mintz, chairman of the Israeli Political Science Association and Shaul Mishal (2006), director of the Middle East Program at the Lauder School of Government Diplomacy and Strategy claim that Israeli counterterrorism is pre-emptive. The main goal of Israeli counterterrorism is to kill or arrest the leaders and masterminds of the Palestinian terrorism to prevent Israel from terrorism, which is very similar to the Aravind’s opinion (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, 2006). Thus, Israeli counterterrorism activities are either reactive or pre-emptive according to these experts. Some of them defend Israeli counterterrorism while the others criticize it.

Chapter 2: After Oslo (1993-1996)

When the most critical terms like terrorism and counterterrorism are characterized, it would be appropriate to bring some empirical examples. This chapter concerns the events which came after the signature of the Oslo Agreements. The whole political context behind the agreements is described. Another part of this chapter describes primary terrorist challenges which Israeli counterterrorism had to deal. The last part of this chapter analyses how the two counterterrorism strategies mentioned in chapter two were applied in practice. Furthermore, the possibility of targeted killing is discussed.

In 1993, the whole world watched as U.S president Bill Clinton, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat met to sign an agreement which was expected to change the face of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict forever. That deal was called the Oslo Accords. The main points of the agreement were the Israeli acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which would represent the Palestinians, who were expected to launch self-rule of the Gaza Strip and small parts of the West Bank. “After signing the accord, Israel and the Palestinians were, within one month, to begin negotiating the details of the withdrawal of Israeli troop from the Gaza Strip and Jericho” (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015, p.298). Moreover, in 1995, Israel and Palestine signed the Oslo Accords 2 by which the Palestinian authorities got more control over the Palestinian territories. In addition, the West Bank was divided into three areas (A, B and C). Area A was under Palestinian control, civil and military. In return, the PLO promised to renounce “terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace” (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Unfortunately, expectations were far higher than the reality. The Peace process launched by the Clinton administration failed after he left office. Violence between Israel and Palestine started to rise again. However, the Oslo Accords were significant because of Israeli counterterrorism strategies which had to adjust to a very new situation in which probably everything changed (Byman, 2011).

Terrorism after Oslo

After Oslo, not Fatah, but Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) led by Arafat became the leading Palestinian terrorist organizations which strictly opposed the peace accords signed in Oslo. Its hostility toward the Accords escalated in 1993 and continued

until 1996. At least 195 Israelis were killed primarily by suicide bombings (Byman, 2011). Behind the most bloody assaults between 1994 and 1996 was Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash, who became the most wanted Palestinian terrorist. Also, in 1994 Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier who was later killed. Another challenge was Yasser Arafat who played a game with Israelis and the international community (Byman, 2011). He tried to convince them that he is a defender of the peace signed in Oslo. Simultaneously, he supported terrorist attacks of Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations based on the situation and his political needs (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015) (Byman, 2011). For instance, when he needed to pressure Israeli politicians, he tacitly approved a terrorist attack. When he needed to support his peaceful image, he ordered the imprisonment of a few Hamas proponents as proof of his devotion to the peace. “Arafat was a master of double talk” (Byman, 2011, p.81). Some could ask why Arafat signed the peace treaty with Israel? The answer is really simple. Arafat wanted to buy more time for his ambitions to establish the independent Palestinian state. Arafat wanted to attack Israel when Palestine would be independent, strong enough and with enough support from other Arab states. Moreover, it is obvious that Arafat allowed to retaliate with a long and bloody wave of suicide bombing. For him, it was vital to keep hatred alive, because true peace would make his actions against Israel meaningless. Therefore, for Israel, it was challenging to build peace and cooperate with someone who was behind the decisions leading to the terrorist attacks targeting Israel and its civilians.

Israeli Counterterrorism after Oslo

As mentioned previously, the Oslo Accords were a disaster for Israeli counterterrorism and intelligence. Their readiness to protect ordinary Israelis from terrorist attacks, mostly suicide bombing embraced by Hamas and the PIJ, became paralyzed due to the Palestinian self-rule over the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. “Israel’s intelligence capacity in the Gaza Strip has dropped to zero” (Byman, 2011, p.83). Thus, a logical question had to be asked by the people trying to deal with Palestinian terrorism. How to obtain intelligence vital for the fight against terrorism without control over the territories? Therefore, once they could not conduct a full control over the Palestinian territories, they had to come with new policies of collecting information and dealing with terrorism. Israeli ability to exercise the reactive (to arrest and trial terrorists) and

pre-emptive (to prevent its citizens by making attacks less feasible) counterterrorism strategies decreased to zero due to the lack of control over the areas where the attacks were designed. Therefore, one of the most crucial tasks for the Israeli counterterrorism struggle was to establish collaboration with Palestinians in order to obtain intelligence vital for their success.

One powerful tool of Israeli counterterrorism was allowing some Palestinians to get in contact with their relatives living abroad. Palestinians were many times offered education, medical treatment and other advantages which could raise their living standards. Also, Israel threatened young Palestinians by labelling them Israeli conspirators which would have deplorable consequences for them. Israel, by threatening young Palestinians, by providing them with better education and healthcare reacted to the suicide bombings. Moreover, the information obtained from Palestinians and the cooperation with Palestinians helped Israel to eliminate at least one significant proponent of the Palestinian terrorism.

For example, one of young Palestinians Kemal Hammad was recruited by the Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency). He was threatened to be labelled an Israeli conspirator. It is important to add that Hammad was one of the few who had direct contact with Ayyash. Thus, Shin Bet gave Hammad a phone for Ayyash which was not only bugged. "Unbeknown to Hammad, it also contained fifteen grams of the explosive RDX" (Byman, 2011, p. 94). Ayyash was killed. As a consequence, Hamas and the PIJ retaliated with attacks which left dozens of Israeli citizens dead. However, according to the intelligence gathered after the assassination, a deadly wave of terrorist attacks had already been planned before the killing. Here the following question may arise. Taking into consideration the fact that Hamas and the PIJ were able to react to the assassination of the supposedly crucial figure of their organisations with even stronger attacks, would it not have been more efficient for the Israelis to carry out counterterrorism actions on a larger scale? Such actions could eliminate more masterminds and simultaneously paralyze their ability to retaliate.

Another significant tool for dealing with Palestinian terrorism was targeted killing. Targeted killing is one of the most important tools of Israeli counterterrorism which has

been used by Israel since its establishment. Israel uses this counterterrorism activity to eliminate people who are responsible for terrorist attacks against Israel or design them. Targeted killing is used if there is no means by which the wanted target could be detected and his terrorist activities eliminated (Wilson, 2006).

For example, in October 1995, the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Fathi Shiqaqi was assassinated in Malta. He was on the way from Lybia where he had met with Muammar Gaddafi, who promised him financial help for the PIJ terrorist activities. The impact of that particular policy is far more apparent. The terrorist activities of the PIJ were paralyzed after Shiqaqi's assassination (Thomas, 2010).

Shiqaqi's assassination differs from the assassination of Ayyash. When Israel started gathering intelligence about the two terrorists, they reacted to the attacks designed by those two terrorists. Israel began to carry out actions which were designed to help apply the Israeli laws by punishing the wanted terrorists following the suicide bombings. Their assassinations could be understood as a reaction to their actions because Israel punished them and applied the Israeli law allowing targeted killings. Such work is the primary goal of the reactive strategy (as mentioned in the section about terrorism, justice could also be embodied in a direct elimination in the case of Israel). On the other hand, the assassination of Ayyash did not help to make terrorist attacks less feasible. Therefore, his death could not be understood as the fulfilment of the pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies.

However, it is important to realize, that at least in the case of the Fathi Shiqaqi's assassination, terrorist attacks of the PIJ stopped for a few months. Thus, they enabled Israel to protect its citizens against the PIJ terrorist attacks. If the primary goals of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies are to apply the laws embodied in punishments (targeted killing in that case) and to make terrorist attacks the least feasible, then, they were fulfilled. Shiqaqi was killed (punished, application of the Israeli law) and not able to continue in his activities (prevention) making this both a pre-emptive and reactive counterterrorism activity. On the other hand, based on the events that followed after his assassination-the PIJ started to cooperate with the above mentioned Yahya Ayyash from Hamas. In addition, the PIJ was able to revenge the death of Ayyash a year after Shiqaqi was assassinated in Malta. Hence, more complex

and systematic counterterrorism action may have been required in order to dismantle both terrorist organisations or at least to paralyze their ability to recover in such a short time period.

However, if Israeli counterterrorism wanted to deal with suicide bombing, it had to restrict the movement of the Palestinian militants. Therefore, a third vital policy was the sealing of the Palestinian territories. The main purpose of that policy was to make the movement of terrorists more difficult which would decrease the number of terrorists who could get into Israel. On the other hand, to seal the border hermetically is nearly impossible, therefore, there were also terrorists who succeeded to cross the border and carry out a terrorist attack (Byman, 2011).

For example, Israel sealed the border to control the lives of the Palestinians who worked in Israel. Many of them were forced to provide information. Otherwise, they would lose their jobs and would not be able to sustain their families (Byman, 2011). Also, once the border was sealed, Israeli soldiers patrolling the border forced potential attackers to find ways by which they could reach Israel and the targets within its territory. "Sealing the border became an increasingly important counterterrorism tool" (Byman, 2011, p.84). On the other hand, there are cases when terrorists crossed the border. Then, the information provided by the Palestinians who worked in Israel proved to be significant, because they could reveal the places where terrorists wanted to attack.

In this case, a mixture of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies can be found. Sealing of the Palestinian borders was a reaction to the previous events of suicide bombing. However, it is also a step which should prevent the Israeli citizens from future terrorist attacks. The information provided by the Palestinians who wanted to get into Israel helped to detect planned suicide bombings and their designers. It means that some terrorists were arrested or killed thanks to the information from the Palestinians who wanted to work in Israel, which could be understood as application of the Israeli law. Even if a planned terrorist attack was not detected according to the information from the Palestinians, the sealed border forced terrorists to find loopholes in the border system, which also heightened the odds of their detection. Therefore, once the border was sealed, Palestinian terrorists were eliminated by the IDF soldiers or detected and tried in Israel. Thus, we can speak about reactive counterterrorism

strategies. On the other hand, the majority of the detected terrorists trying to cross the border and perpetrate an attack were tried in Israel (and imprisoned) or killed. Therefore, the goal of the pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies was met. Their detection, imprisonment or elimination could also be understood as prevention, because they could not continue in their terrorist attacks, thus Israel made their terrorist attacks impossible or less feasible for them.

The tactics of sealing the border could be seen to be comparable with the tactics of the collaboration with the young Palestinians. Both tactics were useful due to the significant intelligence they obtained. On the other hand, would it not be more efficient to apply these two strategies simultaneously? Such activity could increase the number of obtained significant intelligence. On the other hand, to seal the border during the collaboration which leads to the elimination of significant terrorists could warn the wanted terrorists and compromise secret actions. Therefore, it is questionable whether the simultaneous application of the both described activities would fulfil the goals of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies.

The above examples of Israeli counterterrorism are discussed in this part. The first two show us that targeted killing can have positive or negative impacts. The Ayyash's assassination is the result of intelligence activity targeted towards young Palestinians which fulfilled the goals of the reactive strategies. On the contrary, the Shiqaqi's was a result of intelligence activity outside the Israeli borders, which fulfilled the goals of both mentioned strategies simultaneously. Therefore, despite the fact that both actions resulted in targeted killings, their impact was different. Moreover, according to the events which took place after the mentioned actions, it was possible to analyse whether we can speak about reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies simultaneously. Furthermore, the sealing of the Palestinian border led to the obtaining of vital information that fulfilled the goals of reactive and pre-emptive strategies.

Chapter 3: Benjamin Netanyahu period (1996-1999)

This chapter takes us to the year 1996 when the elections in Israel took place, which also had a significant impact on the Israeli counterterrorism actions. The section about counterterrorism shows us that some of the Israeli counterterrorism tactics used during the previous period were also applied during the following one. This chapter also provides us an example of targeted killing which resulted in significant ramifications for Israel and its counterterrorism. Furthermore, the last paragraph of this chapter describes how Yasser Arafat directly supported terrorism despite the fact that he formally cooperated with Israel.

Benjamin Netanyahu won the elections in 1996. “Netanyahu was declared the winner with a scant 30,000 vote margin” (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015, p.330). Netanyahu claimed that while terrorist attacks continue the peace talks cannot. “Upon victory Netanyahu rejected Rabin’s policy of divorcing terrorism from the peace process” (Byman, 2011, p.88). Netanyahu insisted that terrorist attacks are the obstacles on the way towards peace. Also, Palestinians did not perceive Netanyahu and his politics as somebody fitting for making peace.

Terrorism during the Netanyahu’s period

After the electoral victory, one of the first actions of Benjamin Netanyahu was the excavation of one of the holiest places of Islam and Judaism, the Temple Mount, which outraged the Palestinians. Riots broke out. Arafat supported the uprisings, which made them more coordinated and less manageable for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) forces. Palestinian security forces did not disperse the demonstrators but joined them. Moreover, on July 1997, sixteen Israelis died during a terrorist attack on the Mahane Jehuda Market in Jerusalem. Such events required Israeli retaliation (Byman, 2011).

Israeli counterterrorism during the Netanyahu’s period

After opening the border for some time, Netanyahu decided to seal Gaza once again. As in the previous period, sealing of the Palestinian border was a reaction to the attacks coming from the Palestinian territories. Moreover, it helped to detect the attackers

trying to get into Israel, what means they were not able to perpetrate attacks (Byman, 2011).

Thus, the nature of the reactive strategy embodied in the sealing of the border and detection of potential terrorists (later brought in front of a court and imprisoned) was fulfilled once again. Moreover, their detection and imprisonment also met the nature of the pre-emptive strategy (to make the attacks the least feasible or unable to perpetrate for their designers and perpetrators). Although, it is clear that the sealing of the Palestinian territories cannot be a long-term solution, it could be used for the handling of the attacks that are perpetrated as an immediate reaction to the targeted killings of the highly ranked Palestinian terrorists. Thus, a question arises, whether this strategy could not have been used after the assassination of Ayyash in order to handle the above mentioned wave of suicide bombing. Such action could perhaps fulfil the goals of the pre-emptive strategy by decreasing the number of terrorists crossing the border.

However, it was not enough for Israeli society, and Netanyahu knew it. Targeted assassination was used once again. The head of Mossad, Danny Yatom, was asked to provide the targets which could be eliminated (Byman, 2011). The leader of Hamas Khaled Mishal was chosen. However, the Mossad agents were captured in Jordan, and the whole operation was compromised. The ramifications of the activity were significant. Jordan cut intelligence cooperation with Israel. Mossad lost one of the most critical partners providing information about the terrorist activities aimed at Israel. "Indeed Jordanian intelligence officials told me that the assassination attempt shattered their relationship with Mossad for several years" (Byman, 2011, p. 92). On the other hand, the failed assassination brought at least one positive impact. Some Hamas terrorists and designers were intimidated by the failed assassination and fled to countries further from Israel. However, it is good to ask whether the planned assassination was worth the loss of a significant source of intelligence about terrorism planned to hit Israel. Based on the above examples it must have been clear to Israelis that the assassination of Mishal would not have any significant impact on further Hamas actions. Reason being as the above example clearly proves that Hamas was able to replace the assassinated mastermind.

It is important to emphasize that the primary goal of the reactive strategy was not fulfilled by Mishal's failed assassination. Mishal survived and was not brought in front of a court in Israel. However, the goal of the pre-emptive strategy was embodied in the impact of the attempted assassination, when many Hamas terrorists escaped far from Israel or became so deterred they did not continue in their terrorist activities. Therefore, deterrence was the central aspect of the pre-emptive strategy after the failed assassination making terrorist attacks less feasible. This claim could be supported by the numbers of Israeli casualties which played for Netanyahu. 1996 left 56 Israelis dead, the year 1997 left 41 dead, in 1998 sixteen were killed, and in 1999 only 8 Israelis were killed during attacks (Byman, 2011, p.110). On the other hand, the number of the Israeli civilian casualties did not drop significantly before 1998, two years later. Hence, the reason of the drop in the civilian casualties in 1998 and 1999 could rather be attributed to the actions described in the following paragraph.

Another counterterrorism policy was directly aimed at Yasser Arafat. Netanyahu and his strict politics made Arafat more active in the case of fighting terrorism, at least for a while. Netanyahu ordered many raids on the homes of the highest Palestinian proponents and openly complained about Arafat's inactivity to fight terrorism. In addition, Netanyahu provided information which proved Arafat's support for terrorism despite the signature of the Oslo Accords. Therefore, Arafat was forced to cooperate. Otherwise, he would have lost support of the international community (Byman, 2011). In addition, many "Palestinian and Israeli security officials even conducted joint operations in 1999" (Byman, 2011, p.109). Palestinian security forces proved to be crucial in the preventing of terrorism aimed at Israel in 1999. However, apparent cooperation with Israel was exactly what Arafat had wanted in order to prepare the Palestinian terrorist organisations for more violent and large scale attacks.

During this rare cooperation, highly ranked Palestinians provided the intelligence about the whereabouts of the wanted terrorists. According to this information, Israel could find and imprison some of the Palestinian terrorists. Furthermore, some Palestinian terrorists were detected by Palestinian police and imprisoned. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, it would be strange to see Arafat cooperating with Israelis with no ulterior motive. Arafat was a master of the "door revolving policy". It means that Arafat provided some information about the whereabouts of the wanted terrorists. However,

immediately after a terrorist was detected and imprisoned, Arafat released the other terrorists sitting in the Palestinian prisons. “A substantial number the detainees were released after a short period once a superficial interrogation had been conducted and without their preparations for terrorist attacks having been foiled” (IICC, 2007, p.2). In addition, his Fatah actively sponsored summer camps of terrorism for young Palestinians. Simply said, he directly raised new Palestinian martyrs.

In principle, we can find the features of both strategies. When Netanyahu forced Arafat to bolster the cooperation, he reacted to the previous events which left behind Israeli casualties. The information provided by Arafat helped bring some of the wanted terrorists in front of a court in Israel or their elimination. Thus, once the wanted terrorists are imprisoned or killed, they are punished by Israeli laws, which means the primary goal of the reactive strategy is met. Moreover, they are not able to continue in their activities which fulfils the nature of the pre-emptive strategy. However, in practice, the effectivity of this tactic is doubtful. Terrorists imprisoned in the Palestinian jails usually spent only a few weeks or months there. After, they were released and could continue in terrorism. Although the effectiveness of these strategies could be seemingly questioned, keeping the masterminds imprisoned at least for few weeks enabled the Israelis to disrupt the actions of the Palestinian militants. The planning of terrorist attacks was continuously interrupted and thus, could not be finalized. This is one of the strategies which is more plausible to have been behind the drop on the civilian casualties in 1998 and 1999.

The sealing of the Palestinian border proved to be a well-tried counterterrorism strategy which could be understood as reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously. On the other hand, the attempt to kill Mishal showed that targeted killing could become an international fiasco which causes significant ramifications and undermines intelligence cooperation with bordering states. On the other hand, despite Mossad's failure, targeted killing, in this case, spread fear among terrorists who discontinued in their terrorist activities, fulfilling the goals of the pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies. Also, the last part of this chapter explains that cooperation with an enemy could be a double-edged sword. From a short-term perspective these tactics proved to be efficient because it disrupted the activities of Palestinian terrorists and allowed Israelis to obtain vital information from the imprisoned terrorists. On the other hand, these tactics were not

Iliev T: Israeli Counterterrorism

sustainable from a long-term perspective because Arafat continued to release the ostensibly imprisoned terrorists.

Chapter 4: The Second Intifada (2000-2005)

This chapter describes one of the bloodiest time periods in Israeli history. It is divided into two longer sections. The first part discusses the background of the Second Intifada and terrorist activities which took place at that time. Also, this section captures the Israeli counterterrorism activities carried out at the beginning of the Intifada. The first part mostly assesses the failure of the Israeli counterterrorism activities. The second part of this chapter shows that Israel had to change its tactics which brought counterterrorism activities with a more positive impact. It is also important to mention that despite the fact that the Second Intifada lasted for more than six years, this chapter is focused only on the first three years of that struggle.

In 1999, one of the most famous Israeli soldiers and politicians, Ehud Barak, won the elections. Despite his professional military background, he wanted to bring both nations together and made peace more real. "I know not only the suffering of my people, but also recognize the suffering of the Palestinian people" (Byman, 2011, p.113). Nonetheless, experts and people well-informed in the conflict predicted a disaster. It came sooner than many had expected. Ariel Sharon, former Israeli soldier, politician and national hero, planned to visit the Temple Mount, the place tremendously crucial for Muslims and Jews around the world. It was apparent many months before, that once Sharon had visited the Temple Mount, bloody violence would escalate.

Terrorism during the Second Intifada

And he did it. Sharon visited the Temple Mount to demonstrate the Israeli/Jewish dominance. In the days after the visit, riots swelled. Day after day riots were joined by more and more Palestinians. Terrorism started to flourish once again. Outraged Palestinians did not differ between soldiers and civilians. All of them were attacked, and casualties on both sides grew. The second Intifada lasted eight years and left more than 1000 dead Israelis and 5000 dead Palestinians. What is also important to emphasize is that the Israeli death toll during the Second Intifada was higher than the Israeli casualties had been since 1948 (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015) (Byman, 2011). Israeli civilians were dying due to suicide bombing, stoning, lynching, stabbing, and a variety

of attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists during the Second Intifada. “Amongst Israelis, 69% of those killed were civilians and 31% members of the IDF” (OCHA, 2007).

The success of Palestinian terrorism during the Second Intifada was profoundly influenced by the game played by Yasser Arafat. Earlier, in 1995, Arafat had formed the Tanzim, a military wing of his Fatah. The Tanzim played a significant role also during the Second Intifada. When the riots escalated, Arafat called for moderation. Simultaneously, allowing the Tanzim leaders to support violence by which he appeared to be not involved in terrorism (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015) (Byman, 2011). Moreover, Arafat controlled the position of Fatah by arresting the members of other terrorist groups, mainly Hamas. However, he allowed Hamas to attack if it was beneficial for him and the concessions he required from the Israeli state. “As the Second Intifada spread, Arafat tried to exploit the violence but also keep a lid on it” (Byman, 2011, p.121).

Israeli Counterterrorism during the Second Intifada

Israel reacted to the outbreak of the Second Intifada strongly. During the first days of the Intifada, the IDF forces used rubber bullets to control the riots. However, the more violent the riots were, the more violent the behaviour of the IDF forces became. After a few Israeli soldiers were wounded, soldiers started to use rubber bullets from a shorter distance which was lethal for some of the demonstrators.

The very first month left 109 Palestinians dead. Israeli snipers started to use live ammunition to eliminate those who appeared to be dangerous. Among the rioters, conversely there were Palestinian snipers who fired upon the Israeli soldiers. However, the inability of the Israeli snipers to shoot the targets in crowds heightened the Palestinian death toll (Byman, 2011). Despite the very high toll of the Palestinian casualties, Israeli commanders were convinced it was the only way to push the violence back. “A result of the IDF’s deliberate goal of having a casualty ratio that would demonstrate Israeli strength” (Byman, 2011, p.124).

During the first days of the Second Intifada, the IDF forces could be criticised because they did not distinguish between terrorists and rioting crowds. That mistake in the Israeli tactics was responsible for such a high death toll on the Palestinian side. It is important to emphasize that the way in which the IDF fought against the riots during the very early days of the Intifada lacked both, the central nature of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies. Firing into rioting crowds had nothing in common with applying laws and justice on those who were responsible for the attacks and riots during which the IDF soldiers and citizens were killed. In addition, the Israeli activities during the first days did not protect its citizens from terrorism and violence. Moreover, the more Palestinians that were killed by the IDF during the riots, the more violent the attacks of Palestinians on ordinary Israelis became. Israel tried to punish the terrorists responsible for the riots and escalations in violence. It is also important to emphasize that not only the Palestinian terrorists, but also the behaviour of the IDF soldiers significantly increased the ferocity of the violence.

In an attempt to punish the Palestinian terrorists the tactics of house demolitions became one of the most used during the first months of the Second Intifada. In 2002, more than 250 houses were demolished by the Israeli forces. The main symbol of these tactics became a D-9 bulldozer. These particular tactics and the D-9 predecessors had been used by the IDF since the 1950's and had participated in many conflicts like the Sinai War or the Operation Peace for Galilee (Army Technology, n.d.). These tactics operated with an element of deterrence. "Their come at a price that will be paid by everyone taking part in hostile terrorist activity" (Byman, 2011, p. 166).

However, it is a question whether the necessary effect of deterrence worked in practice. In many cases, a bulldozed house was rebuilt from the money provided by the Palestinian authorities. In addition, houses which were bulldozed were empty, and terrorists continued to perform their actions. Therefore, the perpetrators were neither imprisoned, nor eliminated.

The Israeli demolitions lacked both, the nature of the reactive and pre-emptive strategies. Demolitions could be understood as the application of the reactive strategy if the terrorists living in the houses would have been captured, imprisoned or eliminated. However, the majority of them ran away and continued to carry out acts of

terrorism. Demolitions did not fulfil the primary goal of the pre-emptive strategies because terrorists were able to continue. Furthermore, the houses re-built after demolitions only increased the trust of the Palestinians toward the Palestinian authorities and motivated them to carry out more terrorist attacks. Therefore, to bulldoze the homes of the Palestinian terrorists was useful only if Israel controlled the area of demolition. “Former chief of staff Bogi Yaalon cautions that house demolitions are effective only when Israel controls the territory” (Byman, 2011, p.167).

Thus, all mentioned actions did not stop the violence. Israeli counterterrorism during the first month of the Intifada was everything but not sufficient. The growing number of casualties only made the Palestinians outraged which led to directly supported violence and terrorist attacks against Israel. It provoked the PIJ to perpetrate further suicide bombings which left several Israelis dead. Many critics blame Israeli forces for the harsh reaction. However, it is important to realize, regular Israeli troops deployed during the first month of the Second Intifada were not trained in dealing with violent crowds. Israel possessed units trained for such action. However, the number of rioters and the ferocity of violence found Israel unprepared and without enough soldiers trained in dealing with rioting crowds mixed with snipers. Ineffectiveness of the Israeli actions forced the Israeli officials to conduct an operation which would calm ordinary Israelis who were the primary targets of terrorism (Byman, 2011).

Before introducing the second part of this chapter, it is significant to mention that Israel had to transfer the gravity of the violence into the Palestinian territories. There can arise a question, is it more efficient to allow Palestinians to riot in Israel, as we could be seen during the first month of the Intifada. Or, is it more efficient to conduct an operation which would take place within the Palestinian territories, by which the focus of the rioting Palestinians and Palestinian terrorists would transfer outside of Israeli borders? As it is seen in the subsequent part, Israel had to conduct an operation, which would change the focus of Palestinians and bring those responsible for violence in front of a court.

Counterterrorism during the Second Intifada-Defensive Shield Operation (29 March-3 May 2002)

Terrorism was hammering Israel. The majority of Israelis required an operation which would paralyze those who attack. Therefore, on March 29, 2002, the Defensive Shield Operation began.

Area A, entirely under the Palestinian control, was recaptured by the IDF forces. Ramallah, where Arafat's headquarters was based, was one of the first places where the IDF forces were deployed. IDF had to face fierce resistance in the town of Jenin, the home of many top-wanted Palestinian terrorists. The city was full of booby-traps, snipers and bombs waiting for the IDF soldiers. During the operation in Jenin, one of the essential elements of Israeli counterterrorism was used. Mista'aravim, an "undercover unit was the border Guard's second elite force: the literal translation of the word Mista'aravim is "those who masquerade as Arabs" (Katz, 2016, p.11). They significantly helped to build a mosaic consisting of information about every house they raided or searched in Jenin. As a way of preventing the IDF soldiers from the traps prepared by terrorists, Israeli intelligence, Shin Bet mostly, carried out hundreds of interrogations. This helped the IDF soldiers to reveal some traps and also, acquire the known position of enemy snipers, top-wanted terrorists, and gun stocks.

Thus, interrogations carried out during the Defensive Shield in Jenin could be understood as the proponents of the reactive and pre-emptive strategy simultaneously. Once the terrorists were captured, they were sent to Israel for trial and interrogation. After the interrogations, they were imprisoned (application of the Israeli law and punishment) which could be understood as the fulfilment of the reactive strategy. Simultaneously, the imprisoned or killed terrorists could not continue in their terrorist activities by which attacks became less feasible for them. Therefore, the imprisoned Palestinian terrorists and information obtained by interrogation helped to protect the lives of the IDF soldiers and civilians. Moreover, the threat to lives of the IDF soldiers and civilians were prevented by the data obtained during interrogations of top-wanted terrorists, which helped to reveal gun stocks, hiding places of terrorists or planned terrorist attacks. Such actions could be understood as the fulfilment of the pre-emptive strategy. Terrorist attacks became less feasible because many terrorists were imprisoned, dead or their guns were in Israeli custody.

The following part explains why the newly designed demolitions of the residential houses of the terrorists were lot more efficient that those mentioned a few paragraphs above.

Another vital tool of Israeli counterterrorism became house demolitions and the using of human shields. During the operation in Jenin, Israel started to use D-9 armoured bulldozers to “open the doors” of the houses where terrorists or bombs resided. In comparison with the first days of the Second Intifada, Israel in Jenin bulldozed houses of which inside terrorists were hiding. That particular tactic helped avoid casualties connected to the ever problematic entering of the booby-trapped houses. Moreover, D-9 bulldozers had a very significant psychological impact on the terrorists in Jenin. However, using the D-9 bulldozers was problematic. Residents of Jenin mixed with the terrorists were very well aware of the fact, that Israelis could not use the bulldozers, otherwise, they would be blamed for civilian casualties by the international community (Byman, 2011).

Therefore, Israeli soldiers were not allowed to use the D-9 bulldozers in the mentioned cases and aware of the traps prepared by the militants, started to use the residents of Jenin as shields. During the searching of houses, Palestinians were gathered in one room, while one of them was chosen to search a house with the IDF forces. Many times these criticised tactics helped avoid casualties on both sides. Terrorists did not want to shoot their own people, therefore the Israeli military casualties declined. Although, after few weeks, the tactics of using human shields were forbidden after the Israeli Supreme Court “ruled it impermissible on human rights grounds” (Byman, 2011, p.151). After the operation, many critics appeared to blame Israeli soldiers for their brutality. However, the numbers speak for the IDF. Only 23 IDF members and 52 Palestinians died during the operation.

The tactics of demolition and human shields decreased the number of casualties on both sides. During the house demolitions in Jenin, only one Israeli soldier was killed in an accident. Using of the D-9 could be understood as a proponent of the pre-emptive strategy because it significantly decreased the chance of terrorists hidden in the Jenin houses to kill the IDF soldiers or to detonate bombs hidden in their houses. Also, the

impact of deterrence played a significant role, because many terrorists rather surrendered than stayed in a house which was about to be demolished. The terrorists captured after their surrender are the fulfilment of the reactive strategies. They were interrogated, brought in front of a court and many times imprisoned (application of the Israeli law and punishment). By their imprisonment, the primary purpose of the pre-emptive strategy was fulfilled, because they could not continue in terrorism targeted on the IDF soldiers or ordinary Israelis. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize, that the tactic of human shields was recognized illegal by the Israeli Supreme Court. On the other hand, it could be understood as a pre-emptive strategy, because it helped to decrease the number of the IDF casualties.

Picture 1: Palestinian security detainees and prisoners held in IPS and IDF prisons

Year 2002

Palestinian security detainees and prisoners held in IPS and IDF prisons

Month	Date of statistics	Prison facility of:	Total nr. of individuals held	Serving sentence	Detainees	Detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	Admin. detainees
Dec.	3 Dec.	IDF	3,076	670	388	1,069	949
	8 Dec.	IPS	1,435	588	836	0	11
Nov.	4 Nov.	IDF	2,909	597	299	1,086	927
	3 Nov.	IPS	1,361	568	784	0	9
Oct.	1 Oct.	IDF	2,755	570	245	1,069	871
	3 Oct.	IPS	1,306	556	743	0	7
Sept.	2 Sept.	IDF	2,689	514	262	1,056	857
	3 Sept.	IPS	1,330	567	689	16	10
Aug.	8 Aug.	IDF	2,644	476	315	1,045	808
	5 Aug.	IPS	1,176	561	610	0	5
July	15 July	IDF	2,773	447	737	651	938
	7 July	IPS	1,140	575	560	0	5
June	3 June	IDF	2,411	357	208	917	929
	3 June	IPS	-	607	-	-	-
May	12 May	IDF	2,368	388	557	742	681
		IPS	-	-	-	-	-
April	15 April	IDF	2,682	546	-	2,025	111
		IPS	-	-	-	-	-
March	11 March	IDF	1,136	442	15	659	40
	7 March	IPS	1,314	863	447	0	4
Jan./Feb.	24 Jan.	IDF	1,078	320	15	707	36
	6 Feb.	IPS	891	589	-	302	0

(B'tselem, 2018)

Based on previous experience with terrorist attacks perpetrated after counterterrorism actions, Israel had to formulate tactics which would restrict the ability of the Palestinian militants to attack. Therefore, another significant tool of Israeli counterterrorism during the Defensive Shield Operation was imprisonment of a high number of Palestinians who cooperated with terrorist organizations. The main aim of these tactics was to keep Palestinians out of the streets and not to allow them to work for terrorist organizations. During the Second Intifada, Israeli jails were full of Palestinian militants.

As we can see in the picture above, more than 3000 Palestinians were in Israeli custody in 2002. The effect of those tactics was devastating for some terrorist groups which stayed paralyzed and without enough fighters able to carry out terrorist attacks. Moreover, imprisonment of a few highly placed Palestinian terrorists provided important intelligence which led to the detention and elimination of other militants (Byman, 2011, p. 160). Despite the critics of these tactics and actions during the Defensive Shield, they proved to be effective and far more beneficial than Israelis had expected. Many terrorists and members of terrorist organizations were killed. The most experienced militants were killed or arrested, and the new young members were not so skilled or combatable. According to the statistics, more than 95% percent of the intended Palestinian attacks were prevented due to the intelligence Israel obtained during and shortly after the Defensive Shield in the West Bank (Byman, 2011).

The 3000 Palestinians imprisoned in 2002 meet the criteria of the reactive strategy, because those detected militants were tried by Israeli courts and the Israeli laws were applied. “In 2002 the Knesset passed the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, allowing Israel to detain members of terrorist and guerrilla groups” (Byman, 2011, p.161). Their imprisonment is also the fulfilment of the pre-emptive tactics because a high number of terrorist attacks were prevented thanks to the imprisonment (which kept them off the streets) or intelligence obtained from the imprisoned Palestinian militants. The information from interrogations helped jail or eliminate some other highly ranked terrorists and masterminds, which is prevention, because terrorist organisations lost people able enough to design and conduct terrorist attacks. While the most critical terrorists were imprisoned or killed, the ability of their terrorist organizations to strike in Israel decreased rapidly. Moreover, their death or imprisonment meets the primary goals of the reactive strategy, because they were tried and punished (jailed or killed) by Israel.

These tactics could be compared to the imprisonments during the Netanyahu period. However, the imprisonment of the Palestinian terrorists during and shortly after the Defensive Shield proved to be by far more efficient. Therefore, Israel should not rely on the cooperation with the highest Palestinian proponents and imprisonment of the wanted militants under Palestinian custody. It is way more efficient and feasible to keep the prisoners in Israeli jails, where Israel could have full control over the terrorists.

The Israeli counterterrorism actions during the first months of the Intifada can be understood as neither reactive nor pre-emptive. However, the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies started to be fulfilled immediately after Israeli soldiers changed the battlefield and began to fight within the Palestinian towns. The tactics of interrogations and imprisonment of more than three thousand Palestinian militants could be understood as reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies simultaneously. On the other hand, house demolition during the second part of the Intifada proved to be more efficient immediately after Israel started to bulldoze houses within which the wanted militants were hiding. Therefore, the tactics of house demolition fulfilled the goal of the pre-emptive strategies and helped avoid casualties

Chapter 5: War in Gaza (2008-2009)

In this chapter, the rise of Hamas and Fatah is discussed. Moreover, this chapter explains what the most frequently used means of terrorism was before Israel started to act. Further, the part about counterterrorism explains that Israel carried out a multiple of counterterrorism actions during their presence in the Gaza Strip to decrease terrorism and destroy its weapons.

Withdrawal of the IDF forces from the Palestinian towns led to events which gave power back to the terrorist organizations like Hamas and Fatah. They immediately started to build their capacities in the Gaza Strip. The situation in the Gaza Strip reached its peak in 2007 when Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip. “Hamas won a stunning victory in the elections for the 132-seat PLC, winning seventy-six seats” (Bickerton, Klausner, 2015, p.423). Terrorism hitting Israel, as well as the pressure on the Israeli prime minister to act, started to rise.

Terrorism during the War in Gaza

Immediately after Hamas seized power in 2007, Israel realized that a new conflict was about to start. Hamas possessed more than fifteen thousand combatants ready to fight against Israel. Moreover, the Qassam Brigades, which were under the control of Hamas were able to provide more than two thousand militants for any fight immediately. It is essential to add, that Hamas gathered such a high number of soldiers because it was aware of the fact, that the firing of rockets to Israel would surely bring Israeli retaliation. In 2008 and 2009 more than 1370 Qassam rockets were fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip. That number is not finalised because, during the same period, more than 1100 mortar shells were fired. Also, everything indicated that Hamas was preparing for war. Mines and explosive devices were laid, heavy weapons were deployed in bigger cities. Also, booby traps were laid, and tunnels through which the Israeli soldiers could be kidnapped were constructed. Such actions forced Israel to act (Byman, 2011).

Israeli counterterrorism during the War in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead)

On December 19, the last ceasefire was ended. Immediately after, Hamas started to launch “dozens of rockets to mark its ending and the next day announced it would not

extend it” (ceasefire) (Byman, 2011, p. 193). The Cast Lead Operation started by massive air bombing which hit the homes of Hamas leaders, infrastructure, training camps, bases and sites from which rockets were launched (Byman, 2011). The result of this activity was the death of Nizar Rayan, top Hamas leader and a huge supporter of suicide terrorism targeted on Israel. Rayan was killed by a bomb which had fallen on his home. It is important to add, that his home was also a warehouse of weapons for Hamas fighters.

His death is a reaction and punishment to his membership of Hamas and support for the operations targeting Israel. Thus, the killing of Nizar Rayam could be understood as a fulfilment of the reactive counterterrorism strategies because elimination of terrorists is allowed by Israeli law. Besides, his death left Hamas without a significant person, who could conduct and support terrorist activities. Therefore, this death is also the fulfilment of the pre-emptive strategies because he was no more able to perform terrorist operations (Byman, 2011). Moreover, during the first wave of the Cast Lead, many rocket sites and weapon warehouses of Hamas were destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. By that particular action, the readiness of Hamas to target Israeli soldiers and civilians decreased. Therefore, the destruction of rocket sites and Hamas’ positions made terrorist attacks less feasible making these activities pre-emptive.

Based on the analysed data, it came out that the presence of the IDF on the Palestinian territories significantly paralyzed the ability of the Palestinian terrorist organizations to plan and perpetrate retaliation attacks. Therefore, the Israeli targeted killings carried out during the IDF presence on the Palestinian territories are more likely to fulfil the goals of both counterterrorism strategies.

Another tool of Israeli counterterrorism was the use of artillery, helicopters, and engineers. The second wave was embodied in the deployment of four IDF brigades into the Gaza Strip. Those four units were accompanied by a higher number of Israeli tanks, helicopters, and engineers. Explosive devices were detonated in advance which saved the lives of Israeli soldiers during the operation Cast Lead. Booby traps were avoided by moving through fields and residential areas, where they had not been laid. Thus, activities of the Israeli engineers, artillery, and helicopters helped avoid many IDF

casualties. This tactic is very similar to the house demolitions carried out during the Defensive Shield. Both of them prevented Israeli soldiers from casualties.

However, that particular policy does not fulfil the primary goal of reactive strategies fully to the same extent as the tactics of the D-9 bulldozers. The strategy with engineers, artillery, and helicopters could be understood as a reaction because they were deployed to decrease the number of the IDF casualties based on previous experience. They did not bring Palestinian terrorists to Israel to be tried. However, the tools of terrorist attacks were detonated and destroyed, by which terrorist attacks were not perpetrated and the lives of Israeli soldiers and civilians were prevented from a terrorist attack. Therefore, such strategy or tactics fulfils the goals of the pre-emptive strategy.

It is also important to notice that the tactics described in the paragraph above would not be feasible without intelligence. Therefore, another crucial tool of counterterrorism which helped to rapidly decrease the number of Israeli casualties was Shin Bet and the Israeli Intelligence services. Months before the Cast Lead operation was launched, they had started to gather information about the positions of terrorists and dangerous areas of Palestinian cities. Also, the data obtained by the interrogations of terrorists during Cast Lead were immediately sent to the combating units to help them “thwart Hamas’s traps” (Byman, 2011, p.196). Furthermore, Shin Bet and Israeli intelligence services obtained information which led to the detection of the Qassam rocket sites and helped to interrogate and arrest terrorists. It is important to emphasize that those activities did not only save the lives of Israeli soldiers but of Israeli civilians as well, because Qassam rockets mostly killed Israeli civilians.

Intelligence obtained by Shin Bet and Israeli intelligence services helped to destroy most of the Qassam rocket sites by which terrorist attacks using the Qassam rockets became less feasible or impossible, thus fulfilling the goal of the pre-emptive strategies. The information obtained by Shin Bet and the intelligence services helped to arrest and interrogate terrorists. They were tried and imprisoned, which means that the reactive counterterrorism strategies found its application because the Israeli laws were applied. Moreover, they were kept in the Israeli prisons which means they could not carry out terrorist attacks. Also, the information obtained from arrested terrorists led to the detection of other terrorists who wanted to continue in different forms of terrorist

attacks. The goal of the pre-emptive strategy was met due to the fact terrorist attacks became less feasible for the terrorists detected due to the information provided by the already imprisoned terrorists.

The tactics of obtaining intelligence by Shin Bet is very similar to the tactics of interrogations and reconnaissance used during the Defensive Shield Operation. What similarities do these two tactics have? Both helped fulfil the goals of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies. Moreover, they significantly impacted the number of the IDF casualties during both actions. Therefore, is it not a really valuable lesson for Israeli counterterrorism? Such actions can show that interrogations and reconnaissance essentially heighten the odds of success. Simultaneously, they could be a hint how to fulfil both counterterrorism strategies simultaneously.

Therefore, the Israeli counterterrorism activities during the War in Gaza mostly fulfilled the goals of both strategies. The killing of Rayan and actions of Shin Bet helped punish terrorists and also to protect Israeli soldiers and citizens from terrorist attacks and Qassam rockets. On the other hand, the tactics of deploying engineers, helicopters and artillery significantly decreased the number of the IDF casualties, which could be understood as the pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This bachelor thesis has analysed the Israeli counterterrorism operations in dealing with Palestinian terrorism and strategies which were used by Israel in their struggle. Counterterrorism is a set of legal standards and activities, by which states fight against terrorism. On the other hand, terrorism uses all available means of fight, legal or illegal. During the analysis of the chosen counterterrorism activities, this thesis worked with the theories of Lee Jarvis, Michael Lister, and Scott Stewart who described reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies and their primary goals. Therefore, the result was an analytical work, which aimed to answer one primary question: Is Israeli counterterrorism reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously?

As mentioned in the beginning of the thesis, counterterrorism has been playing a major role in Israel since its establishment. The breakthrough was supposed to come in 1993. However, the situation became even worse for Israeli counterterrorism. Israel had to adjust to a new position considering that they and the Palestinians were supposed to establish a peaceful coexistence. As we have seen in the beginning, terrorism was characterized differently by different actors and therefore, we do not know a single exact definition of terrorism agreed by the majority of experts on terrorism and counterterrorism. On the other hand, when we speak about the goals of terrorism we can find more similarities. Terrorism is mostly characterized as a violent action by which its perpetrators seek to achieve their political, religious or ideological goals. The Israeli definition of terrorism should be mentioned as well because this definition also includes people who support terrorism. It is also important to bear in mind that terrorism is an ever changing phenomenon which can use any means at all. On the contrary, counterterrorism is an action, which takes place within the borders of law and tries to deal with the prevention of terrorism. The primary goal of every counterterrorism action is to disrupt terrorism and detect and eliminate its proponents. If counterterrorism is to be efficient, it requires cooperation and reconciliation of more institutions such as the police, army, intelligence and others mentioned in the beginning. In addition, counterterrorism can also use targeted killing and direct elimination of terrorists as can be seen in Israel.

However, many authors and experts characterized the Israeli counterterrorism actions as either reactive or pre-emptive. Some of them opined that Israeli counterterrorism was reactive and created more violence than peace while the other labelled Israeli counterterrorism as pre-emptive trying to disrupt terrorist organizations or to eliminate its perpetrators before they can even attack.

Despite the fact that the authors mentioned at the beginning of this thesis described Israeli counterterrorism as reactive or pre-emptive and isolated these two strategies, this work presented the Israeli counterterrorism actions as fulfilling the goals of both strategies simultaneously. This view on the Israeli counterterrorism actions was beneficial according to us because it tried to explain that Israeli counterterrorism sought to bring terrorists in front of a court or eliminate them but simultaneously worked to make terrorist attacks the least feasible.

The first empirical part about the Israeli counterterrorism activities described that Palestinian terrorism after 1993 started to be more violent than before the signing of the Oslo Agreements. Palestinians established more control over their territories which resulted in even more terrorist attacks. Israel eliminated two significant masterminds of Hamas and the PIJ standing behind the majority of suicide bombing. The assassination of Ayyash did not solve the situation and caused even more civilian casualties, which means that only the goals of the reactive counterterrorism strategies were fulfilled. On the other hand, by the killing of Hammad Israel paralyzed the ability of the PIJ to perpetrate terrorist attacks by which the goals of both strategies were met. Therefore, the two mentioned targeted killings differed in the impact they caused. Another counterterrorism strategy which appeared during the After Oslo and Netanyahu period was the sealing of the Palestinian territories. Both examples of the same strategy fulfilled the goals of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies by detection of the terrorists crossing the border and their elimination. Analysis of the selected counterterrorism activities allowed describing means and ways by which Israel fought against Palestinian terrorism.

Targeted killing described in chapter four had a rather negative impact. Khaled Mishal was not eliminated, and therefore, the nature of the reactive counterterrorism strategies was not fulfilled. On the other hand, it surprisingly met the nature of the pre-emptive

counterterrorism strategies by the effect of deterrence. Comparing the three mentioned targeted assassinations carried out during the first two periods after Oslo, we would conclude that only one of them was apparently reactive and pre-emptive. However, the assassination of Mishal showed that sometimes it is not needed to kill the wanted person to make a terrorist attack less feasible. The last example of the Israeli counterterrorism actions was the cooperation with Arafat, which did not help imprison or eliminate the wanted terrorist. However, it made terrorist attacks less feasible at least for two years. If we compare this action with the cooperation with the young Palestinians mentioned in chapter three, we would conclude that sometimes disruption and interference of terrorist organisations can be more efficient than targeted killing.

Chapter five discussed two significantly different Israeli counterterrorism actions. The first part described how Israel tried to deal with rioting crowds. It is important to emphasize that Israeli counterterrorism was not efficient at all and therefore, it did not fulfil the goals of any strategy. Such behaviour of the IDF and other forces caused bloodshed only. The Defensive Shield Operation was more efficient. IDF started to be focused on the epicentres of Palestinian terrorism. Such an example was the offensive in Jenin, where the IDF and Israeli agents started to detect and interrogate terrorists, which allowed them to obtain intelligence vital for detection or elimination of other wanted terrorists. Therefore, such actions met the goals of both strategies by detection, imprisonment or elimination of the terrorists who were not able to perpetrate any further attacks. Comparing the tactics of house demolition during the Second Intifada, we have to admit that the demolitions during the Defensive Shield operation were more efficient and fulfilled the goals of the pre-emptive strategies because terrorists died or surrendered. In addition, the booby-trapped houses were bulldozed, or the IDF soldiers entered them with Palestinians as human shields. However, it is crucial to mention that the tactics of using the human shields were against the Israeli and International law. Although, on the other hand, it saved the lives of the IDF soldiers and therefore it met the goals of the pre-emptive strategies.

The last tactic used during and after the Defensive Shield was the tactic of imprisonment of the Palestinians working for terrorist organizations. This tactic fulfilled the nature of the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies simultaneously. In addition, this particular tactic could be compared to the imprisonment of the Palestinians during

the Netanyahu period. Both tactics tried to imprison the wanted Palestinian militants, however, only the tactics used during and shortly after the Defensive Shield proved to be efficient, reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously. Therefore, Israel should be more focused on the imprisonment of the wanted terrorists in Israeli jails than on the cooperation with Palestinians.

The last chapter describing different periods of Israeli counterterrorism concluded that the tactics of interrogations carried out by Shin Bet proved to be efficient once again. As in the case of the Defensive Shield operation, this tactic allowed Israel to obtain crucial information which helped detect and eliminate the wanted terrorists. In addition, these tactics helped destroy the sites of the Qassam rockets by which the tools of terrorism mostly disappeared. Hence, this tactic could be labelled as reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously. During the war in Gaza, the targeted killing of Rayan took place by which the reactive and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategies were fulfilled as well. The last but not least, one of the most efficient actions were those with artillery, helicopters, and engineers. This tactic helped significantly decrease the number of the IDF casualties and therefore, it can be characterized as pre-emptive. Moreover, this tactics was very similar to the tactics of demolitions during the Defensive Shield. Both tactics helped protect the IDF soldiers significantly.

Based on the examples of the Israeli counterterrorism actions during different periods after the Oslo Agreements, we would conclude that some of the Israeli counterterrorism actions were reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously. However, it is important to emphasize that the majority of the counterterrorism actions which were reactive and pre-emptive took place during the operations when the IDF had control over the Palestinian territories or at least had sealed them. Therefore, the Israeli counterterrorism actions could be considered reactive and pre-emptive simultaneously, however, the presence and activity of the IDF was a significant factor which can essentially influence whether the goals of both counterterrorism strategies are met.

Resumé

Bakalárska práca sa skladaná z dvoch častí, ktoré možno rozdeliť na teoretickú a praktickú časť. Cieľom teoretickej časti práce je charakterizovať kľúčové pojmy a stratégie, ktoré majú za úlohu vysvetliť problematiku terorizmu, boja proti terorizmu a stratégie ním používané. Hlavnou úlohou praktickej časti je opis vybraných izraelských protiteroristických akcií a následná analýza stratégií, ktoré boli použité počas zmienených akcií. Prvá kapitola stručne vysvetľuje pozadie izraelsko-palestínskeho konfliktu, v ktorom terorizmus hrá jednu z kľúčových úloh. Ďalej je vysvetlený význam Mierových dohôd z Osla, ktorého, ako sa neskôr ukázalo, význam bol prehnaný. Záver prvej kapitoly je tvorí predstavenie hypotézy o dvoch protiteroristických stratégiách používaných Izraelom súčasne v boji proti palestínskemu terorizmu. Táto časť je doplnená o dva vedľajšie ciele, ktorými sú: charakteristika politického prostredia, v ktorom boli izraelské protiteroristické akcie vykonávané a plánované a palestínsky terorizmus, proti ktorému bojovali.

Druhá kapitola je rozdelená do dvoch častí, ktoré sú obsahovo zamerané na terorizmus a protiteroristickú činnosť. Prvá časť druhej kapitoly charakterizuje latinský pôvod slova terorizmus a zároveň dopľňuje, že problém charakteristiky a definovania terorizmu vo svete je spôsobený jeho flexibilitou, rozmanitosťou a formami realizácie a uskutočňovania. Preto existuje medzi odborníkmi viacero názorov na to, čo vlastne terorizmus je a čo nie je. Okrem toho, táto časť bakalárskej práce popisuje izraelskú právnu charakteristiku terorizmu a teroristických organizácií. Taktiež sa zameriava na vysvetlenie hlavných cieľov terorizmu, ktoré sú často chápané ako zabíjanie nevinných ľudí. Avšak, hlavným cieľom terorizmu je väčšinou ovplyvňovanie predstaviteľov štátu, ktoré je bohužiaľ najefektívnejšie cez teroristické útoky na obyčajných ľudí.

Druhá časť druhej kapitoly je zameraná na charakteristiku protiteroristickej činnosti. V tejto časti je vysvetlené, že inštitúcie a osoby zapojené do tejto činnosti, by mali využívať iba legálne spôsoby boja proti terorizmu. Účinná protiteroristická činnosť musí byť súhrou viacerých inštitúcií ako napr. Tajné služby, ministerstvo obrany a vnútra, jednotky, ktoré sú kedykoľvek schopné zatknúť alebo eliminovať

vykonávateľov a sponzorov terorizmu, ale taktiež aj pripravenosť obyvateľstva na krízové situácie. A teda, hlavným cieľom väčšiny protiteroristických činností je použitie všetkých dostupných legálnych prostriedkov, ktorých cieľom je rozvrátenie teroristických skupín alebo likvidácia tých, ktorí sú do terorizmu zapojení alebo ho sponzorujú.

Dalšou dôležitou časťou tejto kapitoly je vysvetlenie reaktívnych a preventívnych protiteroristických stratégií. Hlavným cieľom reaktívnych stratégií je aktivita po tom, čo sa teroristický útok stal. Výsledkom tejto aktivity by malo byť chytenie alebo eliminácia teroristov stojacich za útokmi. Na druhej strane, cieľom preventívnych protiteroristických stratégií je vykonávanie činností, ktoré robia teroristický útok čo najmenej realizovateľný pre jeho plánovačov a vykonávateľov. V súvislosti s Izraelom sú vysvetlené právne akceptované akcie, ktoré sú Izraelom používané v boji proti terorizmu. Týmito akciami sú eliminácia vybraných osôb a použitie zbraní voči osobám, ktoré sa chystajú vykonať teroristický útok. Posledným bodom druhej kapitoly je načrtnutie problematiky, ktorej autormi sú experti na terorizmus a protiteroristickú činnosť. Zmienení experti označujú izraelské protiteroristické akcie buď za preventívne alebo reaktívne, avšak, nikdy nepíšu o možnosti použitia týchto dvoch stratégií súčasne. Preto sa hlavnou hypotézou tejto bakalárskej práce stala otázka, či nie sú niektoré izraelské protiteroristické akcie reaktívne a preventívne súčasne.

Úvod tretej kapitoly pojednáva o širšom politickom kontexte po podpísaní dohôd v Osle. Podpísanie zmienených dohôd malo katastrofálne následky pre izraelský boj proti palestínskemu terorizmu. Izrael totižto stratil kontrolu nad palestínskymi teritóriami a nemal možnosť získať dôležité informácie. To viedlo k nárastu počtu teroristických útokov, pri ktorých zomierali desiatky civilistov. Ďalej je vysvetlené, že jediným cieľom podpísania dohôd z Osla Arafatom, bolo získanie času pre prípravu intenzívnejšieho boja proti Izraelu. Časť tejto kapitoly o izraelskom protiteroristickom boji poskytuje príklad kooperácie s mladými Palestínčanmi za účelom získania informácií. Takáto kooperácia vyústila atentátom na Yahyu Ayyasha. Jeho zabitie však splnilo iba ciele reaktívnych protiteroristických stratégií. Tie preventívne splnené neboli v dôsledku nárastu samovražedných útokov.

Ďalším príkladom boja proti terorizmu je zabitie Fathiho Shiqaqiho, ktorý bol podporovateľom útokov proti Izraelu. Bol zabitý na Malte a akcie jeho teroristickej organizácie boli aspoň na pár mesiacov paralyzované. Poslednou opisovanou akciou je uzatvorenie palestínskej hranice, ktoré spĺňa ciele reaktívnych a preventívnych stratégií.

Štvrtá kapitola vysvetľuje politickú situáciu po nástupe Benjamina Netanyahua a aj terorizmus, ktorý v tomto období zasahoval Izrael. Časť o protiteroristickom boji opisuje znovupoužitie uzatvorenia palestínskych teritórií, ktoré sa ukázalo ako efektívne pri získavaní informácií. Taktiež je opisovaný pokus o elimináciu Khaleda Mishala, lídra Hamasu. Mishal nebol zabitý a izraelskí agenti boli odhalení pri pokuse o jeho elimináciu v Jordánsku. Akcia mala vážne medzinárodné aj bezpečnostné dôsledky pre Izrael. Avšak slúžila ako zastrašenie teroristov, čím bola naplnená podstata preventívnych stratégií. Zdanlivá kooperácia s Arafatom je taktiež vysvetľovaná. Arafat síce zatýkal niektorých palestínskych teroristov, tí však boli po pár týždňoch prepustení, čím sa situácia neriešila. Na druhej strane, takéto zatýkanie robilo prípravu teroristických útokov dlhšou a poskytovalo viac času Izraelcom.

Piata kapitola opisuje jednu z najkrvavejších častí izraelského boja proti terorizmu, druhú Intifádu. Prvé mesiace Intifády boli poznačené neefektívnym správaním izraelskej armády, ktoré viedlo k nárastu násilia. Naopak, operácia Defensive Shield priniesla posun. Izrael začal ničiť domy, v ktorých sa nachádzali teroristi, čo viedlo k ochrane vojakov. Bolo vykonaných viacero zatknutí a vypočúvaní, ktoré poskytli cenné informácie o teroristoch. Okrem toho bolo zatknutých viac ako 3000 palestínskych teroristov, čo rapídne znížilo schopnosť palestínskych teroristických organizácií útočiť proti Izraelu. Preto veľká väčšina operácií vykonaných počas Defensive Shield splnila ciele reaktívnych a preventívnych stratégií.

Šiesta kapitola opisuje vojnu proti Hamasu, ktorá sa odohrala v pásme Gazy. Izrael, tak ako aj v predošlých prípadoch, použil taktiku vypočúvania, ktorá bola opäť efektívna. Táto taktika tiež pomohla izraelským tankom, helikoptéram a ženistom pri odhaľovaní bomb a nástražných výbušných zariadení. Izrael tiež zabil Nizara Rayama, ktorý riadil teroristické útoky proti Izraelu. Preto možno považovať väčšinu protiteroristických akcií v Gaze za splnenie oboch protiteroristických stratégií. Na základe preštudovaných

literárnych zdrojov a komparácie vybraných stratégií, sme však prišli k záveru, že splnenie oboch spomenutých protiteroristických stratégií, je ovplyvnené prítomnosťou izraelskej armády v danej oblasti.

Bakalárska práca prichádza k záveru, že je možné nájsť izraelské protiteroristické akcie, ktoré spĺňajú ciele reaktívnych a preventívnych protiteroristických stratégií súčasne.

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